Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara
With commentary by Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche
FOREWORD
The view of Madhyamika in Buddhism
In Buddhism, the view is essential for both theory and practice. All the various Buddhist schools
and paths have been established based on the right view, and the result of the Buddhist path –
enlightenment – is none other than the complete understanding or realisation of the view. The
view is indispensable for all kinds of Buddhist practice, from the simple and seemingly mundane
acts of a Theravadin monk shaving his head and not eating after midday, to the Mahayana
practitioner abandoning meat, offering butterlamps and circumambulating, to more complicated
and exotic paths such as building monasteries or practicing kundalini yoga. The view not only
gives us the reason to practice; it is also the result we seek to attain through practice.
Furthermore, the view is also a safety railing that prevents us from going astray on the path.
Without the view, the whole aim and purpose of Buddhism is lost. If we wish to reach a
destination, it is fruitless to proceed aimlessly on the journey if we have not established our
direction and destination. Likewise, meditation and action will not bear fruit unless we have
established the view.
For example, when teaching the Four Noble Truths, Buddha taught that the fundamental truth –
the view – is that we are not suffering; we merely have suffering. Therefore, by knowing the
nature and cause of suffering, we can follow the path to liberate ourselves from suffering.
Nevertheless, although many of us are eager to follow the path to liberate ourselves from
suffering, and we may even understand what our suffering is caused by, few of us pay attention
to the view: the fact that we are not suffering, we just have suffering. Because we do not
understand the view, we still cling to primordial suffering. Therefore, no matter how much we
practice and seek to apply methods to end our suffering, our path is not a middle path – a
Madhyamika path, a path beyond conceptual clinging. Instead, it ends up becoming an extreme
path – a path of concepts, which will not liberate us from suffering.
Another example is the concept of renunciation mind, and the familiar images of monks with
begging bowls, shaved heads on so on. When the Buddhist path teaches us to develop
renunciation mind, we might think that we are being asked to renounce samsara with the attitude
that it is imperfect, full of pain and endless futility – i.e. to recognise that samsara is suffering.
Most of us find such renunciation difficult, as we feel we’re missing out on the good things – we
long for the pleasant and beautiful aspects of samsara, which we still believe truly exist out there.
But it is something quite different to renounce samsara based on the view – the view of
emptiness – which holds that both the desirable and futile aspects of samsara are just fabrications
of mind. With the view of emptiness, we can see that renouncing samsaric life is not something
painful. It’s not really a penance or sacrifice, because we realise that there is, in reality, nothing
to sacrifice.
This text, the Madhyamakavatara, is an indispensable text that is widely studied both in Buddhist
philosophical schools and Buddhist meditative schools, and Chandrakirti’s method of
establishing the view in this work has been one of the most venerated throughout the ages. Now
that Buddhism is taking root in the West, I feel it is important for at least some of us to pay
attention to the study of the view and how it is to be established. Unfortunately, our human
tendency is to be much more attracted to the methods of doing something, rather than why we are
doing it. The study of the view appears to be very dry, boring and long-winded, whereas anyone
can just buy a cushion, sit on it, and after a few minutes feel satisfied that they have sat and
meditated. In this age of materialism, people suffer from alienation and lack of purpose, and
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Foreword
many people are seeking for something more. When there is so much seeking, there is a danger
that a path specially designed to relieve temporal pain might come to overshadow the real path
that uproots suffering, the true path to enlightenment. Interest in dharma is scarce to begin with,
and even then, such interest is very fickle. And if we were to encounter a path that did not have
the view, we would become even more disillusioned. This would be very sad, because there is
genuine seeking. Without the view, the whole purpose of Buddhism is lost. It is then no longer
Buddhism – a path to enlightenment – but merely a method for temporal healing. So, even for
the sake of insurance, at least some of us should pay some attention to establishing the view.
I would like to stress that this work is not meant to be final and complete, but I believe it can be a
start, a basis for us to work on and improve. The subject itself is very complex, and when I
taught this text in France from 1996-2000, it was decades after I studied it myself. Moreover,
even as I was teaching this, I never felt satisfied at my ability to express what I wanted to
express, primarily due to my lack of language skills in English. Also, because the audience was
mixed, you will find some very general teachings as well, and because it was taught over several
years, you will find lots of repetition.
I must acknowledge the success of the teaching itself to the persistence of Tulku Pema Wangyal,
and a lot of assistance from his disciples, to name a few: John Canti, Wulstan Fletcher, Helena
Blankleder, and Patrick Carré, and my own inscrutable friend Jakob Leschly. This particular
transcript and editing was done diligently and meticulously by Alex Trisoglio, who I hope will
continue working to improve it. I don’t believe there is any merit in this kind of work, but if
there is any, let us dedicate it to the further understanding of the Madhyamika, through which we
can topple the kingdom of extremism
Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Editor’s Introduction
Editor’s Introduction
This document contains a transcript of Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche’s teachings on
Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara, ‘Introduction to the Middle Way’, which were given during
the summers of 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000 at the Centre d’Etudes de Chanteloube in Dordogne.
The teachings have been lightly edited to improve readability, while keeping to the original style
and vocabulary of the teachings as far as possible. In addition to Rinpoche’s teachings, this
document also contains the slokas (verses) of the root text, the Madhyamakavatara, which are
indented and appear in italics.
Structural outline and logic trees
In his teachings, Rinpoche followed various commentaries, principally the one by Gorampa, a
15th century Sakya master, and also that of Shenga Rinpoche, a 19th century Dzogchen master.
The root text, Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara, does not have any kind of table of contents,
outline or headings, but each commentator creates a sabche (structural outline) that presents the
contents and arguments in a structured framework. The sabche is in fact the commentary itself
in its most essential form. It is common practice for Tibetan scholars to memorise the entire
sabche when studying a text, and the master will often stop to ensure the students understand
where they are in the outline, a tradition that Rinpoche has continued in these teachings. In this
case, the teachings and headings are organised according to Gorampa’s structural outline (which
appears in full after this introduction). However, although this outline is logically structured, it
is quite difficult to present graphically due to its complexity (for example, at one point in this
outline the headings run 28 levels deep!)
So, rather than numbering each heading completely in all its levels (e.g. 2.i.a.ii.b.i.a… etc.) and
indenting each level, an alternative approach is used here. Each heading is marked in the margin
by the letter ‘H’ followed by a number to indicate the level of the heading (where H1 is the topmost
level, H2 is the second level, and so on until H28 – the 28th and lowest level). Successive
headings at the same level are numbered (a, b, c…) or (i, ii, iii…), although this numbering has
been added to facilitate comprehension; it does not appear in the Tibetan original of the structural
outline. In addition to the headings from the structural outline, the text contains another set of
headings that have been added during editing to aid comprehension. These headings do not have
the letter ‘H’ or any numbering, and they are not part of the structural outline.
For an overview of the outline and structure of the arguments in the Madhyamakavatara, readers
may find it helpful to consult the logic trees at the end of this text, which present the structural
outline (in an abbreviated form) in a set of tree-structured diagrams.
Margin notes
In order to improve readability, to help locate information and to increase the overall usefulness
of this document, margin notes have been provided. These notes, which aim to highlight
important points from Rinpoche’s teachings, were added during editing, and Rinpoche has not
checked them. They are not part of the structural outline or Chandrakirti’s text.
Tibetan words and phrases
The first appearance of a Tibetan word or phrase in the teachings will include its pronunciation,
transliteration (according to the Wylie system), and English translation. In subsequent
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Editor’s Introduction
appearances, the word will typically only be referred to by its pronunciation, e.g. tsendzin. Some
of the more common Tibetan vocabulary is included in an appendix. For example:
tsendzin 02,-73Ý,- (mtshan ’dzin) = fixation on characteristics
Following the convention of T.R.V. Murti and Padmakara, the word ‘Madhyamika’ is used to
refer both to the Madhyamika philosophy and to a student/practitioner following this philosophy.
A list of some of the more important and more commonly used Tibetan words and phrases from
the Madhyamakavatara is included as an appendix.
Index and Frequently-Asked Questions
An index and a list of frequently-asked questions may be found at the end of the document, as
well as a bibliography and references.
Hyperlinks
For ease of navigation, the electronic version of this document contains hyperlinks for each
heading from its location in the structural outline to where it appears in the text. .
Acknowledgements
The rough translation of the root text of the Madhyamakavatara was prepared by Jakob Leschly,
and the commentary and teachings by Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche were transcribed and edited
by Alex Trisoglio. The editor would like to thank all those who provided comments, suggestions
and inputs to this document as it has developed, particularly Jakob Leschly and Steven Goodman
for their help with the Tibetan. Every effort has been made to faithfully reproduce the words and
meaning of Rinpoche’s teachings, and any remaining errors are the editor’s responsibility.
We would like to thank everyone at the Centre d’Etudes de Chanteloube for hosting these
teachings, especially Pema Wangyal Rinpoche and Jigme Khyentse Rinpoche. John Canti and
Wulstan Fletcher of the Padmakara Translation Group ran revision sessions each year to help
prepare students for the teachings, Patrick Carré provided French translation, and Khenpo
Jamyang Ösel from Dzongsar Institute taught and answered questions in 1999.
Most especially, we would like to thank Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche, whose extraordinary
blessings, inspiration and patient explanation made this work possible. May his aspirations be
fulfilled! We dedicate our efforts so that all may realise the wisdom that is the ultimate
Madhyamika, and to the long life and work of the masters who uphold these teachings.
Contact
If you have any feedback or comments on how this document could be improved, or questions
about the teachings, please write to: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Ackowledgments
The publication of this Madhyamakavatara text has been sponsored by the Khyentse Foundation, a nonprofit
charitable organization established in the United States in November 2001 under the direction of
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche. The ultimate mission of the Khyentse Foundation is to support the
international community of dharma students and practitioners.
Publication of precious texts, such as this original Madhyamakavatara commentary by Dzongsar Khyentse
Rinpoche, is of primary interest to the Khyentse Foundation. In addition to providing study materials to
assist dharma students around the world, the Foundation hopes to sponsor the following publication projects
as soon as funding becomes available:
• Printing of the Longchen Nyingtik Ngöndro practice manuscript, another work based on
transcriptions of Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche’s teachings.
• Restoration of the Khyentse Library in Dzongsar Institute in Tibet, which was destroyed during
the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960s.
• Translation of teachings by four great Longchen Nyingtik lineage masters: Longchenpa, Jigme
Lingpa, Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo and Jamyang Khyentse Chökyi Lodrö.
• Publication of an introduction to Buddhism to be distributed free to hotels, schools, libraries, etc.
Besides these publication projects, the Foundation will also establish an Endowment Fund for Monastic
Education and a Scholarship Fund to assist those who wish to pursue further studies or spend time in retreat,
but lack the necessary means. Another Foundation priority is to set up and Education Fund which will
endow a Chair or Professorship in Buddhist studies in a major university, and establish a Buddhist school
for western children.
The Khyentse Foundation depends entirely on the generosity of private donors to fund its wide range of
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Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - i
STRUCTURAL OUTLINE
ACCORDING TO GORAMPA’S COMMENTARY
(Go Rabjampa Sönam Senge, 1429-1489, a great scholar of the Sakya tradition)
dbu ma la ’jug pa’i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa dang gzhung so so’i dka ba’i gnas la dpyad pa
lta ba ngan sel
- Numbers in (brackets and italics): Page number in Gorampa’s commentary (Tibetan text)
- Numbers in boldface: Chapter, verse, and line number in root text.
- Numbers at right hand margin: Page number in this transcript of Rinpoche’s teachings
[H1] THE TITLE..........................................................................................................................................5
[H1] THE TRANSLATOR’S HOMAGE.....................................................................................................9
[H1] THE MAIN BODY OF THE TEXT..................................................................................................11
[H1] THE CONCLUSION (749).............................................................................................................409
[H1] THE TITLE..........................................................................................................................................5
[H2] 1. Which Madhyamika is introduced ...................................................................................................5
[H2] 2. How it is introduced .........................................................................................................................6
[H1] THE TRANSLATOR’S HOMAGE ....................................................................................................9
[H1] THE MAIN BODY OF THE TEXT..................................................................................................11
[H2] A. Explaining the introductory branches, the expression of offering .............................................11
[H2] B. Explaining the actual meaning of the main body of the text, that which is introduced (534)...24
[H2] C. Explaining the closing sections of the text (744).....................................................................407
[H2] A. Explaining the introductory branches, the expression of offering .............................................11
[H3] 1. Explaining the reasons for praising compassion (515) ..............................................................11
[H3] 2. The actual praise based on these reasons (530) .........................................................................19
[H3] 1. Explaining the reasons for praising compassion........................................................................11
[H4] a) Of the four kinds of [enlightened] individual, praising bodhisattvas above all (515) .......11
[H5] (1) How shravakas and pratyekabuddhas are born from buddhas (515), 1:1.1 ..............11
[H6] (a) How they are so born...........................................................................................11
[H6] (b) Examining doubts about that being so (516).......................................................12
[H6] (c) Definitions and etymology of the terms shravaka and pratyekabuddha ..............12
[H5] (2) How buddhas are born from bodhisattvas (519), 1:1.2.............................................13
[H5] (3) Therefore bodhisattvas are worthy of praise (520) ...................................................13
[H4] b) Explaining the three causes from which bodhisattvas are born (521), 1:1.3-4..................14
[H5] (1) Identifying these three causes ...................................................................................14
[H5] (2) The sequence of these three causes (522) .................................................................14
[H5] (3) Identifying the bodhisattva born from these three causes (523) ...............................15
[H4] c) Showing how compassion is the most important of these three (529), 1:2 .......................16
[H3] 2. The actual praise based on these reasons (530), 1:3.1 - 4.2.......................................................19
[H4] a) Other ways of explaining the three types of compassion ..................................................19
[H4] b) This extraordinary way of explaining the three types of compassion (531)......................19
[H5] (1) Explaining them in terms of their different objects ..................................................19
[H6] (a) The meaning of the simile of the irrigation wheel...............................................20
[H6] (b) The first meaning of the simile of the moon’s reflection in water (532).............21
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - ii
[H6] (c) The second meaning of the simile of the moon’s reflection in water (533) ........22
[H5] (2) Explaining that their form is common (533).............................................................23
[H5] (3) Summarizing the meaning of this important point (533) ..........................................23
[H2] B. Explaining the actual meaning of the main body of the text, that which is introduced .............24
[H3] I. Explaining the bodhisattva levels (bhumi) which are the cause (534) ..............................24
[H3] II. Explaining the level of buddhahood which is the result (721)
[H3] I. Explaining the bodhisattva levels (bhumi) which are the cause ................................................24
[H4] A. Showing their nature in general in terms of the union of means (compassion) and
wisdom..............................................................................................................................24
[H4] B. Explaining the nature of each in terms of the paramita emphasized (535)........................25
[H4] C. Explaining the qualities of each in terms of the special enumerated features (720)........365
[H4] A. Their nature in general in terms of the union of means (compassion) and wisdom...................24
[H4] B. Explaining the nature of each in terms of the paramita emphasized..........................................25
[H5] 1. The first bhumi, Complete Joy..........................................................................................26
[H5] 2. The second bhumi, Without Stain (564)............................................................................50
[H5] 3. The third bhumi, Giving Out Light (568)..........................................................................56
[H5] 4. The fourth bhumi, Dazzling With Light (572) ..................................................................62
[H5] 5. The fifth bhumi, Difficult to Overcome / Practise (573) ...................................................63
[H5] 6. The sixth bhumi, Advancing / Knowing Clearly (574) .....................................................64
[H5] 7. The seventh bhumi, Gone Far (711)................................................................................341
[H5] 8. The eighth bhumi, Immovable (712)...............................................................................349
[H5] 9. The ninth bhumi, Perfect Intelligence (719)....................................................................358
[H5] 10. The tenth bhumi, Cloud of Dharma (719) .......................................................................360
[H5] 1. The first bhumi, Complete Joy (535) ........................................................................26
[H6] a) Immaculate wisdom as the first, Complete Joy .........................................................................26
[H6] b) Detailed explanation of the qualities of this Complete Joy........................................................27
[H6] c) Concise summary of its qualities by means of similes (564).....................................................49
[H6] a) Immaculate wisdom as the first, Complete Joy, 1:4.3-5.2.........................................................26
[H6] b) Detailed explanation of the qualities of Complete Joy ..............................................................27
[H7] (1) Expressing praise of those on this bhumi.............................................................................27
[H7] (2) Expressing the qualities of the paramita emphasized (558) .................................................44
[H7] (1) Expressing praise of those on this bhumi ..................................................................................27
[H8] (a) The quality that is transferred, the name, 1:5.3-4..............................................................27
[H9] (i) Defining the term Bodhisattva by action (practice)......................................................28
[H9] (ii) Defining the term Bodhisattva by view (realization)...................................................28
[H8] (b) The qualities that are obtained, the meaning (537) ...........................................................29
[H9] (i) The quality of being born into the family, 1:6.1...........................................................29
[H9] (ii) The quality of the ability to discard and to realize, 1:6.2-4.........................................29
[H9] (iii) The quality of pressing on further (spontaneous progress), 1:7.1 ..............................31
[H9] (iv) The quality of passing beyond lower levels, 1:7.2-3 ..................................................31
[H8] (c) The qualities taught by analogy, 1:7.4.......................................................................................32
[H8] (d) The quality of outshining others ................................................................................................33
[H9] (i) Outshining others by the strength of merit on this bhumi, 1:8.1-3 .......................................34
[H9] (ii) Outshining others by the strength of understanding on later bhumis, 1:8.4.........................34
[H9] (ii) Outshining others by the strength of understanding on later bhumis, 1:8.4 .................................34
[H10] (a) Outshining as implicitly stated in the sutra (539)..............................................................34
[H10] (b) The actual meaning stated in that quote (540)...................................................................35
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - iii
[H11] (i) The sutra’s statement that shravakas and pratyekabuddhas understand phenomena
to have no true nature ..................................................................................................35
[H11] (ii) What the other traditions state about this quote...........................................................36
[H12] What the two traditions state.....................................................................................36
[H12] What three quotes state .............................................................................................36
[H13] The first quote...........................................................................................................36
[H13] The second quote ......................................................................................................36
[H13] The third quote..........................................................................................................36
[H11] (iii) Introducing the Master Nagarjuna’s understanding of this point (542)......................36
[H10] (c) Disposing of disputes on that question (542) ....................................................................38
[H10] (d) Negating explanations based on conceptual analysis (545) ..............................................41
[H7] (2) Expressing the qualities of the paramita emphasized (558).......................................................44
[H8] (a) Showing that the paramita of generosity is the principal one, 1:9 ....................................45
[H8] (b) Praising other kinds of generosity (559) ...........................................................................46
[H9] (i) As what causes beings to escape from suffering, 1:10-11............................................46
[H9] (ii) As what also causes lasting happiness, 1:12 ...............................................................47
[H8] (c) Praising the bodhisattva’s generosity ................................................................................47
[H9] (i) The result obtained, manifest joy, 1:13.1-2..................................................................47
[H9] (ii) This generosity is therefore of foremost importance, 1:13.3-4 ...................................48
[H9] (iii) It is much greater than a particular analogous kind of joy, 1:14 ................................48
[H9] (iv) Disposing of disputes about how this joy is obtained, 1:15........................................48
[H8] (d) Categorization of this paramita (560), 1:16.......................................................................49
[H9] (i) Explaining the meaning of the word paramita (561) ....................................................49
[H9] (ii) That which can truly be given this name .....................................................................49
[H9] (iii) That which can be given this name by association.....................................................49
[H6] c) Concise summary of its qualities by means of similes (564), 1:17............................................49
[H5] 2. The second bhumi, Without Stain ...........................................................................50
[H6] a) Detailed explanation of the qualities of the paramita emphasized.............................................50
[H6] b) Summary of its qualities in words of certainty (568).................................................................55
[H6] a) Detailed explanation of the qualities of the paramita emphasized.............................................50
[H7] (1) The features of discipline, the paramita emphasized .................................................................50
[H8] (a) Attaining perfect discipline, 2:1.1-2..................................................................................50
[H9] (i) Its definition .................................................................................................................50
[H9] (ii) Its nature......................................................................................................................51
[H9] (iii) The measure of its perfection .....................................................................................51
[H8] (b) Accumulating the ten positive actions, 2:1.3-2.2.................................................................52
[H8] (c) Making the bodhisattva beautiful, 2:2.3-4............................................................................52
[H8] (d) Being free of dualistic attachment to subject, object and action, 2:3...................................52
[H7] (2) In praise of other types of discipline (566)...................................................................................52
[H8] (a) The penalties of contravening discipline, 2:4-5 ................................................................53
[H8] (b) Keeping discipline as an antidote to these, 2:6.1-2 ...........................................................53
[H8] (c) Discipline as the basis of all good qualities, 2:6.3-4.........................................................53
[H8] (d) Discipline as the cause of higher rebirth and certain excellence, 2:7................................54
[H7] (3) Analogy for perfectly pure discipline (568), 2:8 .......................................................................55
[H7] (4) The divisions of this paramita, 2:9 ............................................................................................55
[H6] b) Summary of its qualities in words of certainty (568), 2:10 .......................................................55
[H5] 3. The third bhumi, Giving Out Light (568)..................................................................56
[H6] a) The nature of this bhumi in words of certainty (569), 3:1.........................................................56
[H6] b) Detailed explanation of the qualities of the paramita emphasized.............................................56
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - iv
[H7] (1) The paramita emphasized, patience...................................................................................56
[H8] (a) Patience mainly through compassion (569), 3:2..........................................................56
[H8] (b) Patience mainly through the view (569), 3:3...............................................................57
[H7] (2) The penalties of lacking patience ......................................................................................57
[H8] (a) It produces an unpleasant karmic result, 3:4-5 ............................................................57
[H8] (b) It diminishes merit already accumulated (570), 3:6 ....................................................57
[H8] (c) Its penalties are visible and invisible, 3:7 ....................................................................58
[H7] (3) The excellence of the qualities of patience (570), 3:8.......................................................59
[H7] (4) The importance of therefore practising patience (570), 3:9 ..............................................59
[H7] (5) The divisions of this paramita (571), 3:10 ........................................................................59
[H6] c) How other qualities are also attained on this bhumi (571), 3:11 ...............................................60
[H6] d) Explanation of the three general practices, generosity and so forth (572), 3:12........................60
[H6] e) The qualities of this bhumi: concise concluding summary (572), 3:13.....................................61
[H5] 4. The fourth bhumi, Dazzling With Light (572) ........................................................62
[H6] a) The great qualities of diligence itself, 4:1.1-2 ...........................................................................62
[H6] b) The nature of this bhumi, which emphasizes diligence, 4:1.3-4................................................62
[H6] c) Words of certainty concerning this bhumi in terms of meditation experience, 4:2.1-3.............62
[H6] d) Leaving behind what is specifically abandoned on this bhumi, 4:2.4 .......................................62
[H5] 5. The fifth bhumi, Difficult to Overcome / Practise (573)..................................63
[H6] a) Words of certainty concerning this bhumi, 5:1.1-2 ...................................................................63
[H6] b) The paramita emphasized, 5:1.3-3½..........................................................................................63
[H6] c) Other qualities, 5:1.3½-4...........................................................................................................63
[H5] 6. The sixth bhumi, Advancing / Knowing Clearly (574) ......................................64
[H6] a) Attaining cessation by emphasizing the paramita of wisdom....................................................64
[H6] b) To those who are blind, the greatness of the paramita of wisdom itself (575) ..........................65
[H6] c) Establishing the way in which this paramita of wisdom is introduced (575).............................66
[H6] d) Summary of the qualities attained in this way
[H6] a) Attaining cessation by emphasizing the paramita of wisdom, 6:1.............................................64
[H6] b) To those who are blind, the greatness of the paramita of wisdom itself (575), 6:2 ...................65
[H6] c) Establishing the way in which this paramita of wisdom is introduced (575).............................66
[H7] (1) The basis according to which this teaching is here explained, 6:3....................................66
[H7] (2) To whom this teaching is to be explained (578) ..................................................................66
[H8] (a) The recipient who is to be taught, 6:4..........................................................................66
[H9] (i) Those who believe in philosophies that speak of an outer or inner reality...........67
[H9] (ii) Beginners ............................................................................................................68
[H9] (iii) Those who have already awakened into the family of the Mahayana................68
[H8] (b) The benefits derived from being so taught, 6:5.1-7.1..................................................68
[H8] (c) The importance of therefore listening to what is taught, 6:7.2-4 .................................68
[H7] (3) Establishing emptiness, the subject to be explained (580) ................................................72
[H8] (a) Explaining emptiness as it is to be realized by all vehicles..........................................72
[H8] (b) Explaining emptiness as it is to be realized by the Mahayana...................................296
[H8] (a) Explaining emptiness as it is to be realized by all vehicles .......................................................72
[H9] (i) Explaining interdependent arising by means of the absence of any self in phenomena ............73
[H9] (ii) Explaining interdependent arising by means of the absence of any self in one’s person (677)246
[H9] (i) Explaining interdependent arising by means of the absence of any self in phenomena ............73
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - v
[H10] (a) As ascertained from the scriptures (sutras) on suchness ...................................................73
[H10] (b) As established in the shastras (582) ..................................................................................74
[H10] (c) As determined in this text by means of logical reasoning (598) .......................................88
[H10] (a) As ascertained from the scriptures (sutras) on suchness (581) .................................................73
The 10 kinds of equality (strictly speaking part of the text rather than part of the
structure, but included here for reference)
1. The equality of having no characteristics
2. The equality of having no defining characteristic
3. The equality of the primordial absence of birth (from any of the four extremes)
4. The equality of being unborn
5. The equality of absence
6. The equality of total purity
7. The equality of having no elaborations
8. The equality of having no acceptance or rejection
9. The equality of being (illusory) like a dream, an optical illusion, the reflection of
the moon in water or a mirage
10. The equality of being neither real nor unreal
[H10] (b) As established in the shastras (582) ..........................................................................................74
[H11] (i) Identifying the differences between the Prasangika and the Svatantrika (582) .........................76
[H12] (a) [In general] (582) ...............................................................................................................76
[H12] (b) Differences in the reasoning by which they determine absolute truth (589).......................76
[H13] (i) Subject ......................................................................................................................77
[H13] (ii) Predicate ...................................................................................................................77
[H13] (iii) Thesis / Proposition ..................................................................................................78
[H13] (iv) Reason ......................................................................................................................78
[H13] (v) Example ....................................................................................................................79
[H13] (vi) Syllogism..................................................................................................................79
[H12] (c) Differences in the way they set out the conventions of relative truth (592) ........................81
[H13] (i) Ground ......................................................................................................................81
[H13] (ii) Path ...........................................................................................................................81
[H13] (iii) Fruit ..........................................................................................................................82
[H11] (ii) Refuting the Svatantrika way (593) ...........................................................................................82
[H11] (iii) Detailed explanation of how the Prasangika determine the truth (594).....................................82
[H12] (a) Setting out the Prasangika view...................................................................................................82
[H13] (i) Establishing the view on one’s own part ..................................................................................82
[H14] (a) What is to be established (594)................................................................................................82
[H15] (i) That relative truth is like an illusion..................................................................................82
[H15] (ii) That absolute truth is free from any elaborations ..............................................................82
[H15] (iii) That in terms of both there is no truth in appearances.......................................................82
[H14] (b) How it is established (595) ......................................................................................................83
[H15] (i) By quoting the sutras dealing with certain truth................................................................83
[H15] (ii) By using consequentialist arguments ................................................................................83
[H13] (ii) Refuting wrong views on the part of others ............................................................................83
[H14] (a) Identifying what is to be refuted ..............................................................................................83
[H15] (i) By means of the path............................................................................................................83
[H16] (a) All delusory appearances ............................................................................................83
[H15] (ii) But here, by means of the Buddha’s word and logic ..........................................................83
[H16] (b) The object ...................................................................................................................83
[H17] (i) Labelling created by the ignorance of imputation ...................................................84
[H18] (a) Exaggeration, the extreme of existence ..............................................................84
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - vi
[H19] (i) Self of person.................................................................................................84
[H19] (ii) Self of phenomena.........................................................................................84
[H18] (b) Underestimation, the extreme of non-existence .................................................84
[H17] (ii) Labelling created by innate ignorance....................................................................84
[H16] (c) The subject..................................................................................................................84
[H14] (b) Explaining the reasoning by which it is refuted ..........................................................................85
[H15] (i) Pointing out contradictions (consequentialist argument) .................................................85
[H15] (ii) Using the opponent’s inferential logic ..............................................................................85
[H15] (iii) Reductio ad absurdum.......................................................................................................85
[H15] (iv) Pointing out circular arguments that prove nothing.........................................................85
[H13] (iii) Being rid of any faults for one’s own part (596) ....................................................................85
[H14] (a) Being rid of faults from a relative point of view.................................................................85
[H14] (b) Being rid of faults from an absolute point of view..............................................................85
[H15] (i) By making no propositions .......................................................................................85
[H15] (ii) By not having any arguments (of one’s own) ..........................................................85
[H12] (b) Refuting objections to the Prasangika view (598) .......................................................................85
[H10] (c) As determined in this text by means of logical reasoning (598)................................................88
[H11] (i) The use of reasoning to refute the four extreme theories of genesis .................................89
[H11] (ii) Disposing of objections from those who believe in (genesis from) self and/or other .....216
[H11] (i) The use of reasoning to refute the four extreme theories of genesis (598) ...............................89
[H12] (a) Explaining the truth of interdependent arising by refuting (the four extreme theories
of) genesis....................................................................................................................89
[H13] (i) The proposition (of Nagarjuna) in brief, 6:8.1-2 ......................................................89
[H13] (ii) Detailed explanation of the reasoning (599) .............................................................89
[H14] (a) Autogenesis (Self-Arising).............................................................................................89
[H15] (i) Reasoning from the commentary (Madhyamakavatara) ..........................................................90
[H16] (a) Autogenesis refuted by suchness.........................................................................................90
[H17] (i) Untenable consequences explicit in the opponent’s statement ....................................90
[H18] (a) Such genesis would be meaningless (Buddhapalita’s refutation), 6:8.3-4 .........91
[H18] (b) No genesis would ever actually occur (Chandrakirti’s refutation), 6:9.1-2 .......91
[H17] (ii) Conflicting consequences implicit in the opponent’s statement.................................92
[H18] (a) Such genesis would be endless, 6:9.3-4 .............................................................92
[H18] (b) The nature of cause and effect would be mixed up, 6:10.1-2.............................92
[H18] (c) Cause and effect would have to be both different and the same, 6:10.3-11 .......92
[H16] (b) Autogenesis refuted by ordinary conventional experience, 6:12.1-2..................................93
[H16] (c) Concluding summary of these two, 6:12.3-4 ......................................................................93
[H15] (ii) Reasoning from the shastra (Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamaka-karikas), 6:13..........................93
[H14] (b) Genesis from other (Other-Arising) (600)...............................................................103
[H15] (i) Statement of that view................................................................................................................103
[H15] (ii) Explanation of the refutation.....................................................................................................104
[H16] (a) Refutation of genesis from other from the point of view of the two truths............................104
[H17] (i) Refutation from an absolute standpoint .............................................................................104
[H18] (a) Exposing fallacious reasoning (601) .......................................................................................104
[H19] (i) Exposing some extremely fallacious implications................................................................104
[H20] (a) Things could arise from things of a different type, 6:14.1-2.............................................104
[H20] (b) Things would arise without any predictability ..................................................................104
[H21] (i) The refutation, 6:14.3-4..........................................................................................104
[H21] (ii) Disposing of objections to it ...................................................................................105
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - vii
[H22] (a) The objection, 6:15...........................................................................................105
[H22] (b) The reply, 6:16.................................................................................................105
[H19] (ii) Refutation of genesis from other in terms of time...............................................................107
[H20] (a) If they do not coexist, a difference between cause and effect cannot be proved ...............107
[H21] (i) Refutation, 6:17 ......................................................................................................107
[H21] (ii) Disposing of objections to it ...................................................................................108
[H22] (a) Objection raised in other texts, 6:18.1-3 ..........................................................109
[H22] (b) Explanation of how this objection is countered, 6:18.4-6:19...........................109
[H20] (b) If they do coexist, cause cannot be said to give rise to effect, 6:20 ..................................111
[H19] (iii) Refutation of genesis from other in terms of the fourfold classification, 6:21 .................112
[H18] (b) Disposing of objections based on ordinary experience.........................................................120
[H19] (i) As expressed in other texts, 6:22 ...............................................................................................120
[H19] (ii) Explanation of the reasoning used to counter the objection...................................................120
[H20] (a) The validity of ordinary experience refuted by differentiation into the two truths and their
subdivisions (603)....................................................................................................................121
[H21] (i) General introduction and definitions, 6:23 .......................................................................121
[H21] (ii) Explanation of each individually (605).............................................................................126
[H22] (a) Relative truth explained in terms of its subdivisions ................................................126
[H23] (i) Subdivided according to ordinary beings’ minds..............................................126
[H24] (a) Classifying deceptive seeing on the part of the subject into two, 6:24 ....126
[H24] (b) Accordingly establishing two kinds of wrongly perceived object, too
(606), 6:25 ................................................................................................127
[H24] (c) Showing that even in ordinary experience the second is not so (607),
6:26...........................................................................................................128
[H24] (d) Applying an analogy (610), 6:27.............................................................129
[H23] (ii) Subdivided according to ordinary vs. sublime beings (relative truth and
merely relative), 6:28 .....................................................................................133
[H22] (b) Absolute truth explained in terms of an analogy (612), 6:29 ...................................134
[H20] (b) Therefore, this (Madhyamika) viewpoint is not contradicted by ordinary experience
(613), 6:30-31.2.......................................................................................................................138
[H20] (c) Explanation of what is specifically contradicted by ordinary experience, 6:31.3-4 ..............139
[H17] (iii) Refutation from a relative standpoint, 6:32..............................................................................141
[H16] (b) The two benefits of these refutations (614)............................................................................142
[H17] (i) The benefit that they free one from eternalism and nihilism............................................142
[H18] (a) How one is free from eternalism and nihilism, 6:33 .........................................................143
[H19] (i) How one is free from them .....................................................................................143
[H19] (ii) Establishing this with quotes from the sutras (615) ...............................................143
[H19] (iii) Dispelling other wrong notions...............................................................................143
[H18] (b) Detailed explanation of what allows this (616).................................................................143
[H19] (i) Ultimately they have no true nature, 6:34...............................................................143
[H20] (a) Refuting genesis from other as absolute truth.......................................................143
[H20] (b) Applying quotes from the sutras...........................................................................144
[H20] (c) Thus dispelling the idea that emptiness is established as the truth........................144
[H19] (ii) Conventionally they have no true nature (619).......................................................144
[H20] (a) If thoroughly analysed, conventional truth is destroyed, 6:35 ..............................144
[H20] (b) Thorough analysis shows that it is the same even for conventional truth, 6:36....145
[H20] (c) Using analogies to illustrate genesis non-analytically, 6:37-38.2.........................145
[H18] (c) Concise conclusion, 6:38.3-4 ............................................................................................146
[H17] (ii) The benefit that they allow for the effects of actions (620) ..................................................149
[H18] (a) Although there is no Ground of All, the effects of actions are not lost .............................149
[H19] (i) The main subject, 6:39 ..............................................................................................149
[H20] (a) The main explanation of how connection between action and effect is allowed
for ...................................................................................................................150
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - viii
[H20] (b) Applying quotes from the sutras (623) .................................................................150
[H20] (c) Dispelling new false notions (624) .......................................................................150
[H21] (i) Expressing that new notion ............................................................................150
[H21] (ii) Dispelling it (626) .........................................................................................150
[H19] (ii) Explaining with an analogy (633), 6:40......................................................................150
[H18] (b) Rejecting two extreme consequences................................................................................152
[H19] (i) The consequence that maturation would be endless, 6:41 ..........................................152
[H19] (ii) The consequence that maturation would be uncertain, 6:42 .......................................152
[H18] (c) The Ground of All was taught as expedient truth (634), 6:43...........................................153
[H19] (i) The need for refutation.................................................................................................153
[H19] (ii) Explaining how this is done........................................................................................153
[H20] (a) The Ground of All is an expedient teaching.....................................................154
[H20] (b) Individual and skandhas are expedient teaching ..............................................154
[H20] (c) That the material world has a true nature is expedient teaching.......................154
[H20] (d) Of the expedient teachings, distinguishing what should and should not be
accepted as conventional truth........................................................................154
[H16] (c) Refutation of the Cittamatra viewpoint that upholds genesis from other (642).................155
[H17] (i) Expressing that viewpoint according to its texts...................................................................155
[H18] (a) Realizing (on 6th bhumi) that the nature of things is the mind alone, 6:45........................159
[H18] (b) From the mind alone, arise subject and object (643), 6:46 ...............................................159
[H18] (c) The definition of the mind alone, 6:47..............................................................................159
[H17] (ii) Explaining what refutes it ....................................................................................................162
[H18] (a) The logical reasoning that refutes the Cittamatra ..............................................................162
[H19] (i) Showing that it contravenes the two truths................................................................162
[H20] (a) Refuting that there can be mind alone without an object .................................162
[H21] (i) Detailed explanation....................................................................................162
[H22] (a) Its impossibility seen using the analogy of deluded mental consciousness (dream) ...........162
[H23] (i) Refuting the proposition, 6:48 ...........................................................................................162
[H23] (ii) Refuting what is used to support it.....................................................................................162
[H24] (a) Refuting that it exists because it is imputed by memory, 6:49......................................162
[H24] (b) Refuting that it exists because it is a dream (644).........................................................163
[H25] (i) What (the Cittamatra) would say, 6:50......................................................................163
[H25] (ii) Refuting that .............................................................................................................163
[H26] (a) There is no truth in the cognition of the dream object, 6:51-52.1.........................164
[H26] (b) There is no truth in the cognition of the waking object (647), 6:52.2-4 ...............164
[H26] (c) In terms of their existence (mind, object, etc.) are therefore similar (648), 6:53..165
[H22] (b) Its impossibility seen using the analogy of deluded sense consciousness ............................165
[H23] (i) In both (deluded and undeluded) cases the object-less consciousness and what is seen
are similar (in either existing or not), 6:54.........................................................................165
[H23] (ii) Untenable consequences of holding that object-less consciousness could arise ...............165
[H24] (a) Untenable consequences, 6:55 ......................................................................................165
[H24] (b) Refutation of the (Cittamatrin’s) counter-argument (649) ............................................171
[H25] (i) The counter-argument, 6:56.1-3................................................................................171
[H25] (ii) Refutation of it..........................................................................................................172
[H26] (a) Overall refutation, 6:56.4......................................................................................172
[H26] (b) Refuting in turn each of its aspects .......................................................................172
[H27] (i) Refuting present potential, 6:57.1.....................................................................172
[H27] (ii) Refuting future potential, 6:57.2-58.................................................................172
[H27] (iii) Refuting past potential ....................................................................................176
[H28] (a) The consequence that arising would occur without any coherence, 6:59.....176
[H28] (b) The counter-argument is the same as the thesis to be proved (circular
argument), 6:60 ...........................................................................................177
[H28] (c) What is other cannot share a single continuity, 6:61....................................177
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - ix
[H23] (iii) Refuting a re-statement in terms of support and object...................................................178
[H24] (a) The statement according to their texts (650), 6:62-64...................................................178
[H24] (b) How this is to be countered...........................................................................................179
[H25] (i) A challenge using their very reasons, 6:65................................................................179
[H25] (ii) Disposing of their statement with the reasoning they used in their previous
counter-argument, 6:66-67 ........................................................................................179
[H25] (iii) All the proofs they use are the same as the thesis to be proved, 6:68.1-3½ ............180
[H25] (iv) There is no scriptural authority for their position (651), 6:68.3½-4........................180
[H22] (c) Its impossibility seen using the analogy of a deluded experience arising in meditation,
6:69-70 ....................................................................................................................................183
[H22] (d) Its impossibility seen using the analogy of deluded visual perception (652), 6:71.1-2 .......185
[H23] (i) Our (Prasangika) approach to this, easy to understand and of great meaning....................185
[H24] (a) The absurdity of that imputation.............................................................................185
[H24] (b) How it is turned back on them................................................................................185
[H23] (ii) Refuting (another) extremely conceptual view of it (654) ...............................................185
[H24] (a) What they believe ...................................................................................................185
[H24] (b) Refuting that (656) .................................................................................................185
[H23] (iii) What was taught were points appropriate to different times and places (660) ...............185
[H21] (ii) Summary (661), 6:71.3-4 ..........................................................................................................187
[H20] (b) Refuting that the doubly empty dependent nature exists as substance ......................................188
[H21] (i) There is nothing to prove that the dependent nature exists, 6:72.......................................188
[H21] (ii) Examining and refuting self-awareness as a proof............................................................188
[H22] (a) Refutation of self-awareness as having any true nature of its own (662), 6:73.1 ...188
[H22] (b) Refutation of memory as proving that self-awareness exists, 6:73.2-74 ................189
[H22] (c) How we understand memory conforms to experience (663), 6:75 .........................190
[H22] (d) Summary, refuting how they understand it (666), 6:76 ..........................................190
[H21] (iii) Refuting its existence even in the absence of proof, 6:77................................................191
[H20] (c) Refuting the notion of a cause imputed as being material, 6:78................................................191
[H19] (ii) The erroneous consequences of contravening the two truths (667), 6:79-80............................191
[H19] (iii) Rejecting its similarity to relative truth....................................................................................193
[H20] (a) A substantial dependent nature and relative truth cannot be the same, 6:81-82................193
[H20] (b) Denials of relative truth would be contradicted by ordinary people’s experience, 6:83 ...193
[H18] (b) Explaining the need for the Cittamatra view to have been taught ......................................196
[H19] (i) To refute other (religions’) ideas of a Creator (668)..........................................................196
[H20] (a) The principal purpose of this scriptural quote, 6:84 ...............................................196
[H20] (b) What was established by other scriptures, 6:85......................................................196
[H20] (c) The purpose of those scriptures, 6:86 .....................................................................197
[H19] (ii) To establish the importance of the mind alone .................................................................197
[H20] (a) The purpose of scriptures on the importance of the mind alone, 6:87....................197
[H20] (b) To think otherwise is in contravention to the scriptures (669), 6:88 ......................197
[H20] (c) Setting out what establishes (the mind alone) as important, 6:89...........................197
[H20] (d) Explaining what is to be refuted if the word “only” is omitted, 6:90 .....................198
[H19] (iii) Thinking otherwise is contradicted by both scriptural authority and reasoning ..............198
[H20] (a) Contradicted by reasoning, 6:91.............................................................................198
[H20] (b) Contradicted by scriptural authority, 6:92 ..............................................................198
[H19] (iv) Therefore acceptance and rejection of the extremes of existence are advised, 6:93........202
[H18] (c) The other scriptural authorities that support it come from teaching of expedient
meaning 202
[H19] (i) Other scriptures in which (the Buddha) spoke of mind alone are of expedient
meaning, 6:94..................................................................................................................202
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - x
[H19] (ii) Setting out proof for that by both reasoning and scriptural authority (670)......................203
[H20] (a) Scriptural proof, 6:95................................................................................................203
[H20] (b) Reasoning (672), 6:96 ..............................................................................................207
[H19] (iii) How this distinction into certain and expedient applies to all the Buddha’s teachings,
6:97 .................................................................................................................................207
[H14] (c) Genesis from both self and other ............................................................................211
[H15] (i) What earlier adherents of this view believe............................................................................211
[H15] (ii) Refuting that view (673)........................................................................................................211
[H16] (a) Disposing of it with reasoning already used....................................................................211
[H17] (i) Disposing of it with reasoning in terms of the two types of genesis, 6:98.1-2 .......211
[H17] (ii) Disposing of it with reasoning in terms of the two truths, 6:98.3...........................211
[H16] (b) Disposing of it with further reasoning, 6:98.4 ................................................................211
[H14] (d) Genesis without any cause ........................................................................................212
[H15] (i) What earlier adherents of this view believe............................................................................212
[H15] (ii) Refuting that view.................................................................................................................212
[H16] (a) Refutation of genesis from a very essence .......................................................................212
[H17] (i) It would contravene reasoning (674), 6:99.1-2.......................................................212
[H17] (ii) It would contravene what can be seen, 6:99.3-100.................................................212
[H16] (b) Refutation of genesis from an elemental cause ...............................................................213
[H17] (i) Such views demonstrate an inability to understand anything beyond this world,
6:101.......................................................................................................................213
[H17] (ii) A logical proof that this view is mistaken, 6:102 ...................................................215
[H17] (iii) Disposing of an objection raised against an analogy of that logical proof,
6:103.1....................................................................................................................215
[H13] (iii) The meaning of what is determined in this way (675), 6:103.2-4............................................215
[H12] [Note: Two further subheadings that the commentary initially lists as belonging to this
section (i), “The Use of Reasoning to Refute the Four Extreme Theories of Genesis”, are
omitted here but appear below, after (ii)]
[H11] (ii) Disposing of objections from those who believe in (genesis from) self and/or other..............216
[H12] (a) Rejecting that (the non-existence of such genesis) is repudiated by what ordinary beings
see, 6:104-106 .........................................................................................................................216
[H12] (b) Rejecting the consequences of holding that (such genesis) does not exist even in
conventional truth (676) ..........................................................................................................218
[H13] (i) The objection, 6:107 ..........................................................................................................218
[H13] (ii) Dealing with it ..................................................................................................................218
[H14] (a) The consequence, which applies to false relative truth, is not definitive, 6:108-110 ..218
[H14] (b) Their proposition is disproved by both logic and scriptural authority, 6:111-112 ......219
[H14] (c) Their thesis is contradicted by their own analogy, 6:113 ............................................227
[H12] [Second subheading of (i)]
(b) Explaining genesis on the basis of interdependent arising, 6:114........................................227
[H12] [Third subheading of (i)]
(c) The benefits of understanding how interdependent arising disposes of the two extremes...228
[H13] (i) The reasoning of interdependent arising cuts through the net of false views (677), 6:115 ........228
[H13] (ii) The realization of interdependent arising counteracts all conceptual notions, 6:116................229
[H13] (iii) The result of investigation is that all conceptual notions are (seen to be) wrong, 6:117-118 ..229
[H13] (iv) Therefore one is advised to abandon attachment and aversion and to investigate, 6:119 ........230
[H9] (ii) Explaining interdependent arising by means of the absence of any
self in one’s person (677) .............................................................................................246
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - xi
[H10] (a) The need to refute what is grasped at by views that hold there to be a self (677), 6:120 ........246
[H10] (b) Explanation of the reasoning of refutations that meet that need (678) ....................................246
[H11] (i) Use of reasoning to analyse and refute the idea that the person is something
substantial........................................................................................................................248
[H11] (ii) Presentation of the person as dependently imputed (694) ..............................................278
[H11] (iii) Using that same logic to expose all existing things (699) ...............................................286
[H11] (i) Use of reasoning to analyse and refute the idea that the person is something substantial .........248
[H12] (a) Refuting the idea that the person exists with five aspects......................................................248
[H13] (i) Detailed explanation of the reasoning used for this refutation...........................................248
[H14] (a) Refuting the idea that the self and the aggregates are different things...............................248
[H15] (i) What those with this view believe, 6:121...............................................................................249
[H15] (ii) Explaining what is wrong with that.......................................................................................253
[H16] (a) Refutation by examining the nature and particularities of that difference.........................253
[H17] (i) Refuting its nature, 6:122.............................................................................................253
[H17] (ii) Refuting its particularities, 6:123................................................................................255
[H16] (b) Refutation by examining the absence of any difference from the aggregates,
6:124.1-2.................................................................................................................255
[H16] (c) Refutation of the idea of such a focus for the “I” and brief conclusion, 6:124.3-125 .......256
[H14] (b) Refuting the idea that the self and the aggregates are the same thing ................................257
[H15] (i) What those with this view believe, 6:126...............................................................................257
[H15] (ii) Explaining what is wrong with that (684) .............................................................................257
[H16] (a) Using reasoning to contradict what is meant by self and aggregates being the same........257
[H17] (i) Refutation by analysing what is grasped at, the self and the aggregates ...................257
[H18] (a) Contradicting it with seven extremely fallacious implications, 6:127-128 ....257
[H18] (b) Rejecting the counter-argument and brief conclusion (685), 6:129.1-3.........259
[H17] (ii) Refutation by the fact that its results, the end of the world etc., do not hold
(686), 6:129.4 .........................................................................................................259
[H17] (iii) Refutation from the subjective standpoint of the yogi.............................................259
[H18] (a) The consequence that when the absence of self was realized, the aggregates
would disappear, 6:130 ..................................................................................259
[H18] (b) The consequence that when the absence of self was realized, desire would
(still) arise, 6:131 ...........................................................................................260
[H16] (b) The absence of any scriptural reference to self and aggregates being the same thing.......262
[H17] (i) The absence of any scriptural reference to the aggregates explained as being the
self, 6:132-133........................................................................................................262
[H17] (ii) If there were such scriptural references, they would be contradicted by both
scriptural authority and logic (687).........................................................................262
[H18] (a) Contradiction by scriptural authority, 6:134 ....................................................262
[H18] (b) Contradiction by logic (688) ............................................................................263
[H19] (i) If they are just a coming together of things, it is like the example of
the chariot, 6:135 ...................................................................................263
[H19] (ii) If the skandhas have shape, they cannot be mind (688), 6:136..............264
[H19] (iii) The implication would be that action and agent are both the same
thing, 6:137............................................................................................264
[H17] (iii) Summary of what has previously been established based on scriptural authority,
6:138-139................................................................................................................264
[H16] (c) If self and aggregates were the same thing, what is to be refuted is confused with what
is to be upheld (689), 6:140-141 .....................................................................................268
[H14] (c) Refuting the idea that they exist as support and something supported, 6:142 ...................275
[H14] (d) Refuting the idea of the self as possessing the aggregates (691), 6:143 ...............................275
[H13] (ii) Summarizing and how this view is taught about in terms of expedient and definitive truth,
6:144-145..............................................................................................................................275
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - xii
[H12] (b) Refuting the existence of the individual as something indescribable (694)...............................276
[H13] (i) Statement of that view, 6:146 .............................................................................................276
[H13] (ii) Explaining what is wrong with it ......................................................................................276
[H14] (a) If it was indescribable, it could not substantially exist, 6:147 ..................................277
[H14] (b) If it was indescribable, (holders of this view themselves) say that it could only
exist as an imputation, 6:148 ..................................................................................277
[H14] (c) Since it is not a real phenomenon, it cannot be proved to be real, 6:149..................277
[H11] (ii) Presentation of the person as dependently imputed ..........................................................278
[H12] (a) Using previously explained reasoning to establish that it is imputed, 6:150 .........................278
[H12] (b) Applying the simile of the chariot (696)................................................................................279
[H13] (i) Summary, 6:151.................................................................................................................280
[H13] (ii) Detailed explanation .........................................................................................................280
[H14] (a) Establishing the simile....................................................................................................280
[H15] (i) If it is analysed with the sevenfold reasoning it has no substantial existence............281
[H16] (a) The mere collection of parts is not a chariot, 6:152.1-2........................................281
[H16] (b) The collection of parts and shape are not a chariot...............................................281
[H17] (i) Without the parts, the collection and shape are not the chariot, 6:152.3-4 ........281
[H17] (ii) Nor is the shape of the individual parts the chariot (697), 6:153-154..............281
[H17] (iii) Nor is the shape of the assembled parts the chariot, 6:155-156......................282
[H17] (iv) Using the same proof for other related (examples), 6:157..............................282
[H15] (ii) The chariot exists for ordinary people without analysis ...........................................283
[H16] (a) When dependently imputed, the chariot exists in conventional truth, 6:158 ........283
[H16] (b) In the same way, things with parts etc. exist in conventional truth, 6:159 ...........283
[H15] (iii) The benefits of analysis with the sevenfold reasoning ............................................284
[H16] (a) It introduces the true nature of things, 6:160 .......................................................284
[H16] (b) It refutes (notions about) things with parts, 6:161 ...............................................284
[H14] (b) Applying (the simile) to the subject under discussion (699).........................................284
[H15] (i) At the time of dependent imputation, a proprietor and so on exist, 6:162.................284
[H15] (ii) At the time of thorough analysis, all elaborations without exception are stopped,
6:163.......................................................................................................................285
[H15] (iii) The focus of belief in an “I” is set up by the power of ignorance, 6:164 ................285
[H15] (iv) Refuting ideas of “mine” in the same way, 6:165.1-2.............................................285
[H12] (c) The result of that analysis, 6:165.3-4.....................................................................................285
[H11] (iii) Using that same logic to expose all existing things ..............................................................286
[H12] (a) Exposing all existing things that are dependently imputed (700), 6:166...............................286
[H12] (b) Exposing in particular all existing things that are actions, 6:167 ..........................................286
[H12] (c) Exposing all existing things that are causes and effects.........................................................286
[H13] (i) According to reasoning already explained, causes and effects have no true nature,
6:168 ...............................................................................................................................286
[H13] (ii) When analysed in terms of whether or not there is contact between them, they have
no true nature, 6:169-170................................................................................................287
[H13] (iii) Rejecting two objections, such as the similarity (in consequences) claimed to apply
to our own argument .......................................................................................................287
[H14] (a) The opponent’s objection, 6:171-172 .......................................................................287
[H14] (b) What is wrong with it (701)......................................................................................288
[H15] (i) Dispelling the objection by having no position .....................................................288
[H16] (a) Our argument does not have the same flaw because we do not take the
position of true existence, 6:173 ....................................................................288
[H16] (b) An example of an action that is valid as long as there is no analysis ...............288
[H17] (i) A valid example that refutes the objection, 6:174 ....................................288
[H17] (ii) A valid example that proves the point (702), 6:175 ................................289
[H16] (c) Flaws in the analysis only point out that the opponent is at fault (703), 6:176 295
[H16] (d) There is no need to prove any true existence, 6:177 ........................................295
[H15] (ii) Dispelling arguments using the rest of the refutations, 6:178 ..................................295
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - xiii
[H8] (b) Explaining emptiness as it is to be realized by the Mahayana (705) .................................296
[H9] (i) How (the Buddha) gave detailed explanations in terms of (beings’) needs, 6:179 .........296
[H9] (ii) Showing what is to be realized through the Mahayana (706), 6:180 ..............................296
[H9] (iii) Detailed explanation in terms of the attributes of the ground of emptiness ....................297
[H10] (a) Explanation of the detailed classification into sixteen ...............................................297
[H11] i) Emptiness of inner, 6:181-182 ............................................................................297
[H11] ii) Emptiness of outer (708), 6:183-184.2...............................................................297
[H11] iii) Emptiness of both outer and inner, 6:184.3-4 ...................................................298
[H11] iv) Emptiness of emptiness, 6:185-186...................................................................298
[H11] v) Emptiness of vastness, 6:187-188 ......................................................................298
[H11] vi) Emptiness of the ultimate, 6:189-190................................................................298
[H11] vii) Emptiness of the compounded, 6:191 ..............................................................299
[H11] viii) Emptiness of the uncompounded, 6:192 .........................................................299
[H11] ix) Emptiness of the limitless, 6:193 ......................................................................300
[H11] x) Emptiness of that without beginning or end, 6:194-195.....................................300
[H11] xi) Emptiness of non-discarding, 6:196-197...........................................................300
[H11] xii) Emptiness of true nature, 6:198-199 ................................................................308
[H11] xiii) Emptiness of all phenomena, 6:200-201.2......................................................308
[H11] xiv) Emptiness of characteristics, 6:201.3-215.......................................................309
[H11] xv) Emptiness of the non-apprehended (710), 6:216-217.......................................312
[H11] xvi) Emptiness of the nature without substantial existence, 6:218 .........................313
[H10] (b) Explanation of the condensed classification into four ...............................................322
[H11] i) Emptiness of things, 6:219..................................................................................322
[H11] ii) Emptiness of absence of things, 6:220...............................................................322
[H11] iii) Emptiness of own nature, 6:221........................................................................323
[H11] iv) Emptiness of other nature, 6:222-223.2 ............................................................323
[H9] (iv) Brief conclusion mentioning the scriptural source, 6:223.3-4 ........................................323
[H6] d) Summary of the qualities attained in this way (711)................................................................324
[H7] (1) The qualities of realizing the absolute, 6:224..................................................................324
[H7] (2) The qualities of realizing the relative, 6:225...................................................................324
[H7] (3) The qualities united, 6:226..............................................................................................325
[H5] 7. The seventh bhumi, Gone Far..................................................................................341
[H6] a) The quality of the meditation, 7:1.1-2 .....................................................................................341
[H6] b) The quality of the paramita, 7:1.3............................................................................................341
[H5] 8. The eighth bhumi, Immovable (712) .......................................................................349
[H6] a) The quality of increasing previous virtue, 8:1.1-3 ...................................................................349
[H6] b) The qualities of what is abandoned and what is realized on this bhumi ..................................350
[H7] (1) The special qualities of the paramita, 8:1.4.....................................................................350
[H7] (2) The special qualities of what is realized (713), 8:1.5......................................................350
[H8] (a) What is set out in the sutra......................................................................................350
[H8] (b) Explaining the meaning of the sutra (714) .............................................................350
[H9] (i) Identifying cessation ..........................................................................................350
[H9] (ii) The extent of the need to arise from it ..............................................................350
[H9] (iii) The need to arise from it (716) .......................................................................350
[H9] (iv) The defects of not arising from it .....................................................................350
[H7] (3) The special qualities of what is abandoned (717), 8:2 ....................................................351
[H6] c) The qualities that will be perfected on the subsequent bhumis, 8:3 ........................................351
[H5] 9. The ninth bhumi, Perfect Intelligence (719).......................................................358
[H6] a) The special quality of the paramita, 9:1.1................................................................................358
[H6] b) How other qualities are also attained, 9:1.2.............................................................................358
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - xiv
[H5] 10. The tenth bhumi, Cloud of Dharma.......................................................................360
[H6] a) Empowerment as the Buddhas’ representative, 10:1.1-2.¼.....................................................360
[H6] b) The special quality of the paramita, 10:1.2.¾..........................................................................360
[H6] c) Explanation of the name of this paramita, 10:1.3-4.................................................................360
[H4] C. Explaining the qualities of each in terms of the special enumerated features (720) ................365
[H5] 1. The qualities of the first seven bhumis set out in terms of numbers........................................365
[H6] a) Explanation of the twelve hundred-fold qualities of the first bhumi, 11:1-3 ..................365
[H6] b) The qualities of the second to seventh bhumis set out in terms of how many times
they are multiplied, 11:4-5......................................................................................367
[H5] 2. The qualities of the last three bhumis set out in terms of particles of dust (721).....................367
[H6] a) The qualities of the eighth bhumi, 11:6...........................................................................367
[H6] b) The qualities of the ninth bhumi, 11:7 ............................................................................368
[H6] c) The qualities of the tenth bhumi......................................................................................368
[H7] (1) The qualities set out in terms of numbers, 11:8.........................................................368
[H7] (2) The quality of manifesting, 11:9................................................................................368
[H3] II. Explaining the level of buddhahood which is the result ...........................369
[H4] A. General explanation (721) .......................................................................................................369
[H5] 1. Refuting the idea that the Buddha has no wisdom ..........................................................369
[H5] 2. Refuting the idea that he has dualistic perception (723) .................................................369
[H5] 3. Setting out our own reasoned opinion (727) ..................................................................369
[H5] 4. Explaining that the kayas are extraordinary (730) ..........................................................369
[H4] B. What is taught in the text (731) ...............................................................................................369
[H5] 1. How the Buddha attained enlightenment.................................................................................369
[H6] a) The explanation itself ......................................................................................................369
[H7] (1) The time, 11:10.1-2 ...................................................................................................369
[H7] (2) The place (732), 11:10.3-4 ........................................................................................369
[H7] (3) How he attained wisdom, 11:11 ................................................................................369
[H6] b) Disposing of an objection................................................................................................370
[H7] (1) The objection, 11:12..................................................................................................370
[H7] (2) The answer to it .........................................................................................................373
[H8] (a) Although it is uncreated, reasoning is valid, 11:13 ...........................................373
[H8] (b) Although it is uncreated, to say he taught is valid (734) ...................................374
[H9] (i) Although it is uncreated, cognisance of Dharma can arise (735), 11:14............374
[H9] (ii) A simile showing that it is valid to say he taught the Dharma even
without discursive thought, 11:15-16 ..................................................................374
[H5] 2. Explaining the kayas that are attained .....................................................................................377
[H6] a) Explaining the three kayas and their qualities .................................................................377
[H7] (1) The three kayas which are the support....................................................................377
[H8] (a) The dharmakaya in which concepts are completely pacified, 11:17 .................377
[H8] (b) The sambhogakaya in which merit is spread, 11:18 .........................................378
[H8] (c) How both of these can display things consistent with illusions.........................379
[H9] (i) Displaying transformations in a single rupakaya (736) ...........................................................379
[H10] (a) Displaying conduct in samsara, 11:19-20½ .......................................................................379
[H10] (b) Displaying conduct such as generosity etc., 11:20½-21½ .................................................379
[H9] (ii) Displaying the lives of himself and others within every pore of his body...............................379
[H10] (a) Displaying his own conduct, 11:21½-22............................................................................379
[H10] (b) Displaying others’ conduct ................................................................................................380
[H11] i) Displaying the noble conduct of the Buddhas, 11:23-24........................................380
[H11] ii) Displaying the conduct of the lesser noble ones, 11:25.1-3½.................................380
[H11] iii) Displaying the conduct of ordinary beings, 11:25.3½-4.........................................381
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara Structural Outline (according to Gorampa) - xv
[H9] (iii) Displaying mastery of other transformations simply at his will ..............................................381
[H10] (a) Mastery of transforming objects, 11:26 .............................................................................381
[H10] (b) Mastery of transforming time, 11:27 .................................................................................381
[H7] (2) The qualities that are supported..................................................................................................385
[H8] (a) Dividing them briefly into ten kinds........................................................................................385
[H9] (i) Summary, 11:28-30.........................................................................................................385
[H9] (ii) Detailed explanation........................................................................................................385
[H10] (1) The power of knowing what is something’s basis and what is not, 11:31.................385
[H10] (2) The power of knowing the fruition of all actions, 11:32 ...........................................386
[H10] (3) The power of knowing beings’ various aspirations (737), 11:33 ..............................386
[H10] (4) The power of knowing all the various constituents of things, 11:34 .........................387
[H10] (5) The power of knowing whether faculties are supreme or not supreme, 11:35 ..........388
[H10] (6) The power of knowing the paths followed by all, 11:36 ...........................................388
[H10] (7) The power of knowing both affliction and perfection (738), 11:37 ..........................389
[H10] (8) The power of knowing and remembering (all beings’) past lives, 11:38 ..................389
[H10] (9) The power of knowing (all beings’) deaths and transmigrations, 11:39....................389
[H10] (10) The power of knowing how to exhaust all defilements, 11:40 ................................390
[H8] (b) The author’s inability to express a clear categorization of them, 11:41 ..................................390
[H8] (c) He has here described them according to someone else’s explanation, 11:42.........................390
[H7] (3) Summary of both together, 11:43...............................................................................................396
[H6] b) Explaining the nirmanakaya and its activity............................................................................396
[H7] (1) The nirmanakaya provisionally taught the three vehicles, 11:44 ....................................396
[H7] (2) Ultimately there is only one vehicle, 11:45.....................................................................396
[H7] (3) He taught three vehicles as his wisdom intent, 11:46-47 ................................................397
[H5] 3. Extolling the Buddha as supreme, according to time (741) .....................................................397
[H6] a) At the beginning, when he attains sacred enlightenment, 11:48..............................................397
[H6] b) At the end, when he remains in order to benefit beings (744) .................................................398
[H7] (1) He remains forever out of supreme wisdom and compassion, 11:49..............................398
[H7] (2) Explanation of the nature of the compassion with which he acts....................................398
[H8] (a) Remaining forever because he is without compare, 11:50 .....................................398
[H8] (b) Remaining forever because the goal is not exhausted, 11:51 .................................399
[H2] C. Explaining the closing sections of the text .................................................................................407
[H3] 1. The way in which he has expressed the teachings (745), 11:52 ..............................................407
[H3] 2. Showing that the subject-matter expressed is not ordinary, 11:53 ..........................................408
[H3] 3. Explaining the need to have written such an expression of it ..................................................408
[H4] a) He has written a treatise to teach about suchness, 11:54.................................................408
[H4] b) He therefore advises us to give up (studying) other traditions’ texts (749), 11:55..........408
[H3] 4. Dedicating the merits of having written the text to the supreme goal, 11:56 ..........................409
[H1] THE CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................409
[H2] 1. The author of the text, colophon..............................................................................................409
[H2] 2. The translators .........................................................................................................................409
Tibetan Words & Phrases...................................................................................................................413
Logic Trees for Structural Outline .................................................................................................431
Chandrakirti’s Opponents - A review of some Indian philosophical schools........... 443
References & Bibliography .....................................................................................................448
Frequently-Asked Questions............................................................................................................. 450
Index..............................................................................................................................................................451
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 1
INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARIES
The importance of the view
Now that the period of Buddhism’s introduction in the West is almost over, we need to establish
the proper study and practice of Buddhism. Up to now, we have tended to emphasise the
methods, things like meditation and gurus, but we have tended to forget the view. The study of
Madhyamika is important because it has vast and intensive analyses and methods to establish the
view. Having the right view is like knowing the direction to Paris. Suppose that you are
travelling to Paris with a guide who says that he knows the road, and then suddenly your guide
takes out a guidebook and starts to act a little strangely. If you know the direction to Paris, then
whether the guide is leading you along the highway or through the bush does not matter. As long
as he is heading in the right direction, it does not even matter if he acts nervously, because you
know and trust the direction.
Nowadays, it seems that people do not care much about the direction, but instead the car inspires
them – the Vajrayana vehicle, the Mahayana vehicle and so on. Even worse than that, they find
inspiration in the guide. With this approach, unless you have so much merit that you accidentally
find success, it is quite difficult to attain the result. We hear teachings like “rest in the nature of
the mind”, which are very intoxicating and nice to hear, but we have no fundamental
understanding of the view. We have to establish that there is a mind that rests, that there is a socalled
rest, and that it is actually possible to rest: to do this, we need to have a view.
I hope that these teachings will broaden our understanding of the view. I place great emphasis on
establishing the view, because when we establish the view we then gain trust and confidence in
the path. Then it will not matter if along the path you encounter all sorts of circumstance, like
your guru acting strangely, because you will still have confidence in him or her.
There is also another reason. Nowadays the spiritual market is quite popular. I do not know so
much about business, but I imagine that in much of business, you have to invent a certain idea
and tell people that they lack something. Then after establishing this, you tell them “what you do
not have, I have”! I have read many books and listened to many teachings, and I can see
wonderful methods like aromatherapy, incense and the sounds of waves and birds. There are so
many wonderful methods, and we should use them rather then negate them, but on their own,
they lack a view, or at least an ultimate view. This is because most of these methods aim for
temporal relief.
If your motivation to study or practice Buddhism is for temporal relief, it may work to a certain
extent, but that is not the real aim of Buddhism. It was never an aim of the great scholars like
Chandrakirti. You will see in this text, and in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharma, that the way they
analyse and approach reality is very subtle and sharp. Sometimes I think they should have
written drama and fiction, then they would have become popular and more people would learn
Buddhism! But they did not do that, so they are forgotten, whereas people like Shakespeare and
Dickens are well known. These Buddhist scholars know that everybody wants happiness, but
they also recognise that the only way actually to reach true and never-ending happiness is to get
rid of your ignorance. By contrast, methods like poetry and literature can only provide
temporary relief from suffering, so Buddhist scholars do not place much emphasis on writing
poetry and stories. In fact, they think that any path, any book or idea, is only useful if it helps a
sentient being to obtain permanent happiness. For example, one Hindu school emphasised the
analysis of external phenomena, and its followers even wrote a book analysing whether or not
If you do not know the
direction to your goal,
you will only reach it by
accident
Establishing the view
brings confidence in the
path
There are many
wonderful methods, but
on their own, they lack a
view
With Madhyamika, we
can establish the view;
having the right view is
like knowing the direction
to Paris
The only way to attain
true happiness is by
eliminating ignorance
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 2
crows have teeth! From Chandrakirti’s point of view, this kind of thing is useless. What if we
find whether a crow has a tooth, or not – so what? It does not serve any purpose!
So as we talk about establishing the view, please remember that the philosophy of Madhyamika
is not just an idea, but is also something very practical. Although at times you will wonder
whether these arguments between philosophical schools are of any practical value, they can
actually be very helpful if you think of Chandrakirti’s opponents as representing your own
emotions, rather than philosophical schools. If you then read their arguments, the sharpness of
your own ignorance will amaze you!
In many Indian philosophies, including Buddhist philosophy, in order for the teacher to establish
the view for the student, it is often necessary to introduce an opponent to have a debate with. I
was wondering if I should leave out all the technical words, the names of the different texts and
views, and the seemingly boring arguments in these debates. But even though you may not
understand it now, you will get used to it. There will be some kind of imprint in your head, and
there will be a side benefit that you will realise that Buddhism is not just about love, compassion
and resting in the nature of the mind! I want the style of these teachings to be as close as
possible to the shedras or Buddhist schools in Tibet. I think that one of the reasons why
Madhyamika is usually taught first among the five different subjects of Buddhist philosophy is
that you first have to establish the view, and then logic and metaphysics can follow.
On a more personal note, this is a Mahayana teaching and not a Vajrayana teaching. I am just
teaching you in my capacity as someone who has more information on the Madhyamika than you
do, so there is no threat of Vajrayana samayas or the automatic development of the guru-disciple
bond. Please do not have any emotional expectations, as I am only here to explain what is
written in the text as best as I can. I am not here to touch your forehead with my finger and
dissolve all your problems!
Some advice on how to study Madhyamika
I would like to give you some advice on how to listen to or study this teaching. I think we will
have many problems with the definition of terms, for example, when I say ‘suffering’, then you
have an idea of what is meant by that, and I have an idea. So when I talk about it based on my
idea and you listen based on your idea, problems can occur. In everyday life, we often do not
entirely mean what we are saying, but now we are studying philosophy, so we need to mean what
we say! We must be disciplined when we use words like suffering, and not take their meaning
for granted.
I think that different definitions of words are one of the root problems between a teacher and
student, especially an eastern teacher teaching western students. So, although we are not going
to study it here, let me introduce some Buddhist logic here, as it will help you. When we talk of
definitions, we have to establish what the definition of a ‘definition’ is. Until we can agree upon
this, we will create a lot of loopholes, and we do not want any loopholes when we study.
Dharmakirti’s definition of a ‘definition’ is that it is free from the three kinds of fault of being
too all encompassing, not all-encompassing enough, and not possible.
You can see that Buddhist scholars do not just teach, “Rest in the nature of the mind” – they go
through all sorts of small details! Now, what is the definition of this pink flower that I have just
picked up? You have to really listen to me very carefully, as you are a philosopher. Can you
create a definition of this particular flower free from the three faults? You can see that the
definition has to include me, for example my hand, since I am holding the flower. If you say the
flower is pink, it is not specific enough, as there are many other pink things in this room. If you
say the flower is round, that is not sufficiently all encompassing, as there are also many other
Our philosophical
opponents in this text
represent our emotions
Meaning what we say:
precise definitions are
important
Dharmakirti’s definition
of a ‘definition’
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 3
shapes in this flower. An impossible definition is easy, for example if you say that the flower
talks.
The point of this example is that when we use big words like ‘emptiness’, or small words like
‘suffering’, all these words need a good definition. This is why when Buddhist masters talk
about suffering, as in ‘samsara is full of suffering’, people cannot understand. For many people,
the definition of suffering is something that is painful. So, they say, “No, I am having a nice
time here right now. It is not true that whole world is full of suffering”. Whereas from a
Buddhist point of view, even getting a suntan while having a nice time on the beach is a form of
suffering, because your body is getting roasted and more wrinkled, and the clock is ticking all the
time.
I am giving you an idea of the importance of definitions when you study. Later on we will talk a
lot about things that are ‘truly existent’, and to understand this, you will need the right definition
of what is meant by ‘truly existent’. Many Buddhists take this for granted, and say that
everything does not exist, and some careful Buddhists say everything does not truly exist. But
even this raises questions, because if you say that everything does not truly exist, then that
implies it should exist in a relative way. In fact, the definition of ‘truly’ is the reason why many
of the Madhyamika philosophers cannot accept the idea of truly existing phenomena, as we shall
see later.
One other important piece of advice is that you should not think about or approach Madhyamika
in a complicated way. There is actually something very simple underlying it, but sometimes we
approach it in a complicated way. Now on top of all these, we need wisdom. That seems to be
the key. Wisdom can be attained in only two ways: devotion, in this case to guru Manjushri, and
compassion towards sentient beings. Somehow, compassion towards sentient beings is difficult,
but devotion to some figure is perhaps possible, as we have the habit of looking to heroes. Now,
there may be many different types of obstacles interfering with our wisdom and merit. In order
to dispel these obstacles, and to accumulate some merit, we will begin every morning with the
Heart Sutra, as it is done in the shedras, and we will pray to Manjushri and Chandrakirti.
Before we start, let us generate the bodhicitta mind, the intention of studying this Madhyamika
philosophy for the sake of enlightening all the sentient beings. At the same time, also develop
joy at the opportunity to hear, contemplate, discuss and maybe even gradually practice the
essence of the Buddha’s teaching, which is emptiness.
The nine qualities of the Buddha’s teachings
The Dharma can be classified into two aspects, the scriptural Dharma or Dharma of transmission,
and the Dharma of realisation, that which arises in the mind of the practitioner along the path.
The Dharma of transmission includes the Buddha’s own words, the sutras, and the shastras,
which are the commentaries on the sutras.
The Dharma of transmission has five qualities:
• Virtuous in the beginning: hearing and studying these scriptures invokes trust and
devotion by convincing you of the ground, path and fruit.
• Virtuous in the middle: as you contemplate on what you have heard, then you will be
able to convince yourself that the result can be obtained.
• Virtuous at the end: as you meditate on it, simultaneously your wisdom will grow.
• Excellent meaning: it consists of teachings on both relative and ultimate truth.
• Excellent words: Buddha’s teachings use ordinary language, something that is known in
the ordinary world.
The importance of
defining ‘truly existent’
Do not think about the
Madhyamika in a
complicated way
The Dharma of
transmission and the
Dharma of realisation
The five qualities of the
Dharma of transmission
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 4
In order to understand these qualities, it is important to talk about what the teachings are being
compared to. There are teachings or paths that have only relative truth or ultimate truth, or
perhaps neither, whereas the teachings of the Buddha comprise both. You can say that it does
not abandon either of the two truths. This is a very important remark because, for example,
shastras like those analysing the tooth of the crow have teachings on neither relative truth nor
ultimate truth. I think we can see many similar examples in bookshops these days. The quality
of using ordinary language is also quite important if you know the history of Buddhism. Some
Hindu schools use only Vedic words, so that in order to practice those methods you almost have
to learn a completely new holy language. This may be why many Theravadin scholars believe
that the Buddha’s teachings were written in Pali rather than Sanskrit, because Sanskrit is a very
Vedic language. I am saying this to show that what I am reciting is not just something poetic,
but that every word has its purpose. These are the five qualities of the Dharma of transmission,
which is like a medium for transmission.
The actual Dharma, which is the Dharma of realisation, has four kinds of qualities:
• Not mixed up, madrepa (ma dres pa): this has nothing to do with the style of the
teaching; it is contrasting Buddhism with Hinduism again. When Atisha Dipamkara
was in Tibet, he heard that Maitripa had died in India, and he was very sad. He
mourned deeply for several days, and later his disciple Dromtönpa asked him why he
was especially sad this time, given that he had heard a lot of other bad news in the past.
Atisha replied that only two scholars in India could differentiate between Hinduism and
Buddhism, Maitripa and himself. Since Atisha was now in Tibet, there was almost
nobody in India who could differentiate between Hinduism and Buddhism. This tells us
that people like us can be easily be attracted to some of the Hindu teachings on nonduality,
such as those taught by Shankara, but that they are not really the same as
Buddhist teachings on non-duality, although they are very similar. Thus ‘not mixed up’
means that the realisation taught by the Buddha is not mixed up with the kind of
realisation taught by Hinduism. This aims directly at the result of shamatha and the
result of vipashyana.
• Complete, yongsu dzogpa (yongs su rdzogs pa): It has a compete method to dispel the
defilements.
• Pure, dakpa (dag pa): It is pure from the beginning. Here we are talking about the
Buddha nature.
• Purifying, jangwa (sbyang ba): It can purify the temporal defilements.
These are the nine qualities of the Dharma of transmission and the Dharma of realisation. The
purpose of this list is to verify the authenticity of the text we are studying. The words of the
Buddha (lung) make up the sutras, but here we are not studying sutra; we are studying shastra,
which is the commentary. The authority of the sutras comes from the fact that they are Buddha’s
own words, while the authority of the commentaries comes from reasoning rigpa (rigs pa).
Strictly, from the point of view of Buddhist logic, reasoning is even more important than the
Buddha’s words, because the Buddha’s words are open to interpretation. And although some
kinds of reasoning can also be interpreted, when we reason that fire can burn you because fire is
hot – that is reality. The Buddha might say that fire is cold and cannot burn you, and you might
also find reasons why fire cannot be hot, but fire will still burn you. This logic cannot be
interpreted!
When you are studying this kind of text, there will be many quotations from the Buddha,
especially in the commentaries. You quote the Buddha’s words mainly when your opponent is a
Buddhist, but if your opposition is non-Buddhist, then the Buddha’s words are useless. For
almost every commentary, like the Madhyamakavatara we are studying here, there will always
be one, two or more supporting sutras. In the case of the Madhyamakavatara, the principal
supporting sutra is the Dashabhumika Sutra (do sde sa chu pa), the Ten Bhumi Sutra.
The four qualities of the
Dharma of realisation
Sources of a text’s
authority: the Buddha’s
words and reasoning
This text’s principal
supporting sutra is the
Dashabhumika Sutra
Non-duality means
different things in
Buddhism and Hinduism
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 5
Keep this in mind when we debate with the Cittamatrin school. We have said that the
Dashabhumika Sutra is our supporting sutra, but the Cittamatrin school, which is probably the
principal opponent of the Madhyamakavatara, will also quote from this sutra and use it to
contradict the Madhyamika school. This is because this sutra contains phrases like
“Bodhisattvas, all these three realms are nothing but mind”. And in the ensuing debate, you will
be able to see how Chandrakirti tries to escape from this kind of negation.
[H1] THE TITLE
The title starts with “gya gar skad du” (in the language of India), which is considered a seal of
authenticity. The commentary on the title is in two parts: which Madhyamika, or Middle Way, is
being introduced, and how it is introduced.
[H2] Which Madhyamika is being introduced?
In the title “Introduction to the Middle Way”, the title could be referring to two possible Middle
Ways. It could be the absolute Madhyamika, the Dharmakaya, which is the absolute nature free
of all conceptual extremes. Or it could be the scriptural teachings on Madhyamika, the texts that
refer to the absolute Madhyamika. There are two categories of these texts: firstly, the Buddha’s
words, particularly the Prajñaparamita sutras, which are the teachings on transcendental
wisdom; and secondly, the shastras.
In this case the title refers to the scriptural Middle Way, and among the commentaries, it refers
particularly to Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamaka-karikas, which is often called the root text of the
Madhyamika. We know this because Chandrakirti also wrote a commentary on his own
commentary, in which he said he would explain the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas. However, this
autocommentary does not go through Nagarjuna’s text verse by verse, and it introduces some
quite different subjects, so not all Tibetan scholars agree that Chandrakirti is referring to
Nagarjuna’s text.
Nagarjuna – a historical note
Not much is known about Nagarjuna, although he is the man often referred to as the father of
Buddhist philosophy. He lived in India in the 1st to 2nd centuries AD, about four hundred years
after the Buddha, who had predicted that “After I die, in the place of Beti there will be a great
monk, and part of his name will be Naga. He will destroy both existence and non-existence”.
Among Nagarjuna’s many works, some of the best known include:
• Mulamadhyamaka-karikas (rtsa ba shes rab): The Root Commentary on the Middle
Way, which he wrote to defeat Hindus and other Buddhists.
• Yukti-sastika (rigs pa drug bcu pa): Sixty Verses on Logic, which he wrote to defeat
Buddhists.
• Vigraha-vyavartani (rtsod ldog): Refutation of Wrong Views, which he wrote in reply to
questions raised about his other books.
• Sunyata-saptati (stong nyid bdun bcu pa): Seventy Verses on Emptiness, where he
expounds on why compounded things are impermanent.
• Vaidalya Sutra (zhib mo rnam thag): The Grinding Machine, which was written to
defeat various sorts of logic.
• Ratnavali (rin chen phreng ba): Garland of Jewels.
Some of Nagarjuna’s
most important works
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 6
The Mulamadhyamaka-karikas has some twenty-one or twenty-two chapters, the first of which
deals with causation and the classification of phenomena. Phenomena can be compounded or
uncompounded. There is no third type of phenomenon that is both compounded and
uncompounded, or neither. The general Buddhist definition of a compounded phenomenon is
kyene jiksum (skye gnas ’jig gsum): birth, remaining and death. As long as a phenomenon has a
beginning/arising, a remaining and an end/cessation, then it is a compounded phenomenon. Of
these three, Buddhist philosophers think that birth is the most important for ordinary people. We
ask questions like “how did we get here?” and in response, philosophers and ideologists invent
all sorts of answers. Some say God, some say atman, some say atoms and others say there is no
cause. In the first chapter of the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas, Nagarjuna deals with all the
conditions and the so-called causes of the universe and the self. Later, he expanded this first
chapter into the Vigraha-vyavartani, the Refutation of Wrong Views.
There is also a chapter in the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas that analyses compounding, which
Nagarjuna later expanded into the Sunyata-saptati, the Seventy Verses on Emptiness, which has
also been translated into English. Then there was an attack from a school that argued that it was
wrong to say that phenomena do not exist inherently, because inherent existence can be proved
with logic. For example, in the Gelugpa tradition, two kinds of existence are distinguished:
denpa drubpa (bden par grub pa) is inherent existence, and tsemé drubpa (tshad mas grub pa) is
logical existence. I think this is a very smart classification, because they then say that belief in
inherent existence is the defilement that needs to be purified by meditation, and belief in logical
existence is the defilement that needs to be purified by reasoning.
Anyway, what you need to understand here is that one philosophical school believes that inherent
existence can be proved by logic. In reply to this, Nagarjuna wrote the Vaidalya Sutra, in which
he completely dismantles the whole system of ordinary so-called logic. He shows that logic
exists only to a certain extent, and that belief in logic as something truly existent is a mistake.
Then there was another attack from certain schools that said that if things are inherently nonexistent,
then all things become like the horn of the rabbit, which has no substance whatsoever.
Do not think this is just a school – we also think like that! And in reply, Nagarjuna wrote
another text called Vyavahara siddha, “Existence from the conventional point of view”.
In the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas, the primary emphasis is on wisdom, and there is no direct
mention of methods. In order to explain the methods more directly, Nagarjuna wrote the
Ratnavali, “Garland of Jewels”. In addition to these texts, which are part of his ‘Collection of
Logic’ (rigs tshogs), Nagarjuna also wrote a “Collection of Praises” (bstod tshogs), where he
praises Dharmakaya and the Buddhas’ wisdom, and a “Collection of Miscellaneous Sayings”
(gtams tshogs).
[H2] How it is introduced
In Tibetan, the title is literally translated as “Entering the Middle Way”. Here Chandrakirti is
entering the Middle Way of Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamaka-karikas as a whole, rather than the
individual chapters. And the way that he does this, as we will find in the sixth chapter of the
Madhyamakavatara, is by refuting arguments that say that things have true existence, or ultimate
origin, kyéwa (skye ba). This is why the philosophy of Abhidharma, the teachings on the
emptiness or egolessness of self and phenomena, is not simply an idea. It is also very important
for practice, since it sets out the Middle Way between the extremes of eternalism and nihilism.
When we study dualism and non-dualism, you will hear the terms ‘eternalism’, takpé ta (rtag
pa’i mtha’) and ‘nihilism’, chepé ta (chad pa’i mtha’). You might think that these are just
philosophical views, but we regularly engage in both these views, cheta nyi (chad rtag gnyis) in
everyday life. We are eternalist whenever we think that things will last forever or remain solid.
The importance of birth,
or arising
Nagarjuna’s refutation of
the true existence of logic
Chandrakirti enters
Nagarjuna’s Middle Way
by refuting that
phenomena have ultimate
origins
Eternalism and nihilism
in everyday life
Inherent existence and
logical existence in the
Gelugpa tradition
The Buddhist definition of
a compounded
phenomenon
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 7
For example, if I make an appointment to meet you tomorrow in a certain restaurant, then by
thinking that the restaurant will still be there tomorrow, you are in some way a victim of
eternalism. And we are nihilists when we think that things are not worth it, or that they have no
ultimate meaning or result. For instance, if have been trying to cure your alcoholic husband for
many years without success, and then finally you give up and decide you cannot help him any
more, then you are a victim of nihilism.
Generally, we say that ignorance and dualistic mind are the same, although we will later meet
concepts like tsendzin (mtshan ’dzin), ‘fixation towards characteristics’, which is not dualistic
mind but is still a type of ignorance. We know that dualism is the cause of all the pain and
suffering in samsara, and the purpose of Madhyamika, the middle way, is not to fall into these
extremes of eternalism and nihilism. And although for the sake of communication we have to
say ‘Middle Path’ or ‘Middle Way’, as Nagarjuna said, “A learned one must not even remain in
the middle”. As long as you have not understood Madhyamika, you are an extremist, and you
become a terrorist. If you want to be sober, you have to study Madhyamika.
We spoke yesterday of the words of the Buddha, and the shastras or commentaries on the
Buddha’s words. At this point, we are studying Madhyamika philosophy, so our heroes are
people like Nagarjuna. But you shouldn’t think that he is the only scholar within Buddhism. If
you look at Buddhist metaphysics or Buddhist logic, other figures are probably as great as
Nagarjuna. Nevertheless, Nagarjuna became very popular in India because of his strong
emphasis on the non-dualistic view. Even Hindu philosophy changed a little bit after Nagarjuna
and his followers defeated it, because of non-dualism.
The commentaries on the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas
That middle way of no extremes is what we are trying to enter here, and trying to study. Our
direct object is the scriptures on Madhyamika, especially the shastra written by Nagarjuna.
Nagarjuna wrote many books, but here we are trying to study the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas.
How do we enter and study Madhyamika? We study the commentaries, and examine how the
commentators are commenting, as each of these scholars has a different way of approaching his
commentary. Eight Indian panditas wrote commentaries on the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas and,
including Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara, the ones that are best known are:
• Akutobhaya by Nagarjuna or Aryadeva (2nd century)
• “Torch to the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas” by Buddhapalita (end 4th/early 5th century)
• Prajñapradipa, “Torch of Wisdom” by Bhavaviveka (early 5th century)
• Commentary by Gunamati
• Commentary by Sthiramati
• Prasannapada and Madhyamakavatara (dbu ma la ’jug pa) by Chandrakirti (6th
century)
• Sitabhyudaya by Devasarman
• Commentary by Gunasri
One of Nagarjuna’s disciples, Aryadeva, wrote the 400 Stanzas of Madhyamika, and in that book,
both view and action are taught equally. He also wrote the “Quintessence Extracted from the
Essence of Wisdom”, which is principally concerned with the view, and an autocommentary.
Actually, Chandrakirti was not a direct disciple of Nagarjuna, but of Buddhapalita. Buddhapalita
and Bhavaviveka were both disciples of Nagarjuna, and their commentaries are very special,
because the debates that arose because of their commentaries played an important role in the
development of the schools of Buddhist philosophical interpretation:
• Madhyamika-Svatantrika (rang rgyud pa) Bhavaviveka
If you have not
understood the
Madhyamika, you are an
extremist
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 8
• Madhyamika-Prasangika (thal ’gyur pa) Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti
• Cittamatra (sems tsam pa) Asanga, Vasubandhu
The two subdivisions of the Madhyamika became distinct in the 5th century with a debate
between Buddhapalita, who founded Madhyamika-Prasangika, and Bhavaviveka, who founded
Madhyamika-Svatantrika. Prasangikas like Buddhapalita do not have any theories of their own.
Instead, they use the method of prasanga, or reductio ad absurdum, to demolish their opponents’
views by showing that they lead to absurd consequences. Bhavaviveka, however, disagreed with
this approach, and said that it is not enough to destroy the views of others, but that we should
also provide counter-arguments. His approach later became the Svatantrika, which should not be
confused with the Hinayana school of Sautrantika (mdo de pa).
For both the Svatantrika and the Prasangika schools, the ultimate truth is the same, but they use
different methods to establish it. However, there are subtle differences between their
understandings of relative truth. In brief, the Prasangikas think that more things are relative than
the Svatantrikas. The differences between Svatantrikas and Prasangikas should not be seen just
as historical arguments, as they concern our own ways of seeing things. So, the Prasangikas are
being very compassionate when they destroy others’ views. It is not just a game.
Chandrakirti was Buddhapalita’s disciple, and he wrote two main commentaries on the
Mulamadhyamaka-karikas in reply to the arguments that Bhavaviveka made against
Buddhapalita. In addition to the Madhyamakavatara, which is more of a commentary on the
meaning, he also wrote the Prasannapada (uma tshig gsal), the Clear Words.
In the 8th century, Shantarakshita went to Tibet and founded the monastery at Samyé. He was
not a direct disciple of Bhavaviveka, but the disciple of one of his disciples. He combined the
Madhyamika-Svatantrika and Cittamatra schools, and created a new school of Madhyamika
called Svatantrika-Yogachara-Madhyamika. His disciple Kamalashila, who wrote The Stages of
Meditation upon Madhyamika (uma’i sgom rim), developed his ideas further, and together they
were very influential in Tibet. Tibetan scholars wrote many commentaries on both Nagarjuna’s
Mulamadhyamaka-karikas and Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara. The best-known
commentaries on the Madhyamakavatara include those by:
• Rendawa who was Tsong Khapa’s teacher (14th century)
• Tsong Khapa, the founder of the Gelug school (14th/15th century)
• Gorampa, a great Sakya master (15th century)
• The 8th Karmapa, Mikyö Dorjé (16th century)
• Mipham Rinpoche (19th century)
The Tibetan texts are popular because they are easy to understand and nicely structured, whereas
some of the Indian commentaries are very flowery and difficult to understand, but when we study
in the shedra, the Indian texts are much more useful.
I will teach this text with a lot of influence from Shenga Rinpoche (gzhan dga’ – gzhan phan
chos kyi snang ba, 1871-1927), a Dzogchen master, and we will principally follow the outline
and commentary by Gorampa. Shenga Rinpoche says that according to Jayananda both the
Madhyamakavatara and Mulamadhyamaka-karikas have explanations of the relative and
ultimate truth, but Chandrakirti has emphasised the relative truth. Some of you may think that in
coming here to study Madhyamika, you will be studying ultimate truth, but according to
Jayananda, the main subject of this text is relative truth. The text talks a lot about the ten or
eleven bhumis and the six paramitas, all of which are relative truth. You will also find that in the
later parts that Chandrakirti repeatedly says that without the relative truth you will never
understand the ultimate truth. He gives the analogy of a swan, that without the right wing of
relative truth, one cannot understand the ultimate truth, and one will not fly towards the other
The debate between
Buddhapalita and
Bhavaviveka led to the
two schools of
Madhyamika
The Svatantrika and
Prasangika schools agree
on the ultimate truth, but
not on the relative
The development of the
Madhyamika in Tibet
Well-known Tibetan
commentaries on the
Madhyamakavatara
The main subject of this
text is relative truth, not
ultimate truth
We will primarily follow
Gorampa’s commentary
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 9
shore. I want to emphasise this, because we often take the relative truth for granted, thinking that
it is easy to know, when in fact it is not.
Jayananda was an Indian scholar who went to Tibet, where he met and debated with the great
translator Ngok Lotsawa (rngog lo ts’a ba legs pa’i shes rab, 1059? – Lekpé Sherab, Atisha’s
translator and disciple). Jayananda lost the debate, which was a bit of an insult for an Indian
scholar, and he returned very discouraged to India, where he engaged in a practice of Manjushri
for many years. Eventually Manjushri appeared to him in a vision, and he became a great
scholar. He went back to debate with Ngok Lotsawa again, but by that time, he had died.
Subsequently, Jayananda also wrote a big commentary on the Madhyamakavatara (dbu ma ’jug
pa’i ’grel bshad).
[H1] THE TRANSLATOR'S HOMAGE
After the title comes the line “Homage to Manjushri Kumara”. These are not yet Chandrakirti’s
own words, which only begin only after this. The translators wrote this homage, for blessings
that they would translate successfully, completely and properly. The tradition of paying homage
to Manjushri originated with the last important king of Tibet, Tri Ralpachen, who was a great
benefactor of the Dharma in Tibet. He sponsored many Dharma works and translations, and for
easier identification of texts, he requested that translators should add a particular homage
according to which the section of the Tripitaka each text belonged:
• For texts from the vinaya, which cover ethics, morality and discipline, the translators
should pay homage to the all-knowing Buddha.
• For texts from the sutra, which contain instruction on meditation, or the results of
meditation, they should pay homage to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.
• For texts from the abhidharma, since they talk about emptiness, non-duality and similar
difficult subjects, the translators should pay homage to Manjushri.
The four necessary things that need to be told before starting
This is traditionally taught in Buddhist schools as an introduction at the beginning of a teaching,
to build a structure. It is ‘necessary’ because it creates four necessary doubts, and dispels the
four unnecessary doubts. If a text does not have these four qualities, there is no reason to study
and practise the text:
• Subject: vakya shes bya
• Purpose: prayojana dgos pa
• Ultimate purpose: paramartha nying dgos
• Link: sambhanda ’brel ba
If a person asks for a glass of water, water is the subject. The purpose is that by uttering these
words, you will get the other person to understand what you want. The ultimate purpose is to
actually get a glass of water, and there should be a link between subject and purpose; purpose
and ultimate purpose; and ultimate purpose and subject.
How does this dispel the four kinds of unnecessary doubts? There are certain texts or words that
do not have a subject, for example whether a crow has teeth or not. This is because no birds have
teeth anyway. Remember that these examples were written in the 6th century, so you have to
think the way they did! Some texts, such as texts on how to marry your mother, do not have a
purpose. Some texts have no ultimate purpose, such as texts explaining how to steal the crown
jewels of the king of the nagas. Finally, there are texts that have no link. I think this is aiming at
How to identify a text by
the translator’s homage
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Introduction – 10
the first chapter of the Upanishads, which says that if you kill animals for sacrifice, you will
attain heaven. If you go to a bookshop nowadays, you will find plenty of books that fall into
these categories!
When Asanga wanted to inspire his younger brother Vasubandhu, who was a hard-line
Vaibhashika scholar, he asked two monks to read two Mahayana sutras – the Dashabhumika
Sutra and another – beside Vasubandhu’s room. As the monks read the sutras aloud, pretending
to learn them by heart, Vasubandhu listened despite himself. He initially thought that the
Mahayana was not a complete teaching because it did not speak of a result. However, in the
afternoon when the two monks read the other text, he realised that the Mahayana also has a great
result. This story illustrates the purpose of knowing these four. So, for the Madhyamakavatara:
• The subject is the eleven bhumis, and the three causes of the Bodhisattva.
• The purpose is that by hearing this, we will gain confidence that such an extraordinary
result can be obtained.
• The ultimate purpose is to go from the 1st bhumi to the eleventh bhumi.
How Asanga inspired
Vasubandhu to study the
Mahayana
The subject, purpose, and
ultimate purpose of the
Madhyamakavatara
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 11
[H1] THE MAIN BODY OF THE TEXT
[H2] A. Explaining the introductory branches, the expression of offering
[H3] 1. Explaining the reasons for praising compassion
1:1 Shravakas and pratyekabuddhas are born from the Muni king;
Buddhas are born from bodhisattvas;
And, from the mind of compassion, non-duality and
Bodhicitta is born the bodhisattva.
We start the main body of the text with another homage, but this time it is the author’s homage.
Nowadays, many writers just try to fill the pages so that they have a book thick enough to sell,
but here we will see how authors like Chandrakirti can say so much in just a few words. For
example, at the same time that he pays homage, he also teaches us the three causes of a
bodhisattva. This text is special, because Chandrakirti does not pay homage to a particular
person, as buddhists normally do, but to compassion. He also makes some other quite unusual
and daring remarks.
[H4] a) Of the four kinds of enlightened individual, praising the
bodhisattvas above all (515)
In the first two lines, Chandrakirti praises the bodhisattvas. Among all the types of sublime
beings – shravakas, pratyekabuddhas, buddhas and bodhisattvas – he praises the bodhisattvas
most highly, saying they are the most important. It might appear that he is breaking the habit of
praising the Buddha, dharma and sangha, but he is not saying this just to be different! Being
controversial seems to be quite valued these days, and people can gain a lot from it. But
Chandrakirti is not trying to do that, as he has a good reason why the bodhisattvas are supreme
among the four beings.
[H5] (1) How Shravakas and Pratyekabuddhas are born from buddhas (515),
1:1.1
[H6] (a) How they are so born
There are three states of enlightenment: shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and buddhas. Both
shravakas and pratyekabuddhas are born from the Buddha’s speech, meaning they have listened
to the teaching of the Buddha and then practised it. According to the Mahayana, the satsam (sa
thsams) or boundary that defines the state of enlightenment is whether a person has destroyed
ego, the root of samsara. And according to the Mahayana, shravakas and pratyekabuddhas have
both destroyed the root of samsara.
Pratyekabuddhas are sometimes called ‘middle buddhas’, because they have purified more
defilements than the shravakas but much less than bodhisattvas. Similarly, shravakas are
sometimes called ‘small buddhas’. So, we can see that the word ‘buddha’ is not necessarily
reserved for completely enlightened beings. As long as someone has destroyed ego, the root of
The three types of
enlightened beings
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 12
samsara, they can be referred to as an “awakened one”. Shravakas and pratyekabuddhas have
awakened from samsara, and they will not go back to samsara. However, the bodhisattvas want
something more. After they have destroyed the root of samsara, they are not satisfied merely
with not returning to samsara; they also wish to gain omniscience. Furthermore, unlike the
shravakas, bodhisattvas also distinguish between two types of obscurations. The only defilement
recognised by shravakas is ego in the sense of attachment to self. However, bodhisattvas also
identify another defilement that needs to be purified: the self of phenomena. Things are a little
more complicated for pratyekabuddhas, as we will see shortly.
I am sure that many of us think that beings become shravakas and pratyekabuddhas because of
practising Hinayana, and that they become bodhisattvas and Buddhas because of practising
Mahayana. However, Chandrakirti says that not even the states of shravaka and pratyekabuddha
can be attained without passing through the Madhyamika; according to him, they all have to
study the Prajñaparamita.
[H6] (b) Examining doubts about this being so (516)
[H6] (c) Definitions and etymology of the terms shravaka and
pratyekabuddha
The Tibetan for shravaka is nyentö (nyan thos), which means both ‘hearer’ and ‘proclaimer’,
someone that makes another person hear. The shravakas hear teachings from the Buddha, such
as those on the Four Noble Truths or the twelve links of interdependent origination, and then tell
others about them. How do they do that? They practise the teachings they have heard, and when
they reach the state of shravaka, they proclaim this to others. Almost out of joy, they say things
like ditar jawa cheso (’di ltar bya ba byas so), which means, “I have done what I need to do”.
By saying this, they encourage other sentient beings to follow the path as well. When they
proclaim, “I have done what I need to do”, they are saying that they have understood the truth of
suffering and abandoned the cause of the suffering, as taught by the Four Noble Truths. They
also say things like “I will not know any more becoming; I will not know any existence beyond
this one”. For them, after they have managed to destroy the cause of suffering, they say there is
nothing more.
Because of our petty Mahayana influence, I am sure that many of us look down on the shravakas,
but we should not even attempt to do this! For example, there is a Mahayana story that when the
five hundred shravakas heard teachings on the great emptiness, they had a heart attack. Pettyminded
people like us might use these stories to boost our ego because we follow the Mahayana,
but this would be a mistake, as the story is actually praising the shravakas! Their shock means
that at least they understand something, whereas we are so dumb that it does not touch us.
There is another way of explaining shravakas. When they hear teachings from the Buddha, they
do not only hear the Four Noble Truths and other Theravada teachings, but also Mahayana
teachings. For example, the Heart Sutra that we read this morning is a discussion between
Shariputra, one of the greatest shravakas, and Avalokiteshvara. But although the shravakas hear
Mahayana teachings, they do not practise the path of the Mahayana, because their aim is simply
to get enlightenment for themselves. Nevertheless, some of them, like Shariputra, Ananda and
Subhuti, teach the Mahayana path to others. The Pundarika Sutra (dam chos pad ma dkar po’i
mdo – the Lotus Sutra) says, “Today we have become shravakas. We will announce the
Mahayana path to those sentient beings who are interested”. You might wonder why they do
this; it is simply a service to the Buddha, their teacher.
You might ask why bodhisattvas are not called shravakas, since they also hear the teachings and
give the teachings. The difference is their aim. The shravakas aim to let people hear. The
The shravaka is a nyentö,
“hearer”, and
“proclaimer”
Followers of the
Mahayana should not
look down on shravakas
Shravakas also hear
Mahayana teachings and
tell them to others, but
they do not practise them
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 13
bodhisattvas do not only aim to let people hear. Their aim and practice is also to let other people
follow the path.
The pratyekabuddha, or solitary realiser, is another state of enlightenment. Pratyekabuddhas
have also destroyed the root of samsara. There are two kinds of solitary realisers: those who live
in communities, and those who live alone, like rhinoceroses. How can solitary realisers, who are
born in a kalpa in which no buddha teaches, nevertheless be born from the Muni King? First,
they hear the teachings of the Buddha. They study and reflect upon the twelve links of
interdependent origination, and they accumulate merit for a hundred kalpas. They pray to be
reborn at a time and in a place when there is no buddha, and they become self-realised at that
time. They usually teach visually rather than verbally. For example, they display miracles such
as when the upper part of their body becomes fire, and the lower part becomes water.
They are considered a higher form of enlightenment than the shravakas for two reasons: their
accumulation of merit, and their accumulation of wisdom. The fastest shravakas usually
accumulate merit for three lifetimes, whereas pratyekabuddhas accumulate merit for a hundred
aeons. In their accumulation of wisdom, shravakas only realise one type of selflessness – the
selflessness of the ego – whereas pratyekabuddhas also realise half of the selflessness of
phenomena.
For the same reasons, pratyekabuddhas are considered less enlightened than bodhisattvas. A
bodhisattva accumulates merit for three countless aeons and fully realises both types of
selflessness, so he has two kinds of wisdom: wisdom that knows nature as it is, and wisdom that
knows nature as it appears, in its multiplicity. Shravakas and pratyekabuddhas may have the
wisdom that knows how it is, but they do not have complete wisdom of how it appears. We will
come to this when we discuss the 11th bhumi, so do not worry too much about it now. These are
only very general differences; there are many others. For example, the bodhisattva practice of
exchanging oneself for others does not exist for the shravakas or pratyekabuddhas.
[H5] (2) How Buddhas are born from bodhisattvas (519), 1:1.2
The next question is, where does a buddha come from. You might think that he comes from
bodhicitta, but in fact, he comes from a bodhisattva, a person. There are two reasons for this:
First, any buddha was previously a bodhisattva, and the first instance of a buddha comes right
after the last instance of a tenth bhumi bodhisattva, so the cause of the buddha is a bodhisattva.
Second, bodhisattvas like Vajrapani and Manjushri act as teachers or reminders to many
bodhisattvas. For example, the Mahayana view is that when Siddhartha was enjoying life in the
palace, Manjushri and Vajrapani manifested birth, old age, sickness and death for him.
[H5] (3) Therefore, bodhisattvas are worthy of praise (520)
We are not paying homage to the bodhisattva yet; we are just saying that he is a greater being.
Before we go on to discuss the three causes of a bodhisattva, let us have some questions.
[Q]: Chandrakirti says that the realisation of the arhats depends on their realisation of
Prajñaparamita. Would the Nyingmapas have a slightly different approach here?
[A]: A little, but the Nyingmapas still have to explain one sloka later. Mipham Rinpoche says
that with the Abhidharma Kosha you can actually attain enlightenment, although
Abhidharma is known as a subject of the lower vehicle. There are certain scholars who
believe that the Abhidharma Kosha alone is not a complete path, while others disagree. I
think that the Abhidharma Kosha can be seen as part of the Madhyamika, as it was written
Pratyekabuddhas
Why pratyekabuddhas are
considered higher than
shravakas
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 14
after Vasubandhu was inspired by Asanga reading all those books [see p.10]. Since the
Abhidharma is sarcastic about the shravaka path, we can say that Vasubandhu is more of a
Madhyamika. Furthermore, if we hold strictly to the Madhyamakavatara point of view,
even the Svatantrika-Madhyamika does not have a complete path. This is a bit shocking,
especially for those who belong to Shantarakshita’s lineage, which includes all of us! But
Chandrakirti has a good reason. Many people think that if the ultimate truth of a path is
perfect, that alone will be enough to lead us to enlightenment, even if its relative truth is
imperfect. But according to Chandrakirti, if even the relative truth is degenerate, then you
do not have a complete path.
[Q]: When you talked about the relationship of the Abhidharma Kosha and the Madhyamika, did
you mean it can be seen as part of the Mahayana?
[A]: Yes – the Mahayana Madhyamika. There are two kinds of Mahayana and Hinayana. Each
has both a theoretical or doctrinal aspect, and a practical aspect. Mahayana theory talks
about both Mahayana and Hinayana practice and the Hinayana theory presents its own
understanding of both Mahayana and Hinayana. Naturally, the Hinayana claims that it is
Mahayana. After all, who does not want to be greater?
[H4] b) Explaining the three causes from which bodhisattvas are
born (521), 1:1.3-4
[H5] (1) Identifying these three causes
Now that we have established that the bodhisattva is worthy of praise, the next question is where
does a bodhisattva come from. Here, Chandrakirti presents the three causes of a bodhisattva:
• Mind of compassion nyinjé sem (snying rje’i sems)
• Non-duality nyisu me lo (gnyis su med blo)
• Bodhicitta changchubkyi sem (byang chub sems)
[H5] (2) The sequence of these three causes (522)
We will spend quite a lot of time in these four slokas, as you can almost say that they reveal the
complete path of the Mahayana. For example, if somebody asks you how a person becomes
enlightened, all you need to do is read them the first sloka or even just the last two lines: mind of
compassion, non-duality and bodhicitta. But here we have to study it academically, so we will
go through these three causes in more detail.
First, why do the three causes come in this order, rather than with bodhicitta first? The reason is
not that Chandrakirti was composing a letter and certain words did not fit on the line, so he had
to put them in this order. It is not that at all! Actually, if you read some other Mahayana sutras,
the order may be different. The main reason here is that compassion is the cause of the other
causes of bodhicitta, so it comes first. There is a good explanation in the commentary by
Rendawa, but briefly, we can say that from the mind of compassion comes non-duality and
bodhicitta, and from these two together with compassion comes the bodhisattva. This is just a
different way of reading the last two lines. Next, we will go through both compassion and nonduality
in brief, and then we will discuss compassion in more detail.
As we will see in a moment, the second sloka explains why compassion is the most important of
these three. It is like a seed, like water, and like ripening. Therefore, compassion comes first.
Although we translate the Tibetan word nyinjé (snying rje) as compassion, it does not necessarily
mean ‘mind of sympathy’. Nor does it mean ‘to suffer with’. Here, it is important that
compassion has the connotation of understanding. We have this in our ordinary language, when
The meaning of
compassion
Why does compassion
come before non-duality
and bodhicitta?
The three causes of a
bodhisattva
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 15
we say things like “you are not in his shoes”, or “if only you were in his shoes, you would know
how he feels”. It does not mean that you also have to suffer, but rather that you know or
understand.
I personally think there is an important reason why compassion comes first here. This is a little
bit touchy-feely, but it does not matter. We have buddha nature, and as Sakya Pandita said, you
can tell that there is a fire in a stove, if you touch the surface and you feel the warmth. Even if
you are a deluded and aggressive being, some of the qualities of buddha nature can be perceived
within you, and one of these is the ability to understand or identify with other people.
For example, if an aggressive person does something very nasty towards someone else, like
beating them, they understand that by through their actions they will create pain, or at least they
understand what pain is. This is very subtle. If a tree branch falls on your head, the branch does
not know that this will hurt your head. But when we hurt someone, we know that our actions
will create pain. There is a mutual understanding of the pain, between the pain creator and the
pain receiver. And based on that understanding, we can develop compassion. If you do not have
that understanding, then you cannot develop compassion, because you do not know about the
pain. The phenomenon of the pain would not even exist for you. So, here you need to know that
compassion is not only sympathy, but that it must also have a lot of understanding.
Second in order comes non-duality. We can also use words like “great mind”, or “great heart” as
His Holiness the Dalai Lama does. Non-duality is simply realising the meaning of the
Madhyamika, and thus being free from extremes like existence and non-existence, eternalism and
nihilism, and so on. If a person has compassion but does not understand non-duality, then this
person can become the victim of their compassion. Suppose that your wife or husband is an
alcoholic, or has a certain addiction. You may have compassion for them, but if you do not
understand non-duality, then you will become fixated towards and cling to the goal of being able
to cure them or help them. Someone who understands non-duality has no such fixation on socalled
goals, which is why bodhisattvas can continue to help sentient beings year after year, life
after life. Since they are not goal-oriented, they do not give up. They do not say things like “I
can never cure all sentient beings, so I will not try”.
If you do not cling to the goal of managing to help, your actions to help sentient beings will not
stop. Even better, when you understand non-duality, your compassion becomes even stronger.
Let us suppose that all of us in this tent are dreaming. We are all having a nightmare that we
have a fatal disease, but somehow one of us knows that this is a dream, a nightmare. This person
tries to tell his fellow dreamers, “Hey look, this is just a nightmare”, but they do not listen to
him. They still believe that this is true and real. Can you imagine? The person who knows it is
a dream may not have woken up. He just knows that it is a dream. But he feels a great
responsibility to tell everyone else, and as he slowly reaches towards bodhicitta, he is determined
to wake up, for example with a bucket of water.
Now we can see why the order is compassion first, then non-duality and then bodhicitta.
However, we should know that the order could be different. Here we are following Chandrakirti,
and his Madhyamakavatara text, which is meant for a general audience. Certain bodhisattvas
may understand non-duality first, and then through that they may develop compassion towards
other sentient beings that do not have that understanding.
[H5] (3) Identifying the bodhisattva born from these three causes (523)
Now, it gets a little complicated! Here we are still on the last line of first sloka, which talks
about the causes of the bodhisattva. Now there is a question – when we say bodhisattva, what
type of bodhisattva are we talking about? How do we define the boundary? The question arises
because Shantideva’s Bodhicharyavatara says that those who have the wish to enlighten all
What type of bodhisattva
are we talking about?
Non-duality
Compassion without
fixation upon goals
Telling other dreamers
that they are having a
nightmare
Sakya Pandita’s image of
fire in the stove
Compassion is based on
understanding
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 16
beings automatically change their name to ‘bodhisattva’, and they then become objects of refuge
by gods and humans. According to Shantideva’s approach, almost all of us are this kind of
bodhisattva from time to time. But is Chandrakirti talking about the same type of bodhisattva?
In general, we speak of two kinds of bodhicitta mind: relative and ultimate, and we classify
beings that have this bodhicitta mind into three groups: worldly beings, bodhisattvas and
buddhas. Unlike Shantideva, Chandrakirti is referring to the type of bodhisattva that has ultimate
bodhicitta mind, which is the direct experience of emptiness. We know this because the fifth
sloka says, “With this attainment, from now on he is known as a bodhisattva”, and in his
autocommentary, Chandrakirti explains that he is discussing someone on the first bhumi
bodhisattva level and beyond.
If you are a Prasangika-Madhyamika student, you do not want two of your great lineage scholars
like Shantideva and Chandrakirti contradicting each other. However, compassion and relative
bodhicitta can also exist within ordinary beings, which is what Shantideva is referring to when he
says that a person with bodhicitta mind will automatically become a bodhisattva. Shantideva
says that someone who merely has the wish to enlighten all sentient beings, which is relative
bodhicitta, can obtain the name of bodhisattva. But here, when Chandrakirti talks of a
bodhisattva, he is not talking about that.
There is another good reason. Chandrakirti has said that the bodhisattva is born from the mind of
compassion, non-duality and bodhicitta. Here, you have to highlight the word ‘born’ in your
text. It is a very important word here, because someone who is born from non-duality has to be a
non-samsaric bodhisattva. Worldly bodhisattvas follow the paths of accumulation and
application, and although they practice compassion and non-duality, they are not yet born as
bodhisattvas. The word ‘born’ is important because we are talking about a result – being born,
already having taken birth. The result that comes from understanding compassion, bodhicitta
and especially non-duality has to be a non-samsaric bodhisattva.
We can also make some other remarks here. For example, by praising the bodhisattva as being
supreme among the four kinds of being, we are also paying indirect homage to the Buddha,
because by praising the seed we also praise the result. Anyway, in summary, the last two lines of
first sloka are a general outline of the three causes of the bodhisattva, which are compassion,
non-duality and bodhicitta. We deal with compassion first, which takes us to the second sloka.
[H4] c) Showing how compassion is the most important of these three
(529), 1:2
1:2 Compassion alone is first seed for the abundant harvest of buddhahood;
Then water for its growth,
And finally, what matures as a state of lasting enjoyment –
Therefore, first I praise compassion.
If you want to know about compassion, this sloka will tell you. Three analogies are given here:
seed, water and ripening. The fist analogy of a seed, makye pa kye (ma skyed pa skyes) tells us
that compassion is like the seed that gives birth to all of the Buddha’s qualities. You did not
have these qualities before, but if you have compassion, then you can obtain them. If you do not
have a fruit, but only a seed, then you can plant the seed and expect the results. Compassion is
like that seed.
The second analogy is that compassion is like water. One could also say it is like the earth, like
ploughing, or like taking care of the seed. Compassion acts like the water or the earth, always
taking care of this seed, encouraging and nourishing it. With compassion, a bodhisattva remains
determined to enlighten sentient beings, even for three countless aeons. Without compassion,
The three analogies for
compassion: seed, water,
and ripening
Relative and ultimate
bodhicitta
The bodhisattva is born
from non-duality
Chandrakirti and
Shantideva are referring
to different kinds of
bodhisattva
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 17
then even if a bodhisattva has quite a good understanding of non-duality, he will have no means
of encouragement. Although it’s very unlikely, this kind of bodhisattva could conceivably
become discouraged or tired on the path, because the path is difficult, and he might end up
wanting to rest as a shravaka or a pratyekabuddha. So, compassion acts as a companion to
encourage the bodhisattva as he proceeds along the path.
Finally, you reach enlightenment, and still compassion is necessary even when the flower has
bloomed and the fruit has ripened. The ripening of the fruit is important, because without
ripening there is no continuum of the seed. When you plant rice, rice grows, and then with this
rice you can plant more. But the seed is important – it has to be perfect, because if it is rotten or
broken, then it will not produce a good result. Compassion seems to be the only perfect seed.
Chandrakirti is telling us that compassion is present at the beginning, in the middle and even at
the end. He uses the analogy of ripening in the third line when he says, “finally what matures as
a state of lasting enjoyment”. This “lasting enjoyment” is important, as it refers to infinite and
never-ending buddha activity. There is no such thing as a buddha benefiting a certain number of
sentient beings and then going on holiday, or something like that. The buddhas’ activity for the
benefit of sentient beings is endless, because of compassion. At the end, during the result, if
there is no compassion, there is no act of ripening. And if there is no act of ripening, no more
seed is produced.
We need to clarify a potential doubt here, about whether the Buddha has compassion. And if he
does, is he motivated to help beings? The problem is that if we say that a buddha has motivation,
it can disturb our fundamental view. Buddhas do not have subject and object, and all our
dualistic clinging. Therefore, they cannot have the kind of motivation that sees the needs of a
particular sentient being in France, and then decides to go there and manifest particular acts. So,
does a buddha have compassion?
There are two answers. First, when the buddhas were bodhisattvas they made many prayers and
wishes, and because of these prayers, they have obtained the three kayas. In particular, they
obtained the Rupakaya, which is the Nirmanakaya, although Nirmanakaya is a Vajrayana term,
and the Mahayana does not really talk about it so much. The way they benefit beings, as
Shantideva said, is like the sun or a wish-fulfilling tree. The sun does not have a wish to
illuminate certain parts of the earth and not shine in other parts. Instead, as the sun comes out,
then whoever wishes to have sun and has merit or good karma, then they will receive sunshine.
The sun does not have the wish to send its rays. The Buddhas manifest in the same way as this,
without the subject and object kind of motivation.
The other way of clarifying this is that the compassion of the Buddha is seen from the point of
view of sentient beings. For someone who has devotion and merit, from his or her point of view
the Buddha’s compassion is there.
Here you need to understand that compassion is necessary in the beginning, in the middle, and
even after you get enlightened. Therefore, we pay our first homage to compassion. We will next
come to the different three types of compassion. Maybe you can ask some questions first.
[Q]: Why don’t we speak of buddha nature as the seed of buddhahood?
[A]: Well, this can be argued. As I was saying earlier, compassion is like the rays of the buddha
nature. I referred to Sakya Pandita’s analogy of the fire inside the stove. You can tell
whether there is fire by touching the stove, and if you feel warmth, you know there is
something like fire inside. Buddha nature does not really manifest. So, although you can
see a person going through emotions like devotion and anger, we do not say, “he’s going
through buddha nature”. But compassion, especially understanding, is one of the qualities
of buddha nature. So, in this case you can say that the first line of the second sloka talks
about buddha nature.
Does the Buddha have
compassion?
Compassion is present at
the beginning, the middle,
and the end
Buddhas benefit beings
without dualistic
motivation
Compassion of buddhas
is seen from the point of
view of sentient beings
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 18
[Q]: In the first explanation of the Buddha’s compassion, you said that the Buddha does not have
the subject and object kind of motivation, but that he benefits like the rays of the sun. This
explains how the Buddha benefits beings, but I do not understand how it shows that the
Buddha has compassion.
[A]: Before they become buddhas, when they are bodhisattvas, the buddhas make many prayers.
They even make specific prayers, such as who will be there when they become enlightened,
how many disciples they will have and even what kinds of flowers will grow in that place.
They benefit beings by the power of this compassion. It is still compassion continuing.
[Q]: It is past compassion.
[A]: But it is still there. You cannot really separate the seed, shoot and result. They are not
really the same, but they are also not separate. Compassion works like this.
[Q]: You said that compassion includes understanding. But if this understanding is about the
suffering of beings, it cannot fit with the idea of no subject and no object.
[A]: This is why there is a clarification and a second answer. If you pray to the Buddha, “please
look upon me, I am suffering here, know me”, and suddenly your problem dissolves, then
you will thank him. You almost create the Buddha who knows your suffering and then
actually helps you, but it is your point of view of his compassion.
This discussion is good! This is how you should study this subject, always trying to find a
contradiction in what I am saying. As I was saying earlier, we are only talking about the author’s
homage here. Just in the homage, Chandrakirti has already explained many things, and I am not
even doing it justice here! I am only explaining one thousandth of what is there! Tulku Jigme
Rinpoche was just saying that when this text was taught by Khenpo Rinchen, another of my
teachers, we spent two weeks just on the first four slokas. There are so many things to talk
about! For example, we talked about shravakas in terms of one who hears and one who makes
others hear. This leads to an immediate doubt – what happens if the shravaka is in the formless
realm, as then he does not make any sound, so he cannot make other people hear! There are so
many things like that, which I have skipped.
[Q]: I did not understand the link between non-duality and compassion, how non-duality comes
about after compassion.
[A]: First, you dream that you have a fatal disease, although you do not yet realise that it is a
dream. But as a greater being, you understand and have compassion towards your fellow
dreamers. Then suddenly you realise you are dreaming, and you understand non-duality.
But because you know that other people do not know this, you also want them to know that
this is a dream. This is bodhicitta. It is that simple.
[Q]: Your second answer does not answer the question about whether the Buddha has
compassion. Does the Buddha have it or not?
[A]: I am saying that the Buddha has it from our point of view. We have to be careful, as after
all, his very existence might just be our point of view too!
[Q]: I am not happy with the first explanation. When we say the bodhisattva made many wishes,
and this motivation is continued in buddhahood, it seems to me that wishes are relative, and
must be exhausted at some point. They cannot go on continuously, endlessly.
[A]: The result is still there, and that is because of compassion. The first answer is that there is a
continuum of compassion, and the second is that we see it from our point of view. The
example works well. A flower has a particular seed, and then with water it grows, and then
produces more seeds. Your argument is good, as you can indeed say that is finished now.
Dharmakirti said that the entire path is gone, that the boat has to be abandoned.
Nevertheless, this seed produces the next flower, so the benefit is there. But we still need
the ripening. Let us suppose that if, despite seed and water, the flower does not grow. Then
it will be the end of the lineage of this flower! This is what we are talking about. This
analogy is so good: seed, water and ripening.
[Q]: Doesn’t sympathy already contain the idea of understanding within it?
[A]: There is no problem if sympathy has the connotation of understanding. But I thought
sympathy can mean just feeling sorry for someone, and that may not work. Let us imagine
a very vicious sentient being that does not have any sympathy at all. If we say that
The difference between
sympathy and compassion
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 19
sympathy is the ultimate compassion, then we must say that this being does not have
compassion, and there is a danger that we might say they do not have buddha nature. But as
a buddhist, no matter how bad someone is, you have to say they have buddha nature. It is
the basis for them to develop all enlightened qualities. My viewpoint is that compassion
seems to be the most evidently manifest quality of the buddha nature.
[Q]: When a flower produces a seed, the seed produces another flower. When you have
aspirations while you are on the path, how can this produce something as different as
buddhahood? How can a seed, which is dualistic, produce a fruit that is not dualistic?
[A]: Because the essence is non-dualistic. The Nyingmapas talk in terms of lhündrup kyi
nangcha (lhun grub kyi snang cha), ‘the spontaneous aspect of appearance’, which refers to
the Buddha nature’s inherent capacity for manifestation.
[Q]: Isn’t this like the argument against the Hindus, that the cause and the fruit are the same
thing?
[A]: They do not even call it a cause and fruit – but then we are climbing to another stage, and
we are not talking about Madhyamika any more. Here we believe in Buddhahood, or at
least in a bodhisattva, and we believe that the three causes of the bodhisattva are
compassion, non-duality and bodhicitta. Is your question about the type of compassion that
bodhisattvas have?
[Q]: My understanding is that the relative bodhicitta that abides in worldly bodhisattvas is
dualistic bodhicitta. But the relative bodhicitta that abides within other types of bodhisattva
may not necessarily be dualistic – can bodhicitta be relative but non-dualistic?
[A]: Here we need to distinguish the meditation and post meditation time of a bodhisattva. That
is why we mentioned tsendzin (mtshan ’dzin), fixation towards characteristics, at the
beginning. A bodhisattva on the first bhumi has relative bodhicitta that has fixation towards
characteristics during the post meditation time, but not during the meditation time. You
could say that dualism, nyidzin (gnyis ’dzin) is ignorance; and fixation towards
characteristics is something like ignorance. However, fixation towards characteristics is not
necessarily dualism, it is tsendzin.
[Q]: Can you have duality without conceiving of the characteristics of things?
[A]: Yes, this is why I am not so sure that ‘dualism’ is the right word for nyidzin. We will talk
more about nyidzin and tsendzin later. When we study defilements and ignorance, we talk
of dualistic mind. A dualistic mind is one that has grasping towards dualistic phenomena,
as a subject and object. A bodhisattva from the first bhumi onwards does not have this, but
he does have fixation towards characteristics. This is not dualistic grasping, but seeing
dualistic appearance – things like colour or shape.
[H3] 2) The actual praise based on these reasons (530), 1:3.1–4.2
[H4] a) Other ways of explaining the three types of compassion
[H4] b) This extraordinary way of explaining the three types of
compassion (531)
1:3 Initially fixating on this so-called ‘I’ as an [existing] self,
‘Mine’ gives rise to grasping.
Helpless beings, driven as an irrigation wheel,
To compassion for these, I bow down.
[H5] (1) Explaining them in terms of their different objects
Can relative bodhicitta be
non-dualistic?
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 20
In this sloka, Chandrakirti gives the second homage, and introduces us to the three types of
compassion. Many scholars agree that these three types of compassion are not distinguished by
their form or aspect, but because of their three kinds of objects:
• Sentient beings that have two kinds of suffering – the suffering of suffering and the
suffering of change: According to Madhyamika, compassion is the wish to protect or
free sentient beings from suffering. So, the first type of compassion is the wish to free
sentient beings from these two kinds of suffering.
• Sentient beings that are tormented by the suffering of compounding: duché (’dus
byas). Simply speaking, using touchy-feely language, we could say it is aimed at beings
tormented by the suffering of impermanence, but it would be much better to use the
word ‘compounding’.
• Sentient beings that do not know that all phenomena lack inherent existence: In
touchy-feely language, we could say it is aimed at those who do not understand
emptiness. Do not worry – more detail on this is coming!
The 3rd sloka covers the first of these three types of compassion.
[H6] (a) The meaning of the simile of the irrigation wheel
Now we will discuss what makes an object of the first type of compassion in more detail.
Initially, although there is no concrete object, simply no object, you have this delusion of ‘I’.
From there comes the idea of ‘mine’, which gives rise to grasping towards all sorts of objects.
Chandrakirti compares sentient beings that suffer in this way to an irrigation wheel or
waterwheel. There were no irrigation wheels in Tibet, but he is referring to the kind of irrigation
wheel that was used in India, where several cups are attached to a wooden wheel. He gives six
reasons why these sentient beings are like an irrigation wheel:
1. An irrigation wheel is tightened or held in place by ropes, nails and so on. Similarly,
sentient beings are bound by karma and afflictive emotions, such as ignorance.
2. An irrigation wheel does not just rotate by itself. It must have a driver or operator. For
sentient beings, this operator is consciousness, and the notions of ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘mine’ or ‘I
am’.
3. An irrigation wheel brings water from the well, and pours it onto the field that is to be
irrigated. I think this is referring to the highest realm of samsara, which, according to
buddhism, many Hindus mistakenly consider nirvana. Although you may reach the
highest level of samsara, you will still come down, just as the water will drain away
from the field. You might find these analogies difficult, but remember that they were
written in India.
4. A waterwheel has to be pulled up with a lot of strength, but going down is easy.
Similarly, it is difficult to go up to higher birth, but to go down to the lower realms is
easy.
5. The fifth similarity concerns the twelve links of interdependent origination. These are
ignorance, perception, consciousness, name and form, the six senses, contact, feelings
or sensation, desire, grasping, coming into being, birth, and old age and death. If you
cannot remember all twelve, you can abbreviate them into three: emotion, action or
karma, and birth. Whether you are talking in terms of three or twelve, the point is that
you cannot really say which one comes first. Similarly, with an irrigation wheel, you
cannot say which of the cups that is attached to the wheel comes first.
6. If you live next to a waterwheel, and you watch it, you will see that it does the same
thing every day. It does not change direction, rest a while or engage in other activities
like dancing – it just does the same thing repeatedly. Samsaric beings are the same – it
The six reasons why
sentient beings are like an
irrigation wheel
There are three types of
compassion, and they
have three different
objects
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 21
is breakfast, lunch and dinner repeatedly. But to see that, you need to stay and watch
for a while.
So sentient beings are like a waterwheel, going round and round. The first kind of compassion is
to want to free sentient beings from this kind of suffering. Many scholars call this kind of
compassion ‘common compassion’, because Hindus also have it. The Sakyapa scholar Shakya
Chokden says that we pay homage to this type of compassion because of the value of the object.
However, for the other two types of compassion, Chandrakirti pays homage not only because of
the value of the object, but also because of the form of the compassion.
Now we need to ask who are included as objects of this first kind of compassion. All samsaric
sentient beings that suffer from the two types of suffering are included, and also shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas who are still on the path. In brief, the object of the first type of compassion is
someone born in samsara without his own choice, someone that is reborn in samsara due to the
power of karma and emotion, rather than his own will.
[H6] (b) The first meaning of the simile of the moon’s reflection in water
(532)
1:4.1-2 Sentient beings are as the moon’s reflection in moving water.
Seeing them as empty in their change and in their nature,
The next half-sloka, the first two lines of the fourth sloka, covers the two other types of
compassion. Here, only one analogy is given – the reflection of the moon in water that is slightly
rippling, stirred by a gentle wind – but the same analogy is used twice, to explain both the second
and third types of compassion.
The object of the second type of compassion is beings that suffer from the compounded nature of
phenomena, i.e. impermanence. In general, compassion is the mind that wishes beings to be free
from suffering. Here, the suffering is the all-pervasive suffering inherent to all compounded
phenomena.
A compounded phenomenon always has a beginning. If there is no beginning, there is no act of
compounding. Then there must be a state of dwelling or remaining; otherwise, again there is no
compounding. Finally, there must be an end to the act of compounding. Even if I drink a cup of
tea, there is a beginning, middle and end. For example, if there is no end to the act of drinking,
there can be no concept of drinking a cup of tea, because you are always drinking, you are stuck
there! So there is a beginning of the beginning, a middle of the beginning and an end of the
beginning. You can say that the end of the beginning is the birth of the remaining, and the death
of remaining is the birth of the death. The death of the death is the birth of the birth. Even if you
have nothing, then there has to be a beginning of the nothingness – there is no space. As I drink
a glass of water, it is the beginning of the emptiness of the glass. Then there will be a remaining
of the emptiness, and soon the death of emptiness and the beginning of filling with coffee! It is
also the beginning of going to pee!
Many people say buddhists are always talking about negative or sad things, like death, dying or
impermanence. But these are not necessarily sad; they are just the nature of phenomena.
Without an end, there is no beginning. I do not have a Ferrari car right now, but if I buy one, that
is also impermanence. I have changed from having no car, to having a car! As long as
compounded phenomena exist, there will be objects of this second type of compassion.
Chandrakirti explains this with the line “Sentient beings are as the moon’s reflection in moving
water”. Here we should underline the word ‘moving’. The water is moving because there is a
wind. The lake is like samsara, and the wind is like karma, emotion and ego.
The objects of the first
kind of compassion
All compounded
phenomena have a
beginning, middle, and
end
We pay homage to
common compassion
because of the value of
the object
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 22
Again, there is something very special here. As long as a phenomenon is impermanent, it can be
harmed. It can be manipulated, interfered with, obstructed or changed. This is also related to the
Buddhist idea of permanence. To our ordinary mind, the sun is permanent. The ordinary mind
equates permanence with something that continues for a long time. But here our definition of
permanence is something that has no birth, no remaining and no end. It cannot have a beginning,
because as long as there is a beginning, there is time, and so there is impermanence.
As long as something is impermanent, it can be harmed, manipulated or obstructed. Nagarjuna
said gang la gnod yod de bde min, “Where there is a possibility of harm, or even actual harm,
there is not happiness”. Maybe there is no harm right now, but harm is waiting there, and one of
these days it will come. Therefore, as Nagarjuna said, something that can be harmed is not
happiness.
In the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas, Nagarjuna also said ’dus byas tham chad slu'i chö ’di na de
dag rdzun pa yin, “Therefore all compounded things are illusions”. For example, if you go to a
river this year and next year you go to the same river you might say “I saw this same river last
year”. But that is an illusion – it is not true! The river you saw last year is gone, dried up, drunk
by the whales and sharks! So Nagarjuna says that all compounded phenomena are illusions –
this is incredible! So the conclusion is that as long as there is impermanence, there is suffering.
This is a special assertion of the Mahayana. In the Vaibhashika and lower schools, they believe
that something can change every instant yet not be suffering. We will talk about this later.
So, all these sentient beings are like a reflection of the moon in water that is being moved by the
wind. And in the second line, “seeing them as empty in their change”, you need to underline the
word ‘change’. In Tibetan, the same word is used for ‘change’ and ‘movement’. You also need
to add the last sentence of the third sloka: “to compassion for these, I bow down”. This is the
commentator’s wish. Chandrakirti does not want to waste space, as I said before – he includes
everything, but he writes in a concise and condensed way.
So, who is included as objects of this second kind of compassion? Included are all the objects of
the first type of compassion, and the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas, not only those who are on
the path but also those who have already attained the result. I am surprised that you are not
shocked! These are enlightened beings, yet they are the objects of compassion! On top of that
are included all bodhisattvas, from the first to the tenth bhumi, during their post-meditation time.
All are within the law of impermanence.
This compassion is also called common compassion, because it is also common to shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas. They share this kind of compassion towards objects that are compounded and
impermanent, but they do not include the post-meditation state of bodhisattvas from the first to
tenth bhumis. They also do not include shravakas and pratyekabuddhas who have obtained the
result of their path.
[Q]: How does this impermanence manifest, given that the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas have
obtained the fruit of their path?
[A]: There is cessation, and there is awakening from the cessation. That is the impermanence.
[Q]: Why isn’t the Buddha also impermanent, as he is born and so on?
[A]: The Buddha is a body of apparition – he does all these things because we think he does all
these things. It is Nirmanakaya.
[H6] (c) The second meaning of the simile of the moon’s reflection in water
(533)
Nagarjuna’s statement:
all compounded
phenomena are illusions
The objects of the second
kind of compassion
As long as a phenomenon
is impermanent, it can be
harmed or changed
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 23
For the third type of compassion, read the same two lines, but emphasise ‘reflection’ and
‘empty’. Again, here we add the last line of the third sloka “to compassion for these, I bow
down”.
[Q]: The word “reflection” is not in the Tibetan?
[A]: The Tibetan is chu yi nang gi da wa tar (chu’i nang gi zla ba ltar) – ‘moon that is in the
water’ – everyone knows that the moon has not fallen into the water!
The object of the third type of compassion is all those who have not understood that all
phenomena do not have intrinsic existence. There is a story about a monkey who went to drink
some water near a lake one evening. He saw the reflection of the moon, and thought that the
moon had fallen into the lake. He went to report this to the king of the monkeys, who was not
only stupid but also ambitious, so he thought, “Ah, now there’s a good chance for me to be
famous and heroic, if we could save this moon!” So, he summoned all the five hundred monkeys
and went to the lake. There was a tree branch hanging over the lake, so all the monkeys held
each other from the branch and tried to take the moon out of the lake. Finally, the weight of so
many monkeys broke the branch, and they all fell onto the moon! They did not understand that it
is an illusion. This is the suffering, and we are no different from these monkeys.
We say that all phenomena lack inherent existence, that they are tsam, mere appearance. This
word ‘just’ or ‘mere’ is very important here. They are just appearance, just sound, and just this
experience. But when these experiences occur, we do not understand their lack of inherent
existence. For example, when you have a small wound and say, “it is just a small thing”, or
when we say it is “just” an appearance, it means a lot. We are not negating the appearance. We
are negating the idea of inherent existence, like moon’s reflection in water – like the monkeys.
Nobody is going to tell these monkeys that there is no reflection of the moon in the water! In
fact, if they were clever monkeys, they could sit next to the reflection of the moon and enjoy all
sorts of romance! We are saying that this moon is not real, but they do not know this. The
bodhisattvas want them to know that and be free from this kind of suffering.
The first two kinds of compassion are called chöpé kün ne longwé nyingjé (spyod pas kun nas
slong ba’i snying rje), ‘compassion inspired by action’. This third type is tawé künné longwé
nyingjé (lta bas kun nas slong ba’i rnying rje), ‘compassion inspired by the view’. It is
uncommon compassion, because it involves understanding both of the selflessness of phenomena
and the selflessness of ego. The object of this third type of compassion includes all the objects
we mentioned earlier, and on top of that, even the meditation time of the tenth bhumi
bodhisattva. This is because even during their meditation time, tenth bhumi bodhisattvas have
not completely realised emptiness. In summary, the third kind of object is anyone who has not
completely or totally realised emptiness.
[H5] (2) Explaining that their form is common (533)
[H5] (3) Summarising the meaning of this important point (533)
In summary, the object of the first type of compassion is someone born in samsara without any
choice, helplessly. We say helplessly if your birth is dependent on conditions rather than
yourself, wherever your karma throws you. For example, your karma might decide that you
should be born as a dog, a rich person’s pet. Or your karma might decide you should be born as
a very healthy human being, but born in war zone like Bosnia. You have no choice. Well
indirectly, you had a choice, but you did not choose! You could always have refrained from
certain things you should not have done, but you did not!
Now, there is one clarification. I was telling you earlier that the nature of compassion is one of
understanding, rather than sympathy. When we talk about compassion towards the meditation
The story of the monkeys
and the moon in the lake
Mere appearance
The first compassion is
towards those reborn in
samsara without choice
The objects of the third
kind of compassion
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 24
state of the tenth bhumi bodhisattva, if compassion meant sympathy, it would not really be
suitable here. You cannot have sympathy towards a tenth bhumi bodhisattva’s meditation time,
but you can have understanding.
I think we have finished with compassion now, although I did not do it much justice. If you want
to study compassion, read this. Now we have finished the homage, and we can finally begin the
main text, which starts on the third line of the fourth sloka.
[H2] B. EXPLAINING THE ACTUAL MEANING OF THE MAIN BODY OF
THE TEXT, THAT WHICH IS INTRODUCED
[H3] I. Explaining the bodhisattva levels (bhumi) which are the cause (534)
[H4] A) Showing their nature in general in terms of the union of means
(compassion) and wisdom
Now we have to talk about the eleven bhumis. Before we talk about them individually, we need
to talk about what a bhumi is in general. What makes a bhumi? Simply, it is a combination of
wisdom and method. In Sanskrit, bhumi literally means earth, land or country – it can refer to
many things. For example, in Indonesia, the language has a lot of Sanskrit influence. In their
official forms, they use words like ‘bhumiputra’ when they talk of citizenship. We use the name
‘bhumi’ for the combination of wisdom and method because the ground or earth acts like a
container for all things to function. For example, you can hoist this tent because of the ground.
Likewise, all the enlightened qualities can grow on the base of the combination of wisdom and
method.
This combination is essential. If there is only wisdom but no method, then it will become like
shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. If there is only method but no wisdom, the state will become
completely ordinary, like us – we have plenty of methods but no wisdom. The combination of
wisdom and method makes the bhumi. Now, for a bodhisattva during the state of meditation,
you cannot classify which bhumi he is in. There is none, because this kind of fabrication does
not exist within their state of meditation. So, on what basis do we differentiate the first to tenth
bhumis? Is it because they have attended certain universities and obtained certain diplomas, or
did national service so they were awarded various medals?
The whole idea of enlightenment is this: if your shirt is dirty, you wash and clean it. Becoming
clean is the result, but it is a result of the absence of dirt. It is not that when you put your shirt
into the washing machine it has somehow become new, or clean. The term ‘result of absence’,
which is dreldré (bral ’bras) in Tibetan, is important to know. The extent of absence is different
for each bodhisattva, and according to the amount of absence, you can say that this bodhisattva is
on the first bhumi, that bodhisattva is on the second bhumi, and so on.
However, in their meditative state there is no classification or difference between the first ten
bhumis. So, who can make this classification? Let us say that a first bhumi bodhisattva is
meditating, and there is another in the same room. From his omniscience, he knows that the
other one is a first bhumi bodhisattva, or whatever. You asked yesterday what is meant by
fixation on characteristics: this is an example. During the post-meditation time, a first bhumi
bodhisattva can know that he is on the first bhumi, but he cannot necessarily recognise the level
of a bodhisattva higher than his own.
In the post-meditation time, a bodhisattva can be recognised by the number of his qualities. For
example, a first bhumi bodhisattva has 1,200 qualities of the path, and a second bhumi
What is a bhumi?
Enlightenment as a
“result of absence”
The qualities of the
bodhisattva in postmeditation
time
The bhumi as a
combination of wisdom
and compassion
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 25
bodhisattva has 12,000 qualities of the path. They can also be identified by what is absent. In
the first bhumi, there is the absence of tongpang (mthong spang), the defilement that can be
abandoned through seeing. On the second bhumi, there is the absence of gom pang (sgom
spang), that which can be abandoned through meditation. We will talk about these types of
defilement later. Each stage of the bodhisattva path emphasises a particular paramita, and in
addition, the bodhisattva usually takes a particular form at each level. For example, a first bhumi
bodhisattva generally takes a royal form, of a king or queen. To be precise, as the
Dashabhumika Sutra (do sde sa chu pa) says, “When a bird flies in the sky, we cannot indicate
the traces of his flight. How can we even talk about it? Likewise, we cannot express the
qualities of the bodhisattvas, so how can you even listen?” Now that we have introduced the
general idea of the bhumis, we can begin with the first bhumi.
[H4] B. Explaining the nature of each in terms of the paramita
emphasised
[Note: the description of the first bhumi begins on the next page]
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 26
[H5] 1. The First Bhumi, Complete Joy
[H6] a) Immaculate wisdom as the first, Complete Joy [1:4.3-5.2]
1:4.3-4 The victorious one’s son, possessing such understanding,
And overcome by compassion, wishes to completely liberate all beings.
1:5.1-2 Fully dedicated as in the Aspirations of Samantabhadra,
His joy is complete. This is known as the first.
The third and fourth lines of the fourth sloka express the meditation time of the bodhisattva.
When Chandrakirti says, “possessing such understanding”, he is referring to a bodhisattva with
an understanding, or wisdom, that is free from all concepts. This refers to wisdom, and
“overcome by compassion” refers to the method. One should never separate wisdom and
compassion, and you can see they are together here: the third line talks of wisdom, the fourth of
compassion.
The important words here are: “possessing such understanding”. This is talking about the
wisdom that is the second of the Seven Auxiliaries to Enlightenment (byang chub yan lag bdun):
1. Pure memory dran pa yang dag
2. Fully discerning phenomena chos rab tu rnam ’byed
3. Pure perseverance brtson ’grus yang dag
4. Pure state of gladness dga’ ba yang dag
5. Pure ecstasy shin tu sbyangs pa yang dag
6. Samadhi ting nge ’dzin
7. Pure state of equanimity btang snyoms
This wisdom is the ability to distinguish, to not remain in samsara because of wisdom and to not
remain in nirvana because of compassion. This is an important quality of bodhisattvas, and
although even the first bhumi bodhisattva has all seven of these qualities, we know from
Chandrakirti’s autocommentary on the Madhyamakavatara that here he is talking about the
second.
In the next two lines, we are talking of the bodhisattva’s post-meditation time. During his
meditation time, he has wisdom and compassion. During his post-meditation, he does prayers
and he has the joy of reaching this state. This is an important state because for aeon after aeon,
he has gone through the path of accumulation and the path of application, and the last limit of the
path of application is just finished. He then enters the state of meditation that is the tonglam
(mthong lam), the path of seeing, where he abandons the defilement that needs to be abandoned
by the path of seeing.
During the meditation state, it is inexpressible, but when he rises from this mediation and enters
the post-meditation, a sort of ‘waking up’, he realises that he has crossed samsara. He realises
that there has been earthquake, a hundred universes have been moved and a hundred buddhas
have come and anointed him. He knows that he will never go back to samsara again, samsara is
gone and he has crossed the border. There is tremendous joy at that time; hence, that is the name
of the first bhumi. That’s it! Now maybe we can have some questions.
The Seven Auxiliaries to
Enlightenment
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 27
[Q]: Is the bodhisattva’s wisdom free from thoughts or free from concepts? I heard you use both
words.
[A]: Either is fine.
[Q]: I have a question about permanence and impermanence. First, you said that impermanence
has birth, remaining and death. Then you said that to be permanent, something must have
no birth, no remaining and no death. So, can there be phenomena that have no birth and no
death, but have a remaining?
[A]: That is not possible. As long as there is remaining, there must be a beginning of the
remaining.
[Q]: So isn’t there a problem with Buddhahood?
[A]: A Buddha does not have a beginning, end or middle. But ignorance has a beginning, end
and middle. So, the end of ignorance is called “Buddha”. But that is not a phenomenon.
[Q]: Isn’t the end of ignorance the beginning of Buddha?
[A]: It is all that I can say now. We cannot point towards Buddhahood with a finger. We can
only say that when ignorance is dispelled, then Buddhahood is there. It is like washing
clothes. The difficulty here is that there the result and the ignorance are closely related in
one way, but in another way, they are totally separate – like the dirt on the shirt. When you
buy the shirt, you do not buy it together with the dirt! They are separate. However, if you
think that the shirt needs to be washed, you are already accepting that it is dirty.
[Q]: You said that we can talk about the end of samsara, but we cannot talk about the beginning
of buddhahood. But if you can talk about the end of samsara, then you have something that
has no beginning, but has an end.
[A]: Yes, but that is something very individual, and all that is path language. During the time
when we talk about the path, you can say you have a path, you have ignorance, and that you
can ‘attain’ buddhahood or ‘achieve’ enlightenment. All this is what we call ‘path
language’, which is used in order to encourage practitioners like us. But now that we are
studying Madhyamika, we are establishing the view, so we need to use some different
language. For example, when we talk about denpa nyi (bden pa gnyis) the two truths, this is
very much ‘ground language’. The two kinds of accumulation are ‘path language’, and the
two kinds of kayas are ‘result language’.
[Q]: Can I ask about meaning of jinyépé kyenpa (ji snyed pa’i mkhyen pa). I understand that the
jitawé kyenpa (ji lta ba’i mkhyen pa) is the understanding of things as they are, namely that
they are empty. Is jinyépé kyenpa the understanding of things as they appear?
[A]: Jinyépé kyenpa is not only the understanding of ‘how it appears’, but it also involves many
other types of omniscience. For example, although Maudgalyana was a shravaka, he did
not know where his mother was. He understood phenomena as they are, which is the
egolessness, which is why he was a shravaka. But he still did not have jinyépé kyenpa,
which is more than simply “how it appears”, and so he did not know where his mother was.
There is another story of when a layman came to Shariputra to be ordained as a monk. To
be ordained, you need to have a seed of some kind of virtuous deed, but although Shariputra
looked for one, he could find anything. He told the old man that he had no seed, so could
not become a monk. The old man was very sad, and went to visit the Buddha, who saw that
there was a seed, because millions of lifetimes ago this old man had been a pig, and he had
accidentally run round a stupa!
[H6] b) Detailed explanation of the qualities of Complete Joy
[H7] (1) Expressing praise of those on this bhumi
[H8] (a) The quality that is transferred, the name, 1:5.3-4
1:5.3-4 With this attainment, from now on
He is known as a bodhisattva
Does Buddhahood have a
beginning?
Egolessness is not the
same as omniscience, as
illustrated by stories
about the shravakas
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 28
We have talked about the introduction to the first bhumi. This is important, because as a
buddhist, you will often say that someone is a bodhisattva. When you say that, what are you
saying? In these two lines, you will find out. We touched on this in the homage, where we
talked about shravakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas and buddhas, and the boundary that
defines when one becomes a bodhisattva. With this sloka, we now know that Chandrakirti is
referring to the first bhumi bodhisattva onwards.
Generally, the name bodhisattva can be given in two ways. One way is from the perspective of a
bodhisattva’s action. The second is from the perspective of the bodhisattva’s view, meaning his
realisation of the view of emptiness.
[H9] (i) Defining the term ‘bodhisattva’ by action (practice)
In the Bodhicharyavatara, Shantideva teaches the first way of obtaining the name bodhisattva,
which is from the point of view of action. From the moment that a person has the wish to
enlighten all sentient beings, he is then qualified to be referred to as a bodhisattva, and he will
then be the object of prostration and homage by gods and humans. This is a bodhisattva from the
point of view of action.
We need a slight clarification, though. Someone might have this enlightened thought for just a
moment; for example, “I wish I can enlighten all sentient beings”. That state is only one of
having bodhicitta, rather than being a bodhisattva. Even the Bodhicharyavatara distinguishes
between a “wishing” bodhicitta and an “entering” bodhicitta. A person might wish to enlighten
all sentient beings for a day or only a minute, but they do not qualify to be called a bodhisattva
just because they have this wish for a couple of minutes.
But someone who has entering bodhicitta has committed that from now on, everything he does
will be for the sake of all sentient beings. For example, he will drink a cup of tea for the sake of
all sentient beings, or go from here to there for the sake of all sentient beings. Someone who has
taken this kind of vow and made this kind of commitment can be called a bodhisattva.
These two, wishing and entering enlightened thought, are what we call relative bodhicitta.
Someone who has both wishing and entering enlightened thought is called a bodhisattva, but this
name is given from the point of view of action. For example, it could be people like us. From
time to time, unexpectedly, you must all have the wish to enlighten all sentient beings. I had it
once, just once! However, when you take initiations or do sadhanas or light butterlamps, if you
really commit yourself, saying “from now on, may all my action be turned into something
beneficial for the enlightenment of sentient beings”, then you become a bodhisattva.
So your question is, does that mean ordinary people like us, in everything we do, always have to
think that we are doing it for the sake of sentient beings? Because there are times when we do
not even think about what we are doing, when we do not even have thoughts – like sleeping. So
the question is, while we are asleep, do we then become a non-bodhisattva, and only become a
bodhisattva again once we wake up and think of doing something for all sentient beings? No,
that is not it. It is written in the Bodhicharyavatara that once you commit, once you have taken
the vow, then even if you are sleeping or in a coma, you are still a bodhisattva and your merit
grows all the time.
[H9] (ii) Defining the term ‘bodhisattva’ by view (realisation)
Here, the words “from now on he is known as a bodhisattva” refer to someone who has ultimate
bodhicitta. He has obtained the name ‘bodhisattva’ from the point of view of realisation of the
The definition of a
bodhisattva in
Shantideva’s
Bodhicharyavatara
Aspiring and entering
bodhicitta
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 29
view. He has a direct experience of emptiness, or direct seeing, which is why we say he is on the
‘path of seeing’. We know that Chandrakirti is referring to ultimate bodhicitta here, because he
states this in his autocommentary, quoting from the 2,500 Verses Sutra.
[H8] (b) The qualities that are obtained, the meaning (537)
So, with this we have been introduced to the quality of this being that has the special name ‘first
bhumi bodhisattva', this mingpoy yönten (ming po’i yon tan). The fifth sloka tells us that he has
obtained this name or title of bodhisattva, and in the following slokas, we are going to talk about
several qualities of the first bhumi bodhisattva that he has obtained. The first quality is having
obtained the name bodhisattva; he is not just an ordinary bodhisattva, but also an ultimate
bodhisattva, a bodhisattva from the point of view of the view. It is like a soldier in an army, who
after several years obtains the name or rank of ‘general’. As well as his name, the bodhisattva
has obtained four qualities:
1. Race, or family, rik (rigs)
2. Purification, accumulation and ability.
3. The ability to improve himself very quickly, reaching the next step easily. It is like
walking up a staircase: after you have stepped with your left foot, your right foot
automatically goes onto the next step. A bodhisattva has this kind of ability to go
higher, whereas people like us may get some good qualities unexpectedly, and hopefully
remain there for ten years, if we don’t lose them beforehand.
4. He excels over lower levels.
[H9] (i) The quality of being born into the family, 1:6.1
1:6.1 Now born into the family of the Tathagatas
The first quality is revealed in the first line of the 6th sloka. We know that he is definitely not a
worldly being, and the opposite of an ordinary being is an enlightened being. There are three
types of enlightened beings: shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and buddhas. The first bhumi
bodhisattva is neither a shravaka nor a pratyekabuddha, so what is he? By way of illustration,
when you cross the Channel Tunnel, as soon as you reach France, you are no longer in England.
You may only be at the border, but you have reached France. Similarly, a bodhisattva is sure to
become a buddha. There are no sidetracks for him: there is just one track. This is why poets
refer to bodhisattvas as gyalse (rgyal sras), ‘prince’, or ‘victorious one’s son’ or daughter. A
bodhisattva is sure to become a buddha, so he belongs to the race or family of the buddhas. The
word ‘Tathagata’, which means buddha, literally means ‘one who has followed the right path’.
There is a travel agent in Bodh Gaya called Tathagata travel agency – I think it is a nice name!
[H9] (ii) The quality of the ability to discard and to realise, 1:6.2-4
1:6.2-4 Completely abandoning the three constant fetters,
The bodhisattva possesses supreme delight
And is able to stir a hundred worlds.
The second quality is küntü jorwa sum (kun tu sbyor ba gsum), which has been translated here as
‘fetters’. In Tibetan, it means something that not only holds you in samsara, but also pulls you
down into samsara. There are three of these fetters, or causes that draw us into samsara and hold
us there:
Holding a certain view as supreme (lta ba mchog ’dzin). This has three subcategories:
The four qualities
obtained by the
bodhisattva
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 30
1. Thinking that the five aggregates are supreme, jigtsok (’jigs tshogs). We think that I,
me and mine are supreme. We hold this view as supreme – we think ‘I am supreme’ –
that is why we are here, and why we return repeatedly.
2. Thinking Nirvana is supreme, tar ta (mthar lta), such as wanting to be reborn in heaven,
thinking that heaven is supreme or that enlightenment is supreme.
3. Thinking that a wrong view is the supreme view, logta (log lta). For example, some
people have an inferiority complex, and think that they are useless or worthless. This is
a wrong view, but you think it is a supreme view. You are addicted to it – you love to
think that you are bad or worthless. Another example is thinking that ignorance is
something inherent that cannot be destroyed.
Thinking that your discipline or ethic is supreme, tülshukgi chogzin (brtul zhugs gi mchog
’dzin). For example, thinking that being a vegetarian is supreme, or that being non-vegetarian
like the Vajrayana is supreme. It is when people think things like “this is the Vajrayana – we can
eat meat, drink alcohol, and have women”, when they think that this is the great ‘openness’ of the
Vajrayana. It is as simple as being proud of being a buddhist, or a Mahayana practitioner, or a
Dzogchen practitioner. This only leads to rebirth in samsara, so be careful! Monks and nuns are
also arrogant, and can go around holding up their sharp noses and thinking, “I am a monk”, or
holding out their big chests thinking, “I am a nun”. Lord Maitreya said that the essence of ethics
is that you have no pride, no arrogance.
Doubt, té tsom (the tshoms): This doubt is one of the biggest problems for a practitioner, in the
sense of not being able to decide what the right path is. It can become a big hindrance to
enlightenment, and it can be the perfect cause for rebirth in samsara.
Suppose that Gérard Godet asks me the way to the toilet. His bladder is full. I tell him to take
this road, turn right, turn left; I give him all the instructions. I say, “You will come to a door
marked ‘men’. This is your toilet – turn the knob and go in. These are my instructions”. He can
follow all these instructions, and actually reach the last stage when he is about to open the door.
But then he looks at the sign ‘MEN’ and has all sorts of doubts. Is this really it? Perhaps the
letters ‘WO’ fell off!
If he has these doubts, it is a hindrance. He has wasted time, and his urine should have come
faster, but it has been postponed several minutes. That is a big obstacle! And on top of that, he
does not know the Vajrayana method of pissing in your pants. What he really needs is the
courage to make a mistake. It does not matter. If he opens the door and finds Ani Jimpa there,
he can close it again! That courage is necessary, and the lack of it is té tsom.
If someone asks you what makes you reborn in samsara and dwell in samsara, the touchy-feely
answer is to say ‘ignorance’. Instead, all you need to do is recite these three causes, which are
what the bodhisattva has abandoned.
The quality of accumulation is taught here on the third line “The bodhisattva possesses supreme
delight”. He has no insecurity about not attaining enlightenment. He is sure. As I said, he is
already there – he is already in France, and it is only a matter of time until he reaches Paris. He
has understood both the selflessness of the person and the selflessness of phenomena.
The fourth line “And is able to stir a hundred worlds”, talks about his ability. Perhaps the word
‘move’ or ‘shake’ would be better than ‘stir’. Every second, he can move the world if he wants
to. He does not have to do it all the time, but he has the ability. Consider someone like
Gorbachev, for example. When he became President of the USSR, all the stock markets went up
and so on – somehow there was a feeling that the world was shaken.
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 31
[H9] (iii) The quality of pressing on further (spontaneous progress), 1:7.1
1:7.1 Joyfully progressing from bhumi to bhumi
Khenpo Kunga Wangchuk, one of my masters, said that when vultures begin to fly, they have
some difficulty, but once they are up high, they occasionally move their wings a little, but they
just stay in the sky. Likewise, the bodhisattva on the first bhumi will have no difficulties at all in
progressing and reaching the second, third and fourth bhumis, and so on. Unless he decides out
of compassion to remain as a first bhumi bodhisattva, he can progress any time he likes. This is
because he has power, or control, over his diligence to engage himself in accumulating merit and
wisdom.
For us, even though we may wish to attain enlightenment, when we actually engage in
accumulating merit and wisdom, and purifying defilements, there are a lot of difficulties. There
are many unfavourable circumstances for accumulating merit and wisdom, and favourable
circumstances for accumulating defilements. This is expressed here in the first line of the 7th
sloka.
[H9] (iv) The quality of passing beyond lower levels, 1:7.2-3
1:7.2-3 The various paths to the lower realms have ended;
The levels of ordinary existence are exhausted.
The fourth quality corresponds to the second and third lines of the 7th sloka. The first of these
two says that he has blocked all the lower realms, which refers to the Path of Application, jorlam
menché (sbyor lam sman chad) and below. There are two paths, the paths of accumulation and
application, and then there are all the samsaric realms. He has blocked these paths, which means
he will never be forced to go down them by power of karma and emotion. But he can choose to
go to these lower realms out of compassion.
[Q]: Earlier, you said that a bodhisattva might become discouraged, and then deviate towards the
paths of the shravaka and pratyekabuddha.
[A]: This is not really going down to the lower realms. Without sufficient compassion, a
bodhisattva might become so tired that he is attracted by the stage of shravaka or
pratyekabuddha, but this is in order to seek a short cut to enlightenment – it is not really a
lower realm. However, your question comes at exactly the right time, because the next line
deals with this point, “The levels of ordinary existence are exhausted”.
You might think that Chandrakirti is repeating himself in the third line, but great scholars like
him never repeat themselves. It might look like repetition, but there is always a new and
different aspect. Here, for instance, right after mentioning that the paths to the lower realms have
ended, he says that the levels of ordinary existence are exhausted. This phrase is a little sarcastic
towards the Hindu doctrines, which teach that one attains the summit of existence through
shamatha, the pacification of the mind. They think that this realm, the highest of the worlds of
the gods, is enlightenment.
In Chandrakirti’s time, Hinduism was the main opponent or alternative to buddhism, but in
general, we can say that other religions seem to have three kinds of aim:
• The highest existence (srid rtse): In some religions, this is heaven. In Hinduism, it is
the peak of existence. This highest state of existence has no perception; therefore, much
of this gross dualism does not exist. Because of this, unless you are an expert, you can
easily mistake it for the real thing. It is like designer watches. The genuine article is
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 32
made in Switzerland, but you can buy an identical fake in Thailand, and unless you are
an expert, you cannot tell the difference.
• To be reborn in Northern Continent. According to buddhist cosmology, we are now in
the southern continent. In the northern continent, people live for a thousand years, and
each of their years is a million of ours. They have wish-fulfilling cows, and enjoy great
pleasure and wealth. In many religions, including the Hindu and Vedic religions, the
aim is to be reborn in this northern continent. It is like a heaven. You do not need to
worry about this one too much, but I have to mention it, because it is in the
commentary. And it is good to know about – perhaps you will end up there, and you
will realise that this is what we were talking about!
• The state of Brahma. This is direct sarcasm. For a bodhisattva, such states are all
exhausted, as he has gone beyond them, and they are not even attractive or interesting to
him. Heaven and the state of Brahma do not tempt him. He may even have revulsion
towards them, because bodhisattvas consider that in these places, too much idealism is
practised but no responsibility is taken. All the schools there are Rudolf Steiner
oriented, no examinations are required, and there is no need to work and social security
is good. But somebody still has to pay the bill!
The main reason why bodhisattvas are not interested in going to these three realms or stages is
that they have so many ‘ripening obscurations’. There are two kinds of ripening obscuration:
• You accumulate merit by doing shamatha meditation, and then you reach that state.
You think that this is final, so you do not wish to advance any further.
• While you are there enjoying yourself, your karmic bank balance is slowly running out,
and one day you realise there are only a few cents left. You have to spend even those,
and then you go back down again. Because of that, you do not even hear the Dharma,
which is one of the freedoms and advantages of a precious human birth.
This can even happen in our day-to-day life. If we are too happy, we do not remember the
Dharma. So, when you are very happy for five minutes, remember that for five minutes you
have been reborn in a realm of long-living gods. But you do not necessarily have to be attached
to that.
[H8] (c) The qualities taught by analogy, 1:7.4
1:7.4 This is taught to be like the eighth sublime level.
The last line of the 7th sloka gives an analogy. When a samsaric being destroys the root of
samsara, he becomes an arya, which means a supreme, or non-samsaric, being. There is a
Hinayana argument that the Mahayana path has an instantaneous progression from the path of
seeing to the path of no more learning. So, they say that the Mahayana path cannot have an arya,
a non-samsaric being who is still on the path, such as the first bhumi. So, some Hinayana people
argue that the Mahayana does not have a gradual path, as they do not have non-samsaric beings
still on the path. That is an important attack, because if you do not have a gradual path, then you
do not have a path at all. And if there is no path, then there is no antidote to the defilements.
That is what they are trying to get at.
Someone on the Hinayana path who has entered the stage of stream-winner is already an arya, a
non-samsaric being. The next stage on the path is the once-returner, and then the never-returner
and then the foe-destroyer, so there are stages of non-samsaric beings on the path. Some
The Hinayana argument
that the Mahayana does
not have a gradual path
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 33
Hinayana people say that Mahayana does not have that, because as soon as you are on the path of
seeing, you instantly become a foe-destroyer.
So, the purpose of this line is to tell Hinayana people that the first bhumi bodhisattva is like the
eighth aryan level. So how do we count to the eighth? There has been a lot of debate in Tibet
about which is the eighth level.
Let me remind you that Chandrakirti is a Prasangika Madhyamika scholar, a consequentialist.
Members of this school always use an analogy that is already accepted within their opponent’s
view. So, here he is using the view of his Hinayana opponent. At this point, you should write a
big question mark in your notebook, because I spent two hours yesterday listening to teachings of
khenpos and reading many commentaries, but I am still not clear as to how they count the eighth
level. They definitely do not count downwards. There are two kinds of stream-winner: the
enterer and the abiders. Then we have the enterer once-returner, the abider once-returner and so
on. We will count upwards, in reverse order, which means that the eighth is the enterer streamwinner.
But I am still not sure whether the eighth level is the enterer stream-winner or the abider
stream-winner.
The Five Paths is more a Mahayana term. These are the path of accumulation, path of
application, path of seeing, path of meditation, and path of no more learning. The first bhumi
bodhisattva is on the path of seeing, so the borderline between samsara and nirvana is just before
the path of seeing. According to Chandrakirti, the stream-winner is the same as the path of
seeing. It is just a difference of language between Hinayana and Mahayana. All these are the
fruit; they are already nirvana.
It is a big thing to be a stream-winner, because it means you have become a non-samsaric being.
Those who are stream-winners receive great respect and devotion from other people. During the
Buddha’s time, some naughty monks wanted to impress the lay people. They were not streamwinners,
and could not really lie about that. So as lay disciples were passing by, they went into a
river and shouted, “Hey, I’ve just entered the stream”, hoping that the onlookers would
misunderstand!
[H8] (d) The quality of outshining others, 1:8
1:8 Striving for enlightenment, even when remaining on the first level,
He defeats those born from the speech of the Sage King, including solitary
realisers.
And, through ever-increasing merit,
On “Far Gone”, his understanding also becomes greater.
We have seen how one obtains the name and the four kinds of qualities of a bodhisattva. We
have just finished talking about how the first bhumi bodhisattva is equal to the stream-winner, by
using an analogy. Now we will look at another of his qualities, the quality of outshining others,
which is the subject of the 8th sloka.
All the shedras and khenpos spend a lot of time on this sloka, because here we need to talk about
the Hinayana, the Mahayana and many other things. The last line in particular is very famous,
and people like Khenpo Rinchen would spend two or three weeks just on that line!
You need to underline the word ‘even’ in the first line, and ‘also’ in the fourth line. Just this
word ‘also’ has been the subject of much discussion, as there is so much meaning behind it.
Sometimes institutes like shedras would invite khenpos just to talk about this!
The importance of the 8th
sloka, and the last line in
particular
How to count the eighth
aryan level
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 34
[H9] (i) Outshining others by the strength of merit on this bhumi, 1:8.1-3
Imagine that there is a king sitting on his throne, surrounded by majestic generals, ministers,
members of parliament, representatives of the citizens, and so on. Then suddenly the queen
comes in, holding the newly born price. Although he is tiny, the prince already outshines the
ministers with his merit, as he is going to become king. No matter how great or clever the
ministers, how long their beards, how much knowledge they have, or how majestic they are, they
will never become king. They will only ever be ministers and generals.
The first bhumi bodhisattva is like a baby crown prince, very small in front of these wise,
majestic and mature shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. But it does not matter, because just as the
prince is going to become king, the bodhisattva will become a Buddha, and not these others.
Another example is given in the Biography of Lord Maitreya Sutra. There is a big tree with a
garuda’s nest, which is surrounded by vultures, owls, hawks, eagles and so on. There is a small
recently born baby garuda, that does not even have hair on its wings, but it can still outshine the
others. Hawks can fly better than the baby garuda, but the garuda is still the king of the birds.
The word ‘even’ in the first line tells us that if the first bhumi bodhisattva outshines the
shravakas and pratyekabuddhas, then bodhisattvas from the second bhumi onwards will
definitely outshine them. Why can bodhisattvas outshine the others? They do so because of
their compassion, and because of the merit that they have accumulated over countless aeons.
[Q]: You said yesterday that the shravakas also have compassion?
[A]: Yes, but a shravaka’s compassion is like a drop of water, whereas a bodhisattva’s
compassion is like the four oceans combined. But our compassion is like dew in the grass,
and compared to us, the compassion of the shravakas is like the four oceans.
[Q]: You said that the bodhisattva is free from three fetters of clinging to a view, or ethics, or
having doubt. Is it that they never have even a temporary stage of doubt, meaning the
thought does not arise in their mind, or is it that it cannot affect them?
[A]: They do not have any doubt. It does not exist for them any more.
[Q]: The analogy says that the bodhisattva outshines others because he will be king in future, but
we are all potential Buddhas.
[A]: Your answer is on the first line of 6th sloka. The bodhisattva is born into the family of the
Tathagatas, so he is sure to become a Buddha. The shravakas and pratyekabuddhas are still
in England, but he is already at the border of France.
[Q]: But what is important is where he is today, rather than that he will be in Paris next year.
Perhaps the one who is in England today might reach Paris before the person at the French
border?
[A]: When all the conditions are there, and there is no antidote or obstacle, then you can be sure
the result will follow. The person in England does not have this. It’s a bit like when
someone says, “I want that”, and another person says, “You’ve got it!” You do not actually
have it, but you are sure it will be given.
[H9] (ii) Outshining others by the strength of understanding on later
bhumis, 1:8.4
[H10] (a) Outshining as implicitly stated in the sutra (539)
The last line of the 8th sloka says, “On “Far Gone”, his understanding also becomes greater”.
In the Dashabhumika Sutra, which is our main supporting sutra, the Buddha says that a newly
born prince will outshine all the mature and learned ministers and generals with his merit. When
this prince grows up and is old enough to actually rule the country, then he will also outshine the
ministers with his intelligence. The sutra continues, “Likewise, sons and daughters of the
The image of the baby
garuda
The image of the newly
born crown prince,
ministers, and generals
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 35
victorious ones, as soon as a bodhisattva obtains ultimate bodhicitta, he will outshine the
shravakas and pratyekabuddhas with the power of his noble aspiration”. In fact, ‘noble
aspiration’ is a good phrase for compassion.
The Buddha goes on to say that when the bodhisattva reaches “Far Gone”, which is the name of
the seventh bhumi, he will outshine the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas even with the ‘superior
understanding of his own object’, rangi yül shepé chewa (rang gi yul shes pa’i che ba). It says
the same thing here on this line: not only his merit, but also his understanding – his superior
understanding of his own object – is greater. We will talk about what this means in more detail.
As you read this, you can sometimes almost feel that Chandrakirti is so taken with the Mahayana
path that he just keeps praising bodhisattvas. In the first three lines, he says that a first bhumi
bodhisattva can outshine shravakas and pratyekabuddhas with his merit, and in the last line, he
says that a seventh bhumi bodhisattva can outshine them with his wisdom. There are no negative
words here, like “he can only outshine them with his merit”. He is always praising the
bodhisattva, and a Hinayana reader might interpret this as sarcasm.
Chandrakirti could have said that the first bhumi bodhisattva is only able to outshine shravakas
and pratyekabuddhas with merit, but not with wisdom. But instead of saying that, he
immediately goes on to say that when this bodhisattva reaches the seventh bhumi, he will also
outshine them with wisdom. But Khenpo Rinchen, one of my teachers, says the word “also” is
actually one of Chandrakirti’s greatest praises of shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. Chandrakirti
is very clever. While he praises the bodhisattvas, he also praises the shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas, by saying “also”. This is indirect praise, because it tells us that shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas have a lot of intelligence – so much that even the sixth bhumi bodhisattva
cannot outshine them.
[H10] (b) The actual meaning stated in that quote (540)
[H11] (i) The sutra’s statement that shravakas and pratyekabuddhas
understand phenomena to have no true nature
Generally, the view that needs to be realised by the shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas
is identical. But their realisation is not the same, as is illustrated by an image. Sometimes a tiny
insect eats away the inside of a mustard seed, and creates a space inside the seed. The realisation
of emptiness of the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas is as big as that space inside the mustard
seed. Notice that I did not say ‘as small as’ – it is a big place! By contrast, the bodhisattva’s
understanding of emptiness is as big as the sky, or perhaps I should say as small as the sky. Here
we are talking about the intelligence of the bodhisattva. Even the first bhumi bodhisattva’s
understanding of emptiness is greater that that of shravakas and pratyekabuddhas, so the question
is, why does he not outshine them even on the first bhumi?
From the first to the sixth bhumis, a bodhisattva cannot irreversibly remove his tsendzin (mtshan
’dzin), what we are calling ‘fixation towards characteristics’. It continues to grow, and he cannot
block it so that it will not return. Here we need to distinguish two types of defilement:
• Dendzin (bden ’dzin): When you look at this pen, you cling to it as a truly existent pen.
If someone says it is spaghetti, you will say, “No, it is a pen”. This is dendzin.
• Tsendzin (mtshan ’dzin) is fixation towards characteristics. As long as there is an object
and a subject, there is tsendzin. There are no details like whether it is truly existing or
not. But this is a very rough explanation.
Two types of defilement:
dendzin and tsendzin
The shravakas’
realisation of emptiness:
the analogy of the space
inside the mustard seed
Indirect praise for
shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 36
Let me give you a bad example. If you are dreaming about a cup of coffee, and in the dream,
somebody asks you if you are drinking coffee, then if you do not know that you are dreaming,
you will say, “Yes, I am drinking coffee”. If they ask if you are sure, you will say, “Yes,
definitely, I’m sure”. And if they ask whether your coffee is satisfying you, you will say that it
is. Then when you wake up and someone asks whether the coffee you drank really existed, you
will say, “No, it was just a dream”. It was not a truly existent cup of coffee.
For now, for simplicity, you can say that dendzin, the belief in things being truly existent, is the
cause of samsara. Shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and first bhumi bodhisattvas have already
abandoned this belief. And, as I just said, the understanding of emptiness of shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas is as big as the space inside a mustard seed, whereas the bodhisattvas’
understanding is like the sky. So, why can’t the first bhumi bodhisattva outshine the shravakas,
given that he has a greater understanding? It is because none of the shravakas, pratyekabuddhas
or bodhisattvas has managed to make their fixation towards characteristics irreversible. Here we
are talking about their progress in term of dreldré, the result of absence.
Let us say that Gérard and I are both looking at that mountain. Gérard is a few feet closer, so he
has a better view; but both Gérard and I have a problem with our eyes, so we are equal to each
other in that sense. Likewise, shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and first to sixth bhumi bodhisattvas
are all equal. One equal cannot outshine another equal, as you have to be greater than another
person in order to outshine them. Therefore, the bodhisattvas cannot outshine the shravakas with
their understanding.
As we have seen, the two ways in which a bodhisattva can outshine shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas are his noble aspiration and his superior understanding of his own object. The
noble aspiration is compassion, which creates merit and makes the first bhumi bodhisattva
outshine the shravakas, whereas the superior understanding of his own object is what the
bodhisattva has on the seventh bhumi ‘Far Gone’.
[H11] (ii) What the other traditions state about this quote
[Editor’s note: Rinpoche did not teach anything under this heading]
[H11] (iii) Introducing the Master Nagarjuna’s understanding of this point (542)
When we talk about the ‘superior understanding of his own object’, rangi yül shepé chewa, there
are three subjects to discuss:
1. Superior
2. Understanding
3. His own object
We will start with the third, ‘his own object’. We need to start by introducing the four extremes,
which are illustrated in the box below. According to Nagarjuna, all phenomena can be included
within these four zones. If you come up with a fifth, I will give you a Manjushri pill! When we
talk about existence, we are not differentiating between inherent or non-inherent or conventional,
we are just talking about everyday existence in the world. For example, do you have a car? Yes,
I have a car – this is existence. The example of neither existence nor non-existence is the
sharpness of the horn on Gérard’s nose – because the horn does not even exist, you cannot talk
about its sharpness.
Why the first bhumi
bodhisattva cannot
outshine the shravakas
The two ways in which a
bodhisattva outshines
shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 37
Existence
Example: a spoon
Cf. Christianity and some types of Hinduism
Non-existence
Example: a rabbit’s horn, or the horn on Gérard’s nose
Cf. existentialism
Both Existence and Nonexistence
Example: the reflection of your face in a mirror
Cf. New Age
Neither Existence nor Nonexistence
Example: the sharpness of the horn on Gérard’s nose
Cf. Taoism
These are the four extremes. If you fall into one or more of these, you are an extremist, and you
do not have the right view of the middle way. Then you do not have ‘the view that is free from
the extremes’. In the first zone, ‘existence’, we can find Christianity. I feel that when buddhists
meditate on emptiness, many of them just delete the first one, ‘existence’, and dwell on the
second, ‘non-existence’. The third one is New Age, where everything is all right, existence or
non-existence. The fourth is Taoism. It is very close to buddhism, and many people think that
‘neither existence nor non-existence’ must be the Middle Way. But this is not so, according to
Chandrakirti. We will come to this in the sixth chapter.
Roughly, one can say that if you just wish to destroy the root of samsara, you can destroy the
first of the four extremes, existence. However, the view that a bodhisattva tries to meditate on is
beyond all four of these zones. That is what we call ‘great emptiness’. So, emptiness is not the
same as non-existence. Many people say that emptiness is something like a void, blank space or
non-existence of this and that – but that is not true. Many people’s emptiness falls into the
second extreme, the second trap.
Shravakas and pratyekabuddhas care more about the first extreme, existence. They emphasise
the understanding of the non-existence of existence. However, a bodhisattva has to understand
the non-existence of existence and the non-existence of non-existence. When you think, “I am”,
that is clinging to existence. Then with some meditation, you can realise the emptiness of self,
but sometimes a person can also have clinging or attachment to this non-existence. From the
Mahayana point of view, that is also a type of defilement.
When the Mahayana says a flower does not exist, it actually means that the flower is free from
the four extremes: it is not existent, nor is it non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, and
not neither existent nor non-existent. If you understand this, you will not ask questions like “how
can the Mahayana say this tent does not exist? I can see it”. Chandrakirti will say it is not
existent but also not non-existent. To our normal mind, ‘not non-existent’ means that it is sort of
existent, but then Chandrakirti tells us that’s not it either. Whichever side you go to,
Chandrakirti is there, saying, “No, this isn’t it!” That is why it is called the Middle Way. And
after all this, Nagarjuna says that a learned one should not even remain in the Middle Way!
[Q]: When one visualises a yidam, for example, first you make it existent, then you dissolve it so
then it is non-existent.
[A]: Yes that is true. In the sixth chapter, Chandrakirti says that all meditations and
visualisations are part of relative truth. Chandrakirti is not saying that you cannot have
existence and non-existence in the relative truth. Remember, as I said on the first day, here
we are establishing the ultimate truth, the view of emptiness.
I cannot talk much about freedom from all these extremes. If you really want to understand this,
understanding only comes from contemplation and meditation. Talking about it just makes it
worse and worse. The more we talk, the worse it gets! But just from hearing the teaching and
The four extremes
Examples of how various
religious views fall into
the four extremes
The great emptiness is not
the same as non-existence
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 38
studying it, a general idea of the view can occur during the Path of Accumulation. It could
happen to us!
And then you meditate on this general idea of the view, and during the Path of Application, a
nyam (nyams) or experience, of freedom from the extremes can occur. The actual understanding
starts at the first bhumi. This explains the analogy of the space inside the mustard seed and the
sky. Even on the first bhumi, a bodhisattva has the beginning of actual understanding of freedom
from all four of the extremes. This is a greater understanding than that of shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas, who only understand the first extreme, and part of the second.
Returning to ‘superior understanding of his own object’, we will now explain the word
‘superior’, and discuss what makes a 7th bhumi bodhisattva superior to shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas. When a bodhisattva reaches the 7th bhumi, during his post-meditation time, he
can make his freedom from tsendzin, fixation towards characteristics, irreversible. This means
that until the 7th bhumi, a bodhisattva still cannot manage to make his fixation towards
characteristics irreversible, which is also the case with shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. This is
why the first bhumi bodhisattva cannot outshine them with his intelligence.
It does not mean that a 7th bhumi bodhisattva is totally free from fixation towards characteristics
from that point on. He still has tsendzin, but does not generate any more tsendzin. The seed has
been planted and the flower is grown, but he is not planting any more seeds. We could say that
he has made the seed sterile, as he no longer accumulates further causes of fixation towards
characteristics. But that does not mean that he no longer has fixation towards characteristics,
because then he would jump to the 10th bhumi or buddhahood! There is still more to purify on
the 8th and 9th bhumis! This tells us that shravakas and pratyekabuddhas still have fixation
towards characteristics, which is why they are equal to bodhisattvas on the first to sixth bhumis.
Now the real problem starts, because our quotations from the Dashabhumika Sutra and the
Biography of Lord Maitreya Sutra give rise to another question. From both quotations, we now
know that shravakas and pratyekabuddhas do have a realisation of the selflessness of phenomena,
and not just the selflessness of the person. If this were not so, a bodhisattva on the first bhumi
could easily outshine them even with his intelligence. However, because shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas have an understanding of the emptiness of phenomena, the bodhisattva does not
outshine them until the 7th bhumi.
We are talking about two things here: realisation, and purification of defilements. The
superiority of a bodhisattva does not relate to things like his physical size or his colour, but lies
in these two aspects: his noble aspiration, and his understanding of emptiness, which is much
vaster than that of the shravakas. We used the example of the space inside the mustard seed to
compare their realisation of emptiness. So, why doesn’t Chandrakirti say that the bodhisattvas
have totally outshone the shravakas? Because although they have superiority in terms of their
realisation of the view, the way they perceive phenomena, they are not superior in terms of their
purification of defilements. To use an analogy, if a shravaka and a bodhisattva are both washing
dirty clothes, neither has reached the point where their clothes will never get dirty again
The quotation from the Dashabhumika Sutra tells us that the baby prince does not outshine the
ministers with his knowledge, which means that the ministers also have some knowledge. We
also know that shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas have all understood the selflessness
of the person, as they are all non-samsaric beings. So, this quotation tells us that a first bhumi
bodhisattva will not outshine shravakas with his intelligence, which means that shravakas must
have some understanding of selflessness of phenomena.
[H10] (c) Disposing of disputes on that question (542)
The 7th bhumi
bodhisattva’s superior
understanding of his own
object
Shravakas must also
understand emptiness of
phenomena
Why shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas have
some understanding of
selflessness of phenomena
Why do bodhisattvas not
completely outshine
shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas?
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 39
We now have to talk about the understanding of the selflessness of phenomena by shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas. You may wonder why I am emphasising this so much. The reason is that if
we make even a slight mistake, we could end up with the consequence that shravakas are already
practising the selflessness of phenomena, and so there is no point even teaching the Mahayana.
In particular, Bhavaviveka said that shravakas and pratyekabuddhas only understand the
selflessness of a person, not of phenomena. Here he is raising an objection, and Chandrakirti
responds by explaining the consequences that Bhavaviveka will have because of saying this. Be
patient here, because we need to go through this. If we have even a small problem here, it will
lead to big problems with the rest of the Madhyamika.
If we look at the framework for the whole of the Madhyamika, there are two things to be
realised:
• Absence of existence of the individual self: gang zag gi bdag med
• Absence of existence of phenomena: chos kyi bdag med
And there are two defilements to be eliminated:
• Clinging to/belief in the individual self bdag ’dzin
• Clinging to/belief in existence of phenomena chos kyi bdag ’dzin
If you want to talk about ignorance, defilements and obstructions to enlightenment, all these are
included in the bottom two. The top two, understanding the absence of existence of the
individual self and of phenomena, are wisdom. When we talk in terms of what has to be
eliminated, we talk about the two types of clinging, and when we talk of what is to be realised,
we talk about the two types of wisdom.
You might ask how these two defilements could be separate. This is a good question. It depends
on your interest. If you want enlightenment, moksha, liberation, then you should get rid of the
first. Once you have done that, that’s it – you are in moksha! That is what shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas want, so that is what they do. As we saw in the homage, in the 3rd sloka, this
defilement is “initially fixating on this so-called ‘I’ as an existing self, ‘Mine’ gives rise to
grasping”. Here we are talking about the ego. It is the first defilement, and it is the cause of the
other eleven links of interdependent origination. But how can these two defilements be separate
things? After all, there can be no notion of ‘I’ or self without the five aggregates. And the five
aggregates belong to the second defilement. This is the problem.
According to Bhavaviveka, shravakas are only interested in getting enlightenment, so they are
only interested in getting rid of the first obscuration, which is ego. That is fine. But then
Bhavaviveka says that the method of realising the emptiness of phenomena is exclusive to the
Mahayana. This is his mistake, according to Chandrakirti. This tells us that shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas must also have knowledge of the emptiness of phenomena. If they did not, they
would not understand the emptiness aspect of the five aggregates. Now, when the causes and
conditions are there, and there is no antidote, the result will follow. Here, the result would be
clinging to ‘I’. If they did not understand the emptiness aspect of the five aggregates, ego could
come automatically. There have been many different ways of thinking about this, not only in
India but also in Tibet. For example, Mipham Rinpoche, Gorampa and Tsong Khapa all had
their own ideas, but I am not going to explain them here.
Now we will talk about bdag ’dzin (chos kyi bdag ’dzin) and bden ’dzin.
Dagdzin (bdag ’dzin) means clinging to the self, which also includes clinging to the self of
phenomena. The characteristics of a phenomenon are the things that can be perceived by the six
senses. The self is also included there. Chos means phenomena, and bdag means something like
How can the two
defilements be separate?
Dagdzin: Clinging to the
self
Bhavaviveka’s objection:
shravakas only
understand the
selflessness of a person
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 40
identity or true self, the thing that identifies something, or makes something what it is. For
example, when we identify something, as in “this is a glass of water” or “this is a piece of apple”,
that is bdag.
[Q]: In western philosophy, we make a distinction between what is perceived, and the underlying
thing that causes those sensations to happen. We do not perceive what is underlying. We
only perceive the sensations. But people believe that there is something underlying that
causes those sensations. That is what we call substance. Is bdag that substance?
[A]: When I say ‘I’ or ‘me’, it is a name, identification, a certain habitual pattern and a
confirmation. Similarly, saying that this is a tent – this is also identification, a hallucination,
a concept and a self. Bdag is ‘true self’, as when English people say ‘itself’, as in ‘by
itself’.
[Q]: When you talk of the thing ‘in itself’ are you talking about something completely separate
from us, which exists in its own right, and which causes our sensations of that thing? If
there is no perceiver, does that thing still have a self?
[A]: No, because then it does not become a chos (dharma), or phenomenon. If none of the six
senses are there to perceive it, then there is no phenomenon.
[Q]: You cannot perceive the underlying substance of something directly, but only through your
senses. You can perceive things like its colour, its hardness or its shape, but you cannot get
beyond your senses. Someone who was not a buddhist would say, “Yes, it’s really there”.
[A]: When we say “this is a cup”, you are asking whether beyond ‘cup’ there is something that
we can then refer to as a cup. According to Chandrakirti, that is zhi mé (gzhi med), there is
no such thing. It is a complete hallucination. There is no base, but you take it as a base and
think ‘this is me’. Here we come to the seven-point analysis of the chariot, in which
Chandrakirti tells us that there is no base, but we hallucinate that there is a base and say,
“this is a chariot”. Similarly, when we say, “this is a tent”, what are we referring to? Is it
this iron beam, or this piece of fabric? If we cut one piece and then another, we will not
find the tent. There is no base, but we still have an idea that this is a tent, and we cling to it.
That is dagdzin.
Similarly, when Jakob thinks his girlfriend is beautiful, that is also dagdzin. When he is very
much in love, he thinks her smell is good, her looks are good, her taste is good – all of that. But
this is baseless, because if there were a truly existent base, then he should always think she
smells good and so on. But one day, when he hates her, her smell is bad and she is no longer
beautiful! This shows that there is no base to her beauty – it is a ‘baseless assumption’.
Then we come to dendzin (bden ’dzin), thinking that something is truly existent. This is a more
gross defilement, because something can be dagdzin without necessarily also being dendzin.
This is because tsendzin, fixation towards characteristics, is chos kyi bdag ’dzin, but it is not
dendzin.
We have seen that, in order to understand the selflessness of the person, shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas must understand the selflessness, or non-substantiality, of the five aggregates.
Indeed, the Buddha taught them about the second selflessness, the selflessness of phenomena, as
we can see from the following quotation. He said that “form is like a bubble and feeling is like a
bubble”, meaning they are essenceless, that they have no substantial existence. There is no true
existence, no reality in there. The Buddha also said that “perception is like a mirage, and karmic
formation is like a banana tree”. A banana tree has many layers, and when you look at it from
outside, it looks very solid. But it is all just layers of skin. As you peel layer after layer of skin,
you end up finding that there is nothing inside. There is no real solid substance, as it is all made
out of skin. This quotation also says that consciousness is like a magical illusion.
So, why is the Mahayana taught, and what makes the Mahayana special? This challenge comes
from Bhavaviveka, who thinks that the teachings on the selflessness of phenomena are exclusive
to the Mahayana. He says that if this subject were also taught to the shravakas, then there would
Bhavaviveka’s challenge:
Why is the Mahayana
taught?
Dendzin: thinking
something is truly existent
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 41
be nothing special about the Mahayana, so there would be no reason or benefit in teaching it
again.
Chandrakirti says that the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas must understand the selflessness of
phenomena, because if they did not understand that, they could not understand the selflessness of
the person. And if you do not understand the selflessness of the person, then you are in samsara.
So, in response to Bhavaviveka, Chandrakirti asks him two questions. Is Bhavaviveka saying
that the teachings of the Mahayana in general are irrelevant? Or is it just that the Mahayana
teachings on the selflessness of phenomena are irrelevant?
The first objection is definitely invalid, since the Mahayana not only has teachings about the
selflessness of a person and of phenomena, but it also has teachings on the paramitas, prayers,
compassion, dedication, and so on. And the aim of the Mahayana is not just to go beyond one
extreme, but also to go beyond all four extremes.
Now we will respond to the second objection, that the Mahayana teachings on the selflessness of
phenomena are irrelevant. Here we are still talking about the ‘superior understanding of one’s
own object’, and we have already discussed ‘superior’ and ‘one’s own object’, so now we come
to ‘understanding’.
[H10] (d) Negating Explanations Based on Conceptual Analysis (545)
Although shravakas and pratyekabuddhas do practise the selflessness of phenomena, there are
three reasons why the Mahayana teaching on this subject is greater:
1. It is clearer
2. It is vaster
3. It is complete
How is it clearer? To the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas, the Buddha only said that form is like
a bubble, perception is like a mirage, and so on. He did not clarify this. But in the Mahayana, he
said that form is emptiness, and emptiness is form. This is much more clear and direct.
Although the Buddha said this to Shariputra, as in the Heart Sutra, Shariputra does not practice
it. He just repeats it, which is why he is nyentö (shravaka).
How is it vaster? When the Buddha teaches shravakas and pratyekabuddhas the selflessness of
phenomena and of the person, he only negates one aspect: existence. But in the Mahayana, he
not only negates the first aspect, existence, but also the other three: non-existence, existence and
non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence. There is a classification of either 16 or
20 types of emptiness, which we will come to when we discuss the 6th bhumi. When we say
‘vaster’, it refers to the quantity of emptiness. For shravakas and pratyekabuddhas, only one type
is taught, but in the Mahayana, all 20 types are taught.
Why is it complete? Shravakas and pratyekabuddhas only understand the first of the four
extremes and a little of the second. In the Mahayana, all four extremes are taught – it is
complete.
There are several different explanations here. Although I will skip over the debates here, they
are good. Nobody is wrong; all are great. The debates are not about winning. If there is
anything to gain, it is wisdom.
In particular, Tsong Khapa says that from the first to the seventh bhumis, a bodhisattva still has
to purify the first defilement, which is tsendzin (fixation towards characteristics), although his
purification of dagdzin (clinging to the self) is finished. Remember that we were talking about
The three reasons why the
Mahayana teaching on
the selflessness of
phenomena is greater
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 42
two kinds of defilements – clinging to the self and clinging to phenomena. The bodhisattva
needs to purify clinging to the existence of phenomena, not just for enlightenment, but also for
omniscience. The selflessness of phenomena is divided into nine parts, and these nine are the
obstacles that need to be purified by the nine stages of the bodhisattva.
When a bodhisattva manages to destroy clinging to the self of the person, he attains the first
bhumi. One can almost say that this first stage of the buddha is just an instant. The tonglam, the
path of seeing, occurs as soon as you see the emptiness. That’s it! But as Tulku Jigme Rinpoche
was saying, for them one minute and one hundred years are identical.
So today, we have completed the line “On ‘Far Gone’, his understanding also becomes
greater”. This usually takes ten or twenty days to teach. Do not tell Tibetans that I taught it in
one day. They would never believe it! I would become an outcast!
[Q]: Is the path of seeing free from the four extremes?
[A]: Not completely. This is why bodhisattvas on the path of seeing are still on the path.
[Q]: Isn’t it true that if shravakas and pratyekabuddhas understand the selflessness of
phenomena, compassion will arise out of this understanding, and they will then become
Mahayana?
[A]: Yes, they certainly have a lot of compassion, but it is tiny when compared to the Mahayana.
[Q]: Why are selflessness of phenomena and the person treated separately?
[A]: It is a question of what different people are interested in. Some only want enlightenment, so
they need to abandon clinging to the self of the person, which is what binds them to
samsara. Others want to go further, and gain omniscience, so they need to abandon clinging
to the self of phenomena, which is what binds them to nirvana.
[Q]: The ‘I’ can only perceive phenomena through itself, so I cannot see any real difference. It
also seems that the ‘I’ can perceive itself through phenomena.
[A]: You still have that, even if you have abandoned clinging to the self of the person. You only
abandon the clinging to the person; you do not abandon the person.
[Q]: So can we say that the ego transforms during this journey?
[A]: Yes, it looks like that. But strictly, you should say speak in terms of the dag, the baseless
assumption towards something that does not have any base. We will come to this in detail
later. For example, although there is no basis for thinking so, you think this is a tent. That
is similar to clinging to the self of a phenomenon. On top of that, you think that this is a
truly existent tent, which bodhisattvas do not. It is stupid to try to speak on behalf of the
bodhisattvas, but I am guessing that they have an idea of a tent, and the one that perceives
the tent – subject and object – but not the clinging. These two are not truly separate. It is
like a large staircase that goes up to the first and second floors of a house. You can leave
the stairs at the first floor if you are happy with that. But if you want to go further, you
continue on the same staircase until the second floor. It is the same staircase, but you could
divide it into two by saying that one set of stairs goes to the first floor, and another set of
stairs goes to the second floor. In summary, although there is no basis to the idea of a tent,
an ordinary person will think this is a tent, and believe that it is truly existent. Bodhisattvas
do not believe it is truly existent, but they still have the idea of subject and object, although
without clinging.
We talked earlier of dreldré, the result of absence. In fact, the word buddha, or in Tibetan
sangyé (sang rgyas) especially sang (which means ‘purified’) is very much this dreldré, this
result of absence. When we praise the Buddha, we say, ‘awakened one’. That is the supreme
praise, rather than ‘great one’, ‘powerful one’, or ‘beautiful one’. His greatest quality, being
awakened, is a result of absence: the absence of sleep, the absence of ignorance, and so on. We
should take the meaning for granted, as there is a lot to think about here. In Sanskrit, ‘ignorance’
is avidya, and in Tibetan, it is marigpa.
The problem is that in English, ignorance means ‘not knowing’. This implies that there is
something to know that you do not know, but that is not good here, because the word avidya
The meaning of “absence
of ignorance”
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 43
connotes just the opposite. It is not that you do not know something that you should know, it is
that you know something where there is nothing to know! There is no base; there is nothing
there in reality. But you create something and then ‘know’ that. That is avidya, that is the not
knowing – not knowing the reality. Of course, misunderstanding is also included within
ignorance. If somebody thinks this teabag is a fish, it is also ignorance. But here we are talking
about the situation where there is nothing solidly existent in reality, but your mind thinks there is
something. That is avidya. And that something is dag, and clinging to it is dzin. Dag is almost
like a self. For example, Jakob thinks his girlfriend is beautiful. Here, ‘beautiful’ is the dag.
And when others are near her, Jakob is jealous: this attachment, this clinging, is the dzin.
So, in buddhism, ignorance has nothing to do with evil or misunderstanding. It is a
hallucination, a mirage. People think that dualism refers to bad/good, ugly/beautiful and so on.
Yes, these are also dualism. But there are no separate solid entities such as subject and object –
they are one. When you do not know that, and you divorce subject and object, then it becomes
dualism. Dualism is also ignorance. When we look at this teabag, our habitual mind thinks that
this is a solidly existent external phenomenon. We think there really is a teabag there, which is
separate from my mind that thinks, “This is a teabag”. But according to buddhism, especially the
Mahayana, there is no teabag if there is no knower, one who gives this type of label. So this is
why, if I ask you whether you see the cup of tea that I see, you would normally say yes, but in
fact you never see my idea of this cup of tea – you only see your idea of this cup of tea.
Although there is just one type of ignorance, it is classified into two types according to its object
of focus: clinging to the self of the person, and clinging to the self of phenomena. The second
one includes the first, but the first is focussed mainly on the self, such as when you think, ‘I am’.
When you think, ‘he is’, that is a phenomenon. The self of a person refers to your own person,
whereas a phenomenon, like a tent, is something that is not you. You can abandon the first type
of clinging and still be stuck with the second. Let us suppose you are washing clothes because
you see them as dirty. It takes half an hour to remove all the dirt, but some people just want to
wash the clothes for fifteen minutes, and then they’re happy. They do not see the rest of the dirt
as dirt, whereas true hygiene fanatics really wash it properly. The way that ignorance works, the
way it obscures, is also categorised into two:
• Apprehending things as truly existent
• Apprehending things as mere appearance
The first is thinking things like “I think I am truly existent”. Do not worry about whether you
have the second kind of ignorance, because for us this dirt would be an attainment rather than an
obscuration! To show these ideas, we can draw a diagram (see illustration on next page). The
triangle in the diagram above represents ignorance. It is drawn without a break to represent that
there is just a single continuity. The beginning of the path is the point at which you take refuge,
or when you accept the four mudras or the four seals, which are:
1. All compounded things are impermanent.
2. All emotions are suffering.
3. All phenomena are without truly existing characteristics, without a truly existing ‘self’.
4. Nirvana is beyond the extremes (nirvana is peace).
If you have taken refuge, then these four mudras are included when you take refuge in the
Dharma.
Ignorance is classified
into two: clinging to the
self of a person and the
self of phenomena
Ignorance is not a
misunderstanding or evil.
It is a mirage, a
hallucination.
The Four Great Seals
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 44
When you cross the border between samsara and nirvana, you become a first bhumi bodhisattva.
According to the Hinayana, you would be called an Enterer Stream-Winner. Upon reaching the
first bhumi, the bodhisattva has abandoned clinging to the self of the person and dendzin, the
type of clinging that we have called ‘apprehending things as truly existent’.
The tenth bhumi is the borderline between the path and no more path. Enlightenment has two
meanings: no more returning to samsara, and omniscience. You could also call the 1st bhumi
enlightenment, since there is no more returning to samsara. But at the bottom of the diagram, is
complete omniscience, dzokpé sangyé (rdzogs pa’i sang rgyas).
There is another borderline at the 7th bhumi. As we discussed earlier, the first bhumi bodhisattva
can outshine shravakas and pratyekabuddhas with his merit, but not with his intelligence.
Bodhisattvas have a greater view, a superior understanding of their own object, because they are
looking at all four extremes, whereas shravakas and pratyekabuddhas are only looking at one and
a half. But 1st to 6th bhumi bodhisattvas cannot outshine them with intelligence, because they
still create the causes of tsendzin, ‘apprehending things as mere appearance’. The 7th bhumi
bodhisattva outshines shravakas and pratyekabuddhas, as he no longer creates the causes of
apprehension of mere appearance. But until he has omniscience, he is still suffering because of
his apprehension of mere appearance, so he is still an object of compassion. This is the third type
of compassion that we talked about earlier (on p. 19).
This is why Chandrakirti refers to the shravaka and pratyekabuddha states as ‘island
enlightenment’. In ancient times, Indian adventurers made voyages to the middle of the ocean to
look for jewels. Sometimes, after months of seeing only the sky and the ocean, they would get
tired. And if they came across a small island, they felt happy and wanted to settle down there for
a while. But according to the Mahayana point of view, eventually they will all have to continue
on their journey.
[H7] (2) Expressing the Qualities of the Paramita emphasised (558)
The 7th bhumi bodhisattva
no longer creates the
causes of tsendzin
The 1st bhumi bodhisattva
has crossed the border
between samsara and
nirvana
Shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas as
“island enlightenment”
The 10th bhumi is the
borderline between path
and no more path
OBSCURATIONS
- Clinging to both ideas of self
- No more clinging to self of person
- No more dendzin (solid belief in true
existence of phenomena)
- Still create causes of tsendzin
- Still cling to self of phenomena
- tsendzin still present
- 7th to 10th bhumi bodhisattvas no
longer create causes of tsendzin
- No more clinging to self of
phenomena
- Path of Accumulation
- Path of Joining
- 1st to 6th bhumis (for
bodhisattva path)
- 7th to 10th bhumis
Enterer Stream- Winner
(for shravaka/
pratyekabuddha path)
TAKING
REFUGE
SAMSARA
NIRVANA
ENLIGHTENMENT
Ordinary Beings
Beings on the
Path
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 45
[H8] (a) Showing that the paramita of generosity is the principal one, 1:9
1:9 Here, the first cause for perfect enlightenment,
Generosity, is the most important.
Giving his flesh with enthusiasm,
Infers what is not seen.
Here we are talking about the qualities the bodhisattva seeks to cultivate during his postmeditation
time, and in particular, the paramita that is most important on this bhumi. On the first
bhumi, the most important paramita during the bodhisattva’s post-meditation time is generosity.
There are three types of generosity:
• Material generosity;
• Protection;
• Dharma.
Although the bodhisattva practices all of them, the emphasis here is on material generosity.
There are two types of material generosity: outer (giving flowers, water, incense, elephants,
peacocks, and palaces), and inner (giving up one’s wife, son, or daughter). There are many
examples of material generosity in the stories of the bodhisattvas’ past lives.
When Shakyamuni was a king in a previous life, he gave up his whole family for a single word
of Dharma. As an Indian king, he had all the material wealth imaginable, but still he was not
satisfied with life. He declared that if someone could give him wisdom, he could give up
anything. Lord Indra transformed himself into a Brahmin, and said he would give Shakyamuni a
word of wisdom if he would give him all his queens. And Shakyamuni gave them up.
Actually, the love for wisdom of the Indian kings was amazing. It was perhaps the greatest in
human history. It was only after the Moghul invasion of India that the kings became intoxicated
with women, wine and expansion of the kingdom. Hari Chandra, one of the Rajput kings, lost
his entire kingdom because his favourite pastime was debating with his fifty buddhist scholars
and fifty Hindu scholars. Although his ministers informed him that the Moghul invaders were
right at his walls, he wanted to finish the debate! The ancient kings’ love of wisdom was also
reflected in their architecture. Instead of building ornate palaces, they would just have four
pillars and a ceiling. They did not even have walls. But Ani Jimpa is complaining that this is a
sidetrack, so we should return to the text!
There should be the word ‘even’ at the start of the third line: his act of generosity is the most
important, so that “even giving his own flesh with enthusiasm infers what is not seen”. For
example, when Shakyamuni was a prince called ‘Courageous One’, he was walking in a forest
and he gave up his body to a hungry tiger. The last line is important, because how can an
ordinary person judge whether someone is already on the first bhumi or not? You cannot see,
smell or taste such qualities. But if someone has the courage to give up his own flesh, this tells
us that he has inner qualities that we cannot see, and that he is on the first bhumi. However, until
they reach the path of seeing, bodhisattvas are instructed not to give up their flesh or their life,
with the exception of donating organs after death.
The hard-line Hindu master Ashvaghosha did this. He debated with Aryadeva, the disciple of
Nagarjuna, and their bet was that the loser would join the winner’s religion. Ashvaghosha lost
three times, but his dislike of buddhism was so great that he decided to jump into the Ganges.
Aryadeva sent a monk from Nalanda University to catch him and then lock him in Nalanda
library for seven days. There was nothing there for Ashvaghosha to do except read books, and
he found a passage where Buddha Shakyamuni had predicted him, and predicted that he would
be the first person to narrate the life of the Buddha. During those seven days, he remembered all
The story of the debate
between Aryadeva and
Ashvaghosha
The story of how
Shakyamuni gave up his
family for a word of
Dharma
The courage to give up
your own body
The three types of
generosity
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 46
his previous lives as a bodhisattva, and attained great devotion to the Buddha, Dharma and
sangha.
He became one of the greatest poets in India, and wrote the Buddhacarita, which is the story of
the Buddha. For example, Ashvaghosha narrates the scene of prince Siddhartha’s night time
escape from the palace very beautifully. He describes all the sleeping courtesans, including one
who has been playing the tambourah and has now fallen asleep holding it as if it were her lover.
It is so beautifully written.
One day Ashvaghosha was travelling through a forest, and he met a tiger. The tiger ate his
limbs, but not completely, and Ashvaghosha continued to crawl along although he was losing
blood and dying. Every time he saw a stone, he wrote a poem, and after seventy verses, he died.
This poem is called Seventy Aspirations, and they are prayers you can recite.
[H8] (b) Praising other kinds of generosity (559)
[H9] (i) As what causes beings to escape from suffering, 1:10-11
1:10 Ordinary individuals, craving happiness,
Cannot live without comfort.
Recognising that comfort comes from generosity,
It was this the Muni spoke of first.
The 10th to 12th slokas praise acts of generosity in general, not specifically those of a first bhumi
bodhisattva. In this sloka, Chandrakirti says that as long as a person is materially poor, generally
this person is considered unhappy, although we should emphasise the word ‘generally’ so there
won’t be questions like “Isn’t Milarepa happy”. Material wealth cannot occur without causes
and conditions. These are of two kinds:
• The knowledge and the ability to accumulate wealth, such as knowledge of business
strategy, patience, cleverness and putting an emphasis there. But these are just
conditions, not the main cause, as one can see that many people with a business degree
are still poor and starving.
• The real underlying cause is acts of generosity in past lives or at the beginning of this
life. The Buddha knows the good qualities of having generosity and the downfalls of
not having it, which is why he taught generosity as the first of the paramitas.
In general, we say there are three stages to the Buddha’s teaching on this earth, each of which is
to overcome something. First, in order to overcome non-virtuous deeds, he taught cause and
effect, reincarnation, karma, and similar things. The second stage is in order to overcome
clinging to the self, and the third is to overcome clinging to all types of view. The third is
exclusive to the Mahayana, the second is common to both Mahayana and Theravada and the first
is the most common. Since generosity is an act of karma, it is taught in the first stage.
1:11 Uncompassionate, extremely insensitive,
Striving solely for personal benefit –
Even such individuals will obtain comforts,
And have all sufferings pacified, through generosity.
In this sloka, being ‘extremely insensitive’ also includes those with ridiculous ‘courage’ to ignore
the suffering of all other sentient beings, which refers slightly to shravakas and pratyekabuddhas.
The three stages of
Buddha’s teachings
The causes and
conditions of material
wealth
The story of Ashvaghosha
and the tiger
Why generosity was
taught first
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 47
[H9] (ii) As what also causes lasting happiness, 1:12
1:12 Furthermore, practising generosity,
They will swiftly meet with a superior,
Completely cutting the stream of samsara.
Having such a cause, they proceed to the yield of peace.
Normally, people perform acts of generosity for worldly gains rather than for enlightenment. But
here Chandrakirti says that even if people do not have this greater kind of motivation and if they
practice generosity only with worldly motivations such as becoming richer, as long as they keep
on practising generosity, then eventually they will meet a superior being. This also comes from a
sutra, which says that aryas, which are non-samsaric beings such as bodhisattvas, are bound to
go to generous people. They are attracted to them. For example, the Buddha’s begging bowl
represents that he goes to town to beg alms.
Once there was a small tear in Buddha’s robe. Ananda offered to repair it, but Buddha declined
his offer, put on his robe, and went to a nearby village to beg alms, as he usually did. He met a
poor girl with nothing to wear who came and sewed this tear up with grass. At that moment
Shariputra laughed, and when he was later asked why, he said that at that very moment in the
Heaven of the Thirty-Three, Lord Indra ordered Vishwakarma, the god of architectural design
and engineering, to measure the palace for her when she would take rebirth there.
But she did not want that, as her aim was enlightenment. I think she became the nun Utpalmo,
named thus because she was as beautiful as the utpala flower. Although she was a nun, she was
so beautiful that a local prince chased her. After many days she stopped and asked him which
part of her body he liked most. By this time, she was already a Foe-Destroyer. The prince was
stunned, and did not know how to reply, so he said he liked her eyes. Then she took out both of
her eyes and gave them to him. At that moment, the prince realised the truth of phenomena,
understanding that beauty is only a compounded thing, just an idea.
If a person keeps on engaging in generosity, one day he will meet a superior being. Then he will
hear the teachings, cut the stream of samsara and reach nirvana.
[H8] (c) Praising the bodhisattva’s generosity
[H9] (i) The result obtained, manifest joy, 1:13.1-2
1:13.1-2 Those pledged to others’ welfare,
Will soon gain happiness through generosity.
Now we turn to the generosity of a bodhisattva. For us, the result of our generosity, which may
be future wealth or happiness, may come in ten years or even in the next life. It is neither
obvious nor quick, which may explain why people are not generous. But bodhisattvas are not
seeking to become rich and powerful; they have pledged to other people’s welfare, and their aim
is to make others happy. So, as soon as they give, they know the other person is happy, and this
is why the bodhisattvas gain happiness. For us, the motivation behind our generosity is that we
can gain happiness. For a bodhisattva, the motivation is that others can become happy, so
naturally he gains his result more quickly.
The story of the nun
Utpalmo and the prince
The story of the poor girl
who repaired the tear in
the Buddha’s robe
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 48
[H9] (ii) This generosity is therefore of foremost importance, 1:13.3-4
1:13.3-4 Hence, for those with compassion and those without
The importance of generosity is stressed.
Therefore, the happiness of all beings relies solely on generosity, whether they have compassion,
like the bodhisattvas, or not, like shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and people like us. This is why the
importance of generosity is stressed.
[Q]: We say we are generous in order to gain happiness, but isn’t that also the case for
bodhisattvas? Surely, it also makes them happy to give?
[A]: It makes them happy, but the difference is that it makes them happy to have the other person
happy. For us, the result just makes us happy.
[Q]: Do bodhisattvas intend to make themselves happy?
[A]: No, they do not. This is actually quite an important thing for Mahayana buddhists to know.
If, for example, you are supposed to build a temple for your teacher, then as soon as you
have the intention to build it, that pure intention, then it is already a success. Success does
not depend on actually managing to build the temple and having a consecration ceremony.
As soon as you have that motivation, it is the end of an act. But this does not mean that you
should just be happy with it. Of course, you can accumulate more actions that are positive.
But if the temple were to be destroyed by wind or an earthquake, a bodhisattva would have
no regrets. Instead of giving up, he would build it again.
[H9] (iii) It is much greater than a particular analogous kind of joy, 1:14
1:14 When hearing or thinking of “give!”
The pleasure of a bodhisattva
Exceeds the pleasure of the arhat’s nirvana,
Not to mention [the joy of] giving everything.
Again, we are talking about bodhisattva’s act of generosity. Even the happiness of shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas cannot exceed the simple happiness of a bodhisattva when he hears the word
‘give’. Chandrakirti is not just saying this to be poetic or nice to bodhisattvas. It is logically
true, because the aim of shravakas and pratyekabuddhas is to reach enlightenment, whereas the
aim of bodhisattvas is to make other people happy. We do not even need to mention whether a
bodhisattva actually gives anything, since just hearing the word ‘give’ makes him so happy. The
Sanskrit word danaparamita, ‘give’, has many other meanings as well. It connotes
impermanence, death, reincarnation, past life and next life. It also connotes the chance to
accumulate merit. This is another reason why bodhisattvas are happy when someone says
“give”. It not only creates the chance for them to give, but also reminds them of many teachings.
[H9] (iv) Disposing of disputes about how this joy is obtained, 1:15
1:15 Suffering when cutting and giving his body,
He realises the pain
Others endure in the hells and so forth.
He thus endeavours in eradicating suffering.
When a bodhisattva gives his own limbs or flesh, he feels great pain as he cuts his body, because
he still has tsendzin, clinging to mere appearance. Because of this hardship, an ordinary person
would refrain from continuing, but a bodhisattva will feel the sufferings of the hell and hungry
ghost realms in his own body, and it will remind him of his responsibility to end the suffering of
all beings. So, instead of stopping, he will complete these acts even more quickly.
Pure intention is central
in the Mahayana
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 1 – 49
[H8] (d) Categorisation of this paramita (560), 1:16
1:16 Giving, which is empty of giver, gift and receiver –
Is known as transcendent paramita.
Attachment to these three
Is taught as being ordinary paramita.
[H9] (i) Explaining the meaning of the word paramita (561)
Now we are talking about two kinds of paramitas here. The real paramita does not yet exist on
the first bhumi. ‘Paramita’ means ‘gone beyond’, and a first bhumi bodhisattva has not yet gone
beyond. He has something almost authentic, but it is not complete.
[H9] (ii) That which can truly be given this name
When there is no clinging whatsoever to the self of the giver, or the thing that you are giving,
such as a flower, or the receiver – then the generosity it is called ‘beyond worldly paramita’.
[H9] (iii) That which can be given this name by association
Although a bodhisattva can have attachment to these three, not as being truly existing but just as
mere appearance, if he dedicates his act of generosity for the sake of the enlightenment of all
sentient beings, then it is called “worldly paramita”.
To illustrate this, suppose that I want to give this spoon to Gérard Godet. I give it to Gérard, and
then he says, “I do not have my bag with me, so please can you look after it for me”, and he
gives it back to me. Now, although the spoon is in my hand, it is no longer mine. It has already
been dedicated. Although it was my gift, if I run away with the spoon, I will be stealing from
him. Likewise, although a bodhisattva still has clinging, if he dedicates his act of generosity to
enlightenment, then it becomes a worldly paramita. This is what is called ‘giving the name of
result to the cause’. It is like the sun penetrating our tent.
[H6] c) Concise summary of its qualities by means of similes (564), 1:17
1:17 The bodhisattva, firmly established in such mind,
Has become a holy being, ravishing and radiant with joy,
Which, as the water crystal jewel,
Perfectly vanquishes dense darkness.
So, the bodhisattva remains firmly in such a mind of understanding his own object. And as he
remains in that state, a radiant joy comes from his realisation that he has reached the first bhumi.
This joy is like a water crystal jewel, which is an Indian name for the moon, and it will vanquish
all the dense darkness of clinging to the self of a person and clinging to phenomena as truly
existent.
Here ends the first enlightened aspiration of “The Philosophy of the Middle Way”.
Giving the name of result
to the cause
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 2 – 50
[H5] 2. The Second Bhumi, Without Stain
[H6] a) Detailed explanation of the qualities of the paramita
emphasised
[H7] (1) The features of Discipline, the paramita emphasised
[H8] (a) Attaining perfect discipline, 2:1.1-2
2:1.1-2 Here, because he possesses perfect discipline
He abandons the stains of faulty ethics, even in dreams.
[H9] (i) Its definition
The second bhumi bodhisattva emphasises ethics, so we need to start by discussing ethics a little.
When they talk about discipline, buddhists talk about ‘downfalls’ or tung wa (ltung ba),
including ‘natural downfalls’ and ‘downfalls depending on breaking the precepts’. In buddhism,
it is important to know that it is not a superior being, such as the Buddha, who determines things
like bad karma or unwholesome deeds. You decide them. For example, suppose you are very
angry with a particular person such as Gérard. You want him to have unhappiness and to be
separated from happiness. Now, if you have recently arrived on Earth, you may not know what
makes people happy and unhappy, so you may actually do the reverse.
But you are not like that. You have been in samsara for millions of lifetimes. That is, of course,
if you believe in reincarnation. If not, at least you have been here a few years, meaning that you
have an education here. We know that, in general, stroking someone gently produces happiness
and punching him or her on the nose causes unhappiness. You have a reference, because
someone once punched you and you felt pain. And now you are using that reference in order to
cause him pain.
But let us suppose that Gérard Godet has come from Jupiter, and that he has a strange nose and
ears. For him, punching someone on the nose is actually a greeting. But because I do not know
this, I still have bad karma when I punch him, because I think that it will give him pain. It all
depends on my motivation. If I know that he loves to be punched on his nose, some sort of kinky
stuff like that, and then I do it as a greeting, it is different.
When we shake hands, I do not think we are creating good karma, but if we do it with a certain
sort of motivation, it can also create good merit. If you do that, this is what we call a ‘natural
downfall’. When we speak of “good karma” and “bad karma”, the words good and bad are just
to distinguish the result. We call it bad karma because the result is painful and good karma
because the result is not painful. That’s all. You can change it if you like.
Now, we turn to “downfalls depending on breaking the precepts”. The Buddha said to the monks
that they should not cut trees. If you are a follower of the Buddha and you disobey that, you are
breaking a vow. It does not have much connection with ‘natural downfalls’, but it is something
that you promised to do and you broke it. For example, in the Vajrayana, if your teacher tells
you never to tell anyone that there is a sun and a moon in the sky, you should never say it,
In buddhism, bad deeds
are defined by your
motivation, not divine
judgement
Two types of downfalls
Downfalls depending on
breaking the precepts
Natural downfalls
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 2 – 51
although you know that the whole world knows. You should still keep it secret. You should not
even think of saying to your teacher that everybody knows this, as perhaps you may miss an
important opportunity to receive a teaching. But anyway, let us forget this Vajrayana touchyfeely
stuff.
[H9] (ii) Its nature
According to the Theravada, many vows are actually a form. Usually, the Theravada speaks of
two kinds of form. One is something that you can see and feel with your senses. The other you
cannot perceive, but these imperceptible forms are still dependent on elements. For example,
when a person takes a monk’s vow, that vow is a form, and is it dependent on the elements of
this person’s body, his aggregates. Therefore, when a person dies, his monk’s vow also exhausts.
Of course, the result of the vow, which is the merit, continues. But the vow exhausts, which is
why, if the person is reborn as a bird, for example, he will not be a bird monk.
This is why, when a person is about to become a monk, there are many questions, like “do you
have a secret organ”. This is because if you do not have a secret organ, you cannot take a
Theravada vow, and you cannot become a monk or a nun. There are intensive studies of things
like this in the Vinaya. People think the Vinaya is just ‘the Buddha said do this, and do not do
that’. But, for example, it contains a detailed discussion about what happens if a person who is a
hermaphrodite takes a monk’s vow, and after a few months, his secret organ changes.
In the Mahayana, the bodhisattva vow is not a form vow. A bodhisattva can take a bodhisattva
vow from now until enlightenment. In between, he might be reborn as a snake, a bird or human
being, but he is still a bodhisattva. This does not mean that if a Mahayana bodhisattva took a
monk’s vow that he will go on being a monk, because the authority on monastic comes from the
Theravada sutras. It is important to know that when a follower of the Mahayana takes a monk’s
vow, they are always taking it from the point of view of the Theravada. This is very important to
know.
In the second line of the first sloka, we should highlight the word ‘even’. The first sloka
introduces us to the second bhumi bodhisattva, and his post-meditation time qualities of ethics or
discipline. We need to clarify ‘the stains of faulty ethics’. Here we are talking about having no
guilt. As long as you feel guilty about breaking a vow or a rule, it shows that you have not yet
perfected discipline. I am currently explaining the difference between regret and guilt as follows.
When you feel regret, you have more power to not repeat the action. But with guilt, although
you know that it is not the right thing to do and you might whine about it, but you still do it. A
bodhisattva on the path may feel a lot of regret and guilt at breaking rules and vows, but the
second bhumi bodhisattva is free from both of these.
[H9] (iii) The measure of its perfection
But this does not mean that a first bhumi bodhisattva has faulty ethics. Chandrakirti is saying
that the second bhumi bodhisattva stresses this method of discipline more, not only in his real
life, but also in his dreams. This is because his deeds of body, speech and mind are pure. They
are pure because he has completely abandoned harming other beings, and on top of that, he has
pledged to help other beings.
In the Mahayana, vows
do not have a form
The difference between
regret and guilt
In the Theravada, vows
have a physical form
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 2 – 52
[H8] (b) Accumulating the ten positive actions, 2:1.3-2.2
2:1.3-4 Because deeds of body, speech and mind are pure,
He accumulates the ten-fold aspect of the sacred path
2:2.1-2 On this tenfold path of virtue,
As he progresses, it becomes exceedingly pure.
Because of that, he accumulates the ten-fold aspects of the sacred path. The ten-fold aspects of
the sacred path are three of body, four of speech and three of mind:
• Body: refraining from killing, sexual misconduct and stealing.
• Speech: refraining from lies, gossip, harsh words and divisive speech.
• Mind: refraining from covetousness, harmful intentions and wrong views.
When Chandrakirti says, “it becomes exceedingly pure”, he is not saying that the first bhumi
bodhisattva does not have these ten-fold aspects of the sacred path, but that on second bhumi, it
will be even more exceedingly pure.
[H8] (c) Making the bodhisattva beautiful, 2:2.3-4
2:2.3-4 As the autumn moon, ever immaculate [discipline]
Is ravishing in its soothing light.
The third and fourth lines talk about one of the qualities of discipline, which makes the
bodhisattva immaculate, beautiful and pure. The analogy is that of an autumn moon. Generally,
the moon is clear and white, but in India, the autumn moon is considered especially bright, as
there is less haze and mist in the sky during that season. Likewise, the second bhumi bodhisattva
is free from all the downfalls of body, speech and mind.
[H8] (d) Being free of dualistic attachment to subject, object and action,
2:3
2:3 Dwelling on the purity of his own discipline,
Is not pure discipline.
Thus in regard to its three [aspects], at all times
He is perfectly free of the engagements of dualistic mind.
This sloka talks about a special quality of the bodhisattva’s discipline: not clinging to the three
faults of object, subject and action. There should be the word ‘if’ somewhere in this English
translation. Although it is not possible, if a bodhisattva were to have pride (one of the three
fetters, see p. 29) at being a very well disciplined person, then he would no longer have pure
discipline. Therefore, the second bhumi bodhisattva is always perfectly free from dualistic mind
becoming engaged in the discipline that has to be kept, the action of keeping, or the bodhisattva
who is the keeper of the discipline.
[H7] (2) In praise of other types of discipline (566)
The ten positive actions
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 2 – 53
[H8] (a) The penalties of contravening discipline, 2:4-5
2:4 Having comforts through generosity, yet miserable,
This arises from breaking the limb of discipline.
Having exhausted all your investments,
Later these will not yield much comfort.
Now we are praising discipline and ethics in general, rather than the bodhisattva’s discipline in
particular. Perhaps the translation should have ‘wealth’ rather than ‘comforts’ in the first line, as
it is the result of generosity. A person may engage in acts of generosity and become comfortable
with all sorts of worldly wealth, but despite their comfort, we can still see beings in this world in
a miserable situation. An example is becoming king of the nagas, who are supposedly very rich.
Some people are wealthy because of their generosity in past lives, but they may now be so stingy
that they do not share their wealth with others or even spend it on themselves.
From the perspective of the Dharma, being fortunate or not is usually judged according to
whether a person can understand the Dharma or not. From this point of view, when a person is
born into a very wealthy family, but as their pet or a horse or something like that, it is because
they have broken the limb of discipline. When a person is reborn into such situations, he will
exhaust all his good karmic investments. Since such a being is using up all causes for wealth,
and not creating more causes for wealth, later this being will not enjoy worldly wealth. This is
one aspect of the fault of not having discipline.
2:5 Dwelling independently in an agreeable place,
One may still not be able to stay,
Falling into an abyss and losing one’s independence,
How will one get out later on?
The fifth sloka gives us advice on why a person should have discipline. When a courageous
warrior is free, healthy and in good circumstances, he should take advantage of this opportunity,
and advance – perhaps to conquer more of the enemy, or gain greater victory. If such a warrior
is trapped by enemies, then bound and imprisoned by them, then no matter how courageous he is,
he cannot move. He cannot do anything. If you are dwelling independently in a good and
agreeable place, you may nevertheless not be able to stay. In other words, if you do not take
advantage of that good circumstance, then when you fall into some kind of abyss and become
dependent upon others, how will you get out? Therefore, discipline is necessary, to be free.
[H8] (b) Keeping discipline as an antidote to these, 2:6.1-2
2:6.1-2 For this reason, having spoken of generosity,
The Buddha spoke of discipline.
Because there are many faults if you lose discipline or ethics, as stated in the two preceding
slokas, the lord Buddha therefore spoke of discipline right after he spoke of generosity.
[H8] (c) Discipline as the basis for all good qualities, 2:6.3-4
2:6.3-4 Qualities grown in the pasture of discipline,
Yield unending fruits of enjoyment.
If you have a good pasture of discipline, then all the enlightened qualities will grow without any
ending.
A person is fortunate to
the extent that they can
understand the Dharma
We should have discipline
in order to make the most
of our good
circumstances
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 2 – 54
[H8] (d) Discipline as the cause for higher rebirth and certain excellence,
2:7
2:7 Ordinary individuals, speech-born,
Those certainly possessing enlightenment for themselves,
And bodhisattvas, all attain certain excellence and
Higher rebirth solely from discipline.
When you study these Indian texts, instead of looking at lots of commentaries, the way you read
them can also clarify things. For example, all you need to do is read the seventh sloka as
follows:
For those ordinary individuals who attain a higher rebirth, the sole cause of their
higher rebirth is discipline. Discipline is also the sole cause of the speech-born, which
are the shravakas, attaining excellence. This is also the case for the self-buddhas,
meaning the pratyekabuddhas, and the bodhisattvas. Here we are speaking of two
kinds of result: certain excellence, which is nirvana, and a higher rebirth.
[Q]: When we say, “born from speech”, does that include both shravakas and pratyekabuddhas?
[A]: Yes, but usually, pratyekabuddhas are not referred to as nyentö, which means those born
from speech. Here, we are referring specifically to shravakas.
When you perform a non-virtuous deed, one of the ten non-virtuous actions, if it is very strong,
then it will cause rebirth in the hell-realm. If it is less strong, it will cause rebirth in the animal
realm, and least strong will cause rebirth in the hungry ghost realm. If there is still some karmic
power remaining, then although you may be reborn in the human realm, there will be other
effects. In general,
• If you have killed in your past life, you will have sickness and a short life.
• If you stole a lot in your past life, you will lack wealth or you will have to share your
wealth with others.
• If you engaged in sexual misconduct, you will have untrustworthy friends, or a spouse
who will somehow always create many enemies.
• If you told many lies, you will be subject to scandal and being cheated.
• The result of slander is that you always end up in situations of conflict and you cannot
resolve the conflict. You will also have bad mannered companions.
• If you have spoken harsh words, you will be prone to bad news. And no matter what
you say, your words will always become a cause for a big argument or some kind of
disaster.
• If you have gossiped, then nobody can really make any sense out of what you say. You
will also have unsteady courage. For example, when you go shopping, you need
courage to make decisions like whether you should buy a red T-shirt. But some people
do not have this. They hesitate and wonder whether to buy a red one or a blue one.
• Covetousness creates constant dissatisfaction, and desire for all sorts of materialistic
things.
• Harmful thoughts will always make you want to search for something, and what you
search for will always be harmful to you. Others will also harm you.
• If you had wrong views, then no matter how clever or sceptical you normally are, if
somebody tells you something incredibly stupid, you will believe it. An example is Cat
Stevens. You will also become very critical, always going around looking for faults. It
becomes a habit. All journalists are born in this category.
All these results occur within the basic philosophy of karma I told you before. It is not as if there
is a buddhist police force that determines the appropriate punishment for your crime! The reason
Some common karmic
results of negative actions
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 2 – 55
I am explaining this is so you can see that the result is a continuum of the cause. If you kill
someone, you will have a shorter life. If you plant rice, it grows into rice, not into a horse!
[H7] (3) Analogy for perfectly pure discipline (568), 2:8
2:8 Just as a corpse and the ocean,
And auspiciousness and misfortune [cannot] co-exist,
So a great sovereign applying himself to discipline,
Cannot live with carelessness.
This is very Indian. In India, they used to throw dead bodies into the ocean, but in the morning,
the ocean would always throw them back. This sloka says that just as the ocean and corpse do
not remain together, auspiciousness and misfortune cannot coexist. Similarly, the second bhumi
bodhisattva is overpowered by discipline, and so he cannot live with carelessness.
[H7] (4) The divisions of this paramita, 2:9
2:9 Who abandons, what is abandoned, and for whom –
Discipline with these three points of reference,
Is taught to be ordinary paramita;
Absence of clinging to these three, transcendent.
There are three points. The one who abandons (such as the second bhumi bodhisattva); what is
abandoned (such as killing); and for whom (such as animals or British cows). If a bodhisattva
has an attachment or clinging to these three, this is taught to be worldly paramita. But one
should still dedicate the action. However, if there is no clinging then, as with the first paramita,
the action is a beyond-worldly, or transcendental, paramita.
[H6] b) Summary of its qualities in words of certainty (568), 2:10
2:10 The moon-like bodhisattva while non-worldly,
Is the glory of this world.
Like the radiance of the autumn moon – the Stainless –
His stainlessness soothes the anguish of sentient beings.
The bodhisattva on the second stage is not worldly, yet he is the glory of this world, because he
can give protection to worldly beings. He is called stainless, because he has no downfalls of
discipline. Like the autumn moon in India that cools people who are suffering from heat, the
second bhumi bodhisattva soothes the anguish of all sentient beings. The second chapter is
finished now, and we will try to go to the fifth chapter today. It is usually done this way in the
shedras, where the second to the fifth chapters are taught in one day. This is like a Sunday
holiday for students – it is less difficult to study, and this is when the students wash their clothes.
But this is it! There are a few more slokas like this at the beginning of the sixth chapter, but from
then they are like diamonds – they are so tough!
Here ends the second enlightened aspiration of “The Philosophy of the Middle Way”.
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 3 – 56
[H5] 3. The Third Bhumi, The Luminous (Giving out
Light)
[H6] a) The nature of this bhumi in words of certainty (569), 3:1
3:1 Because the wisdom-fire, burning the firewood of all phenomena,
Blazes, so the third bhumi
[Is called] ‘Luminous’. Here as the son of the Sugata
Radiates like the sun’s copper light.
Here, phenomena are compared to firewood, and wisdom is compared to fire. So, the first line
tells us that the wisdom fire burns the firewood of all phenomena, burning all clinging to notions
of phenomena as truly existent.
I do not know if there are such concepts in the West, but in India, many stages of dawn are
distinguished before the sun actually rises – there is a first dawn, a second dawn, and so on. Just
after the last dawn, a reddish-purple coloured light appears in the sky. Here we are trying to
explain that final, complete enlightenment is like the complete existence of the sun in the sky.
But the copper-coloured light appears first thing in the morning. Likewise, although a third
bhumi bodhisattva is not yet on the final stage, he will have a complete nyam (nyams), or
experience, which is compared to that purple light of dawn. This does not mean that he sees a
purple light, but that the first indication of complete enlightenment is shown at this stage, which
is why this bhumi is called ‘the creator of the luminous’. During his post-meditation time, the
bodhisattva’s practice on this bhumi is patience.
[H6] b) Detailed explanation of the qualities of the paramita
emphasised
[H7] (1) The paramita emphasised, Patience
[H8] (a) Patience mainly through compassion (569), 3:2
3:2 Although he is innocent, aggressive individuals may
Carve from his flesh and bones,
Slowly, measure by measure,
Yet, such dissection merely makes his patience grow.
Innocent is not the right word. A bodhisattva cannot be an object of aggression, as he is so
gentle and kind that he does not provoke any aggression. Someone like this may be so innocent
that he does not deserve to be an object of your aggression. But some people are so selfish and
aggressive that they can cut a bodhisattva’s body, wait a while, and then cut some more. They
cut him apart gradually, measure by measure. This is based on a story.
But even in this kind of situation, instead of getting angry towards such people, the third bhumi
bodhisattva will have great compassion and patience towards the creator of his pain. This sloka
tells us about the power of his patience motivated by compassion.
The various colours of the
dawn as an analogy for
the stages of
enlightenment
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 3 – 57
[H8] (b) Patience mainly through the view (569), 3:3
3:3 Because for the bodhisattva who sees selflessness
Victim, perpetrator, moment, manner,
Purpose – are all seen as a reflection,
[He attains] patience.
The third sloka tells us about the power of his compassion due to his understanding of reality, of
emptiness. A bodhisattva on the third stage has seen the selflessness of a person completely. He
has also realised the selflessness of phenomena, and abandoned clinging to phenomena as being
truly existent. At this point, the bodhisattva sees all phenomena as a reflection in a mirror, and
for him there is no longer a victim, perpetrator or action. Through his understanding of the truth,
he will obtain patience.
[H7] (2) The penalties of lacking patience
[H8] (a) It produces an unpleasant karmic result, 3:4-5
3:4 If you take revenge upon having been harmed,
How can this reverse the harm done?
Accordingly, revenge is useless for this life,
And counterproductive with regard to the next.
Now we will talk more about general things, such as the faults of lacking patience. If someone
has harmed you and you wish to take revenge on this person, will taking revenge return you to
the initial state before the other person harmed you? In other words, will it solve the real
problem? In the 4th sloka, the first two lines ask this question, and the answer given in the next
two lines says it will not.
That is why it is not necessary to take revenge and lose patience in this life, as it is something
that will also produce bad effects in future lives. As Aryadeva said, “if someone criticises you,
you should check whether what he said is true or not. If it is true, then you should not get angry
or impatient, because it is true. If it is not true, again you should not get angry or impatient,
because it is not true”.
3:5 The result of earlier non-virtuous action,
Is regarded as having been called purification [by the Buddha].
[Yet] you harm the other. The suffering from that anger,
Is what you now proceed to sow.
Here we are still talking about the faults of not having patience. When one goes through pain or
suffering caused by someone else, one should regard this as the exhaustion of a past life’s karma.
If instead we are motivated to harm others and actually take revenge, it is a cause of suffering.
So how could one lead oneself to such suffering?
[H8] (b) It diminishes merit already accumulated (570), 3:6
3:6 Because getting angry at a bodhisattva,
One hundred kalpas’ virtue accumulated through generosity and discipline,
Is destroyed in an instant.
Therefore, an evil worse than anger does not exist.
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 3 – 58
If one gets angry towards a bodhisattva, the merit that one has accumulated for one hundred
kalpas through generosity and discipline will all be destroyed in one instant. Therefore, among
the evil deeds that destroy virtuous actions, anger is the most powerful.
There are several categories of non-virtuous actions, which have different effects of destroying or
ripening. For example, a non-virtuous action that has the greatest result, or ripening, is killing
one’s own father. This is one of the five limitless non-virtuous actions. Of all the actions that
destroy virtuous action, anger is the worst.
There are two points to be clarified here. Firstly, in the Bodhicharyavatara, Shantideva says that
anger can destroy the virtuous deeds of a thousand kalpas, but in the Madhyamakavatara, we
have seen that it is one hundred kalpas. Since Chandrakirti and Shantideva are both Prasangika-
Madhyamika, how can they have a different view? However, there is no contradiction here,
because they are commentating on two different Mahayana sutras. Shantideva is explaining the
Sutra of the Heap of Jewels, Ratnakuta Sutra (dkon mchog brtsegs pa), and Chandrakirti is
explaining the Sutra of the Display of Manjushri. The first sutra, the Ratnakuta Sutra, talks
about a lower bodhisattva such one on the path of accumulation, becoming angry towards a
higher bodhisattva such one on the path of seeing. However, the Sutra of the Display of
Manjushri talks about a higher bodhisattva, such as one on the path of application, losing
patience with one on the path of accumulation. The point here is that both sutras are talking
about bodhisattvas losing patience and getting angry, not ordinary people. If an ordinary person
gets angry with a bodhisattva, we would not even measure the result in terms of one hundred or
one thousand kalpas!
The second clarification concerns the word “destroyed”. How strong is Chandrakirti’s meaning?
Does it mean that if an ordinary person gets angry, it completely destroys his merit and makes it
non-existent? This is an example of how the great saints and scholars use emphasis when they
write. Here Chandrakirti really wants us to have patience and abandon anger, so he prefers to
use strong words like ‘destroy’.
In the Flower Ornament Sutra, the Avatamsaka Sutra, Buddha says that an action can never be
destroyed by anything else unless it has ripened. There would be another problem here, which is
that a bodhisattva in the path of accumulation could never ever reach enlightenment. They will
always be angry at times, and each time one hundred kalpas’ or one thousand kalpas’ merit
would be gone. So, here the actual meaning of the ‘destroyed’ is ‘postponed’. Anger will
postpone the ripening of the merit that is the result of generosity and discipline.
[H8] (c) Its penalties are visible and invisible, 3:7
3:7 It creates an ugly body and leads to the unholy,
Robbed of discriminating mind,
Impatience will hurl you into the lower realms –
Patience remedies the above and develops qualities.
Here again we are talking about the general downfalls of lacking patience or having anger. The
first two first lines of the 7th sloka are obvious downfalls, and the third line talks about a downfall
that is not obvious. The first line says that the moment a person is angry, it creates an ugly body.
It shakes them, and it makes them ugly. That’s it.
Even if someone is normally very holy, gentle, sober and wholesome, when they get angry, it
leads them downwards. It makes them lose their wholesomeness, gentleness and good character.
They become so involved with their anger that it robs all their intelligence and discernment of
right and wrong. If you check this, it is very true. We make most of our mistakes when we are
angry, like driving too quickly and missing the red light. The third line talks about how
Of all the actions that
destroy virtuous deeds,
anger is the worst
What is the meaning of an
action being “destroyed”
by anger?
Shantideva and
Chandrakirti say different
things, but they do not
contradict each other
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 3 – 59
impatience or anger will also lead you to the lower realms, such as animal, hungry ghost or hell
realms. The last line talks about the quality of patience, saying that it has the opposite effects to
impatience.
[H7] (3) The excellence of the qualities of patience (570), 3:8
3:8 Through patience [you will be] beautiful;
Adored by holy beings; skilful in
Discerning right and wrong; and thereafter
Born as a human or god, you will exhaust evil.
Continuing from the 7th sloka, the 8th sloka says that patience creates a beautiful body; leads to
the holy; promotes a discriminating mind; and raises us to the higher realms. These are opposite
to the faults of anger.
[H7] (4) The importance of therefore practising patience (570), 3:9
3:9 Ordinary individuals and bodhisattvas,
Knowing the defects and qualities of anger and patience,
Abandon impatience and rely on
Patience as praised by Superiors.
To understand this sloka, you just have to change the order of the words. Knowing that ordinary
individuals have the defects of anger, you should abandon impatience and rely on patience.
Knowing that bodhisattvas have the enlightened qualities of patience, you should abandon
impatience and rely on patience as praised by the superiors.
[H7] (5) The divisions of this paramita (571), 3:10
3:10 Dedicating to perfect enlightened buddhahood,
With threefold reference is ordinary paramita.
If non-referential, the Buddha
Taught this to be transcendent paramita.
This sloka talks about the different kinds of patience. As with the other paramitas, although you
may have dedicated your patience, if you have the threefold reference, then your patience will be
referred to as worldly paramita. If there is no clinging, it is taught by the Buddha to be beyondworldly
paramita. If you want to know more about patience and the faults of anger, read
Shantideva’s Bodhicharyavatara, as it includes very elaborate methods, such as the twenty-four
types of patience, and so on. Here, I will briefly explain the four types of patience, which are
having patience towards:
• Unfavourable circumstances for oneself and one’s own friends and relatives.
• Obstacles to favourable circumstances for oneself.
• Favourable circumstances for one’s enemies.
• Obstacles to unfavourable circumstances for one’s enemies.
These include all types of patience. The first two are easy to understand. The third is that we do
not like it when our enemies have a nice time, and the fourth is that we do not like it if somebody
is about to intervene and solve our enemies’ problems.
The four types of patience
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 3 – 60
[H6] c) How other qualities are also attained on this bhumi (571), 3:11
3:11 On this bhumi the bodhisattva [attains] samadhi and foreknowledge,
Exhausting entirely desire and anger.
And is always able to overcome
This world’s gross attachment to desire.
On the third bhumi, the bodhisattva has all the attainments of samadhi. There are four samadhis,
but first I will tell you the six types of clairvoyance or foreknowledge:
• Divine eye
• Divine ear
• Remembering past lives
• Knowing other people’s minds
• Knowing things through miraculous powers
• Knowing things without emotion
The third bhumi bodhisattva does now have the fifth and sixth of these. Do not worry too much
about these; I am just reciting the names for your information. The four concentrations of the
form realm, the four meditative absorptions, are the result of shamatha meditation. In buddhist
terminology, it is called shinjong (zhin sbyong), the mind becoming supple.
The first two lines of this sloka talk about the bodhisattva’s own qualities. The first line talks
about what he has obtained and the second talks about what he has purified. We need to clarify
the words “exhausting entirely desire and anger”; we may think that this was already done on the
first bhumi. By the first bhumi, the view of desire and anger as being dendzin, or truly existent,
is destroyed. But the tsendzin, or apprehension of mere appearance, is divided into nine
categories. There are nine defilements, which means that every bhumi apart from the first has its
own share of defilements. The second line is saying that the third bhumi bodhisattva has
abandoned his share of defilements.
So, the two first lines talk about his quality of obtaining purification, and the two last lines talk
about what he can do for others, although I am not sure that this translation will work. We are
saying that the third bhumi bodhisattva has not only managed to overcome desire, which is the
cause of the desiring realms, for himself. He can also overcome this in others.
[H6] d) Explanation of the three general practices, generosity and so forth
(572), 3:12
3:12 These general practices – generosity and so forth –
The Sugata advocated for householders.
[These] known as the accumulations of merit,
Are seeds of the body, containing the Buddha’s form.
This sloka is almost a conclusion, almost. The three practices of generosity, discipline and
patience are praised as the ideal practice for bodhisattvas that are householders. In the
Mahayana, we talk of two kinds of accumulation, of merit and wisdom. If someone asks you
about merit, it is explained in the third line of this sloka. Similarly, if someone asks you about
the causes of Nirmanakaya and Sambhogakaya, the Buddha’s form, the answer is given in the
fourth line. Actually, Nirmanakaya and Sambhogakaya are not really Mahayana terms; there we
talk of the Rupakaya, the form body.
The six types of
clairvoyance
There are nine types of
tsendzin, which are
abandoned on different
bhumis
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 3 – 61
[H6] e) The qualities of this bhumi: concise concluding summary (572), 3:13
3:13 The bodhisattva who is the radiance of the sun,
First completely dispels his own darkness,
He then wishes to dispel the darkness of sentient beings.
On this bhumi, though very sharp, he knows no aggression.
The third bhumi bodhisattva is the creator of the luminous, or light. While he is obtaining the
wisdom of the third bhumi, he dispels his own share of darkness, which is the tsendzin or
apprehension of mere appearance. In doing that, he dispels the darkness of others, and he is then
very sharp at dispelling his own downfalls and those of others.
Now we come to an important statement of the Mahayana. Although he is very sharp, he does
not have aggression towards someone who has faults. Ordinary beings are not like this. Perhaps
some of us can solve our own problems, but when we manage to do this, we become proud and
this pride leads us to aggression. Pride is always based on some kind of comparison. You look
at someone who has a fault, and you think that they have a fault that you had before, so there is
pride and aggression. But when a bodhisattva sees a fault in someone, he sees their complete
ability to solve the problem on their own. For instance, if we wake up from a nightmare and we
see someone else still having a nightmare, we do not boast about how we managed to wake from
a nightmare, as it is such a small thing to do.
Here ends the third enlightened aspiration of “The Philosophy of the Middle Way”.
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 4 – 62
[H5] 4. The Fourth Bhumi, Dazzling with Light
[H6] a) The great qualities of diligence itself, 4:1.1-2
4:1.1-2 All qualities depend on diligence –
Cause of the two accumulations of merit and wisdom.
All the post-meditation enlightened qualities depend on diligence. Diligence is a cause for both
kinds of accumulation, merit and wisdom.
[H6] b) The nature of this bhumi, which emphasises diligence, 4:1.3-4
4:1.3-4 Blazing with diligence,
The fourth bhumi is known as Radiant.
In this 4th bhumi, diligence will blaze. When there is blazing diligence, it is referred to as the 4th
bhumi, which is known as the ‘Radiant One’.
[H6] c) Words of certainty concerning this bhumi in terms of meditation
experience, 4:2.1-3
4:2.1-3 Here the bodhisattva’s radiance
From thoroughly meditating on the aspects of buddhahood,
Shines brighter than copper.
The purple colour that we were talking about before has now become much redder. On the 4th
bhumi, the bodhisattva has extra qualities of all the 37 limbs or wings of enlightenment. He had
them all on the 1st bhumi, but now his power of these limbs is greater – here there are extra
qualities. For your information, I will read them:
• Four contemplations
• Four perfect abandonments
• Four limbs of miracles
• Five powers
• Five forces
• Seven limbs of enlightenment
• Eight noble paths
[H6] d) Leaving behind what is specifically abandoned on this bhumi, 4:2.4
4:2.4 Belief in self and its effects are exhausted.
On this line, we are again stressing that he abandons his own share of defilements.
Here ends the fourth enlightened aspiration of “The Philosophy of the Middle Way”.
The 37 limbs of
enlightenment
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 5 – 63
[H5] 5. The Fifth Bhumi, Difficult to Overcome/Practice
[H6] a) Words of certainty concerning this bhumi, 5:1.1-2
5:1 All the demons of self-importance,
Cannot defeat the [bodhisattva] on the bhumi Difficult to Overcome:
Meditation is excellent, mind is good, the nature of truth
Is thoroughly realised, thus he becomes skilful.
This great being on the 5th stage cannot be defeated by all the demons of self-importance,
including the four kinds of physical demons such as maras or yakshasas. This bodhisattva
cannot be overthrown from the stage called “Difficult to Overcome”, which is now his name.
[H6] b) The paramita emphasised, 5:1.3-3½
Here even during the post-meditation time, he stresses meditation, like shamatha.
[H6] c) Other qualities, 5:1.3½-4
The translation here on the third line is not so good. He will have a greater understanding of the
subtle meaning of the Four Noble Truths. For example, the Four Noble Truths can be condensed
into the two truths, but the two truths cannot be contained within the Four Noble Truths. For
example, Sukhavati, the realm of Amitabha, is relative truth. But if you talk in terms of the Four
Noble Truths, this realm is not suffering, nor emotion, nor path, nor cessation. So, the pure
realms have to be relative truth. The fifth bhumi bodhisattva understands things like that.
[Q]: When we talked of a moment of anger that can destroy kalpas of merit, you distinguished
between a bodhisattva and an ordinary being. But I thought that once someone takes the
bodhisattva vow, the power of his or her action increases. So, the anger of a bodhisattva is
even worse than the anger of an ordinary being, and therefore more negative.
[A]: The bodhisattva’s vow is like a golden pot, which can be repaired. The Theravada vow is
like a clay pot that, once broken, will always be broken.
[Q]: But ordinary beings have no pot!
[A]: If there is no pot, it is good, because we can start to have a pot. This is all touchy-feely, but
a virtuous action is always more powerful than a non-virtuous action and it is actually easier
to create than a non-virtuous action, because negative actions involve lots of sweat. There
is also a good logical reason. If a dirty shirt is washed, then it is easier to make it clean.
But it is impossible to make the shirt dirty. There may be a stain on the shirt, but it is
impossible to unite the shirt and the dirt.
[Q]: But there are many more beings in the lower realms than in the higher realms.
[A]: I am giving you the theory and logic behind it. I am not denying that there are many dirty
shirts, but in reality, the dirt and the shirt cannot be made inseparable. You can unmask a
mask, but you cannot unmask where there is no mask.
Here ends the fifth enlightened aspiration of “The Philosophy of the Middle Way”.
Virtuous actions are more
powerful and easier to
create than non-virtuous
actions
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 64
[H5] 6. The Sixth Bhumi, Advancing / Knowing Clearly
[H6] a) Attaining cessation by emphasising the paramita of wisdom, 6:1
6:1 In ‘Advancing’ his mind dwells in meditation,
Advancing towards the dharma of perfect buddhahood.
Seeing the suchness of dependent arising,
[The bodhisattva] dwells in wisdom, thereby reaching cessation.
In the first sloka, the first two lines talk about the sixth bhumi bodhisattva’s quality of shamatha,
and the last two lines talk about the qualities of his vipashyana. When he was on the fifth bhumi,
this bodhisattva placed great emphasis on samadhi, meditation. Because of that, now that he has
reached the sixth bhumi, he is advancing towards the unique qualities of the Buddha, such as the
ten powers. Do not forget that here we are talking about the bodhisattva’s qualities during postmeditation
time. But as you can see, on the sixth bhumi, his post-meditation qualities now
resemble meditation qualities.
By the power of his vipashyana, he sees the reality of dependent arising, and with this wisdom,
he attains cessation. In this case, cessation is not nirvana, but cessation of the four extremes. He
understands everything as illusion, much more completely than on the five previous bhumis. For
example, his understanding of the third noble truth, the truth of path, is much more pure and
perfect.
Here I want to stress something important. All bodhisattvas are looking at the same object,
wisdom, but even during their meditation, there is a difference of distance. The tenth bhumi
bodhisattva is much closer than the first. A bodhisattva can see no difference between his
wisdom and the wisdom of a higher bodhisattva. However, a bodhisattva on a higher bhumi,
using his clairvoyance, can see differences during the meditation time between his wisdom and
that of a lower bhumi bodhisattva.
However, although bodhisattvas can remain in meditation for a long time, they cannot remain
there forever. The strength of their meditation exhausts, and they have to rise from their
meditation state. Then they enter what we call post-meditation time. During this post-meditation
time, bodhisattvas see things and discriminate between them, for example between man and
woman, or black and blue. This is what we call tsendzin, the apprehension of mere appearance.
I will now add another defilement to our list, which is part of tsendzin. The first seven bhumis
are referred to as the ‘impure seven bhumis of the bodhisattva path’, and the three last bhumis are
referred to as the pure stages of the bodhisattva. The last three bhumis are very special stages.
From a very ordinary point of view like ours, we cannot tell the difference between such
bodhisattvas and the Buddha. From the eighth bhumi onwards, bodhisattvas do not receive
teachings from the Nirmanakaya any more. But they have still a defilement, which is part of the
tsendzin, called nyinang (gnyis snang) ‘mere apprehension’. There is no more appearance, no
more perception. I think that this is probably why only these bodhisattvas have access to the
Sambhogakaya. We will go through this later, but I am introducing the name now so you will be
prepared (for a discussion of tsendzin, dendzin and dagdzin, see diagram below, and p.44)
The qualities of the sixth
bhumi bodhisattva
All bodhisattvas look at
the same object, wisdom,
but see it differently even
in their meditation
Bodhisattvas have
tsendzin during their
post-meditation time
He attains cessation of
the four extremes, and
understands that
everything is illusion
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 65
[H6] b) To those who are blind, the greatness of the paramita of wisdom
itself (575), 6:2
6:2 As an entire crowd of blind people
Can easily be led to their desired destination
By a seeing individual, likewise intelligence
Can lead the blind qualities to victory.
The 1st sloka is a summary of the 6th bhumi. The second sloka is a summary in praise of wisdom.
If five or ten blind people, or even a thousand, are travelling through a strange place where they
have never been before, they only need one person who is not blind to lead them to their
destination. Here, Chandrakirti is saying that without wisdom, all the other enlightened qualities
such as generosity, discipline, patience and meditation are all blind. But wisdom will lead all the
other qualities that do not have the wisdom eye or nyam, to the victorious place. The 3rd and 4th
lines of the 1st sloka state that “seeing the suchness of dependent arising, the sixth-bhumi
bodhisattva dwells in wisdom, thereby reaching cessation”. This gives rise to two questions.
• What do we mean by dependent arising?
• What do we mean by a bodhisattva dwelling in the kind of wisdom that knows
dependent arising?
Defilements on the
bodhisattva path
The two main questions
answered in the sixth
chapter
dendzin (bden ‘dzin)
Solid belief in true
existence of
phenomena
Ordinary samsaric
beings have this
defilement, but
shravakas,
pratyekabuddhas and
1st bhumi bodhisattvas
have abandoned it
dagdzin (bdag
‘dzin)
Clinging to
the self of the
person
Shravakas,
pratyekabuddhas
and 1st bhumi
bodhisattvas no
longer have
clinging to the
self of the person
choki dagdzin (chos kyi
bdag ‘dzin)
Clinging to the self of
phenomena
Remains until attainment of
buddhahood
tsendzin (msthan ‘dzin)
Apprehension of mere
appearance
Bodhisattvas on the 1st to 6th
bhumis still create the causes of
tsendzin, but no longer do so
from the 7th bhumi
nyinang (gnyis snang)
Mere apprehension
The part of tsendzin that
remains on the 8th to 10th bhumis
dagdzin (bdag ‘dzin)
Clinging to / belief in self
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 66
The rest of this chapter answers these two questions: What is dependent arising? And what is the
wisdom that knows dependent arising? In his self-commentary, rangdrel (rang ’grel),
Chandrakirti says these questions should only be asked of high aryas or non-samsaric beings like
sixth-bhumi bodhisattvas, not someone like him. This tells us that a person should have reached
at least the first bhumi if they are to answer such questions properly. So directly, he is being
very humble here by saying that he is not yet on the first bhumi. And indirectly, he is warning
future writers not to claim that they are higher beings and able to make commentaries on the
Buddha’s words.
Then our imaginary opponent asks us why we cannot use sutras like the Dashabhumika Sutra
and some of the Prajñaparamita Sutras as the basis for our explanation. Chandrakirti’s answer
is that you cannot even interpret the Buddha’s words unless you are on the first bhumi. In that
case, our opponent asks, how are you going to explain this to us? You cannot do it directly
yourself, and you cannot make commentaries on the Buddha’s words, so how are you going to
explain this? This brings us to the third sloka.
[H6] c) Establishing the way in which this paramita of wisdom is
introduced
[H7] (1) The basis according to which this teaching is here explained, 6:3
6:3 The one who realised the profound dharma of this [bhumi],
Through the scriptures as well as through reasoning
Was Arya Nagarjuna. Based on his scriptural tradition,
I shall explain this tradition, as it exists today.
Here Chandrakirti is saying that the great qualities of sixth bhumi bodhisattvas are taught in
“absolute” sutras, those that do not require interpretation, and also by direct cognition and
indirectly through logic. He is simply saying that he cannot teach this subject himself, but that
he will explain it in the way that Nagarjuna taught it. This sloka tells us something important
about what makes a shastra authentic.
So, Chandrakirti is going to explain these teachings according to Nagarjuna’s tradition, but this
leads us to ask how do we know that Nagarjuna is at least on the first bhumi? His coming as
someone who has already reached the first bhumi was predicted in two sutras, the Lankavatara
Sutra and the Sutra of Twelve Thousand Clouds. We previously talked about being able to tell
whether someone is on the first bhumi by whether he could give up his or her own limbs. At the
end of his life, Nagarjuna gave up his head to a prince.
[H7] (2) To whom this teaching is to be explained (578)
[H8] (a) The recipient who is to be taught, 6:4
Now we are going to talk about the qualities or characteristics of a listener of these teachings. To
what kind of person should we answer these two questions? Or more directly, to whom should
we teach Nagarjuna’s words?
6:4 Even an ordinary being may, when hearing of emptiness,
Repeatedly feel immense joy surging within,
Bringing forth tears that moisten his eyes,
And making the hairs on his body quiver.
Only someone who has
reached the first bhumi
can answer them
Chandrakirti will teach
according to Nagarjuna’s
tradition
How do we know that
Nagarjuna has reached
the first bhumi?
What are the three types
of people to whom
Madhyamika may be
taught?
So how will Chandrakirti
answer?
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 67
6:5 He has the seed for the mind of perfect enlightenment
And is a perfect recipient for instruction,
He must be taught the ultimate truth.
So the resulting qualities will arise.
6:6 Applying at all times perfect discipline, he comes to abide therein.
Giving with generosity, adhering to compassion,
And meditating on patience,
He completely dedicates his virtue to beings' enlightenment.
6:7.1 Devoted to the perfect bodhisattvas,
The answer is given in the 4th to 6th slokas, and the first line of the 7th sloka. How do we know
whether a person has the qualities of a listener? Even an ordinary being may have repeated joy
upon hearing the teachings on emptiness. The sign of such joy is that it will bring forth tears that
moisten his eyes, and make the hairs on his body quiver. This kind of person has the seed for
enlightenment, and can receive instructions on both the selflessness of phenomena and the
selflessness of the person. And then, the following enlightened qualities will slowly arise in him:
• He will appreciate the preciousness of these teachings on emptiness, and that they can
only be obtained and understood with a precious human birth. Therefore, he will ensure
that he does not violate the codes of discipline and ethics, so he will be reborn in a
higher realm.
• He will know that in order to receive such teachings, one has to have favourable
circumstances, so he will plant the cause for these by engaging in generosity.
• He will meditate on compassion, knowing that if he does not have compassion, he may
become satisfied with the first type of freedom from extremes, and then not go forwards
to understand the other kinds of freedom from extremes.
• He will understand that if he has strong anger or aggression, he will not be able to
discern the right path from the wrong path, so he will practice patience.
• In order for his merit not to be wasted, he will dedicate it all to the enlightenment of all
sentient beings.
• He will know that the only person who can actually guide him on the path and in his
practice is a bodhisattva. Therefore, he will have devotion towards the perfect
bodhisattvas.
This list is like a summary. Now I will explain in more detail the three kinds of people to whom
one can teach the Madhyamika:
[H9] (i) Those who believe in philosophies that speak of an outer or inner
reality
The first kind of person is someone who already has an established philosophy, such as
Hinduism or buddhism. This is why it is much easier to teach a hard-line Moslem or Christian,
because at least they have a view, and then we can debate. It is so difficult to teach New Age
people, because they are like honey. They paste things from here and there, they do not know
what they are talking about and we do not know where we should be directing our arguments.
There is a big difference between rimé (ris med) non-sectarian, and New Age. Rimé always tries
to be as authentic as possible, and to have pure vision, whereas New Age people are always
diluting everything, from classical music to Dharma.
For the kind of person who already has a philosophy, we can teach Madhyamika with all the
Prasangika-Madhyamika arguments and logic. An example of this kind of person is a follower
The enlightened qualities
that will arise upon
hearing the teachings on
emptiness
One can teach a person
with a clear philosophy,
but it is hard to teach a
New Age person
To a person with an
established philosophy,
we teach Madhyamika
with all its logic
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 68
of the Samkhya school, a Hindu philosophy that believes in self-born entities, which will be our
opponent for the next few days.
[H9] (ii) Beginners
The second kind of person that we are supposed to teach is someone completely new, who has no
philosophical background. However, according to Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo, such a person
has to have one quality: shame and embarrassment. This is very important, so listen carefully. If
you encounter someone who does not believe in anything, it is almost impossible to teach him
something. Therefore, you have to find a cause to begin with. You have to find shame and
embarrassment in him, and you will find it easily. As long as a person has ego, he has shame and
embarrassment.
For example, if I ask Gérard to lift his skirt because I am not sure about his sex, he will be
embarrassed. Why? He might not believe in reincarnation or karma, but his embarrassment
shows that he has a philosophy of some sort. Then we can start our discussion of Dharma! He
may not have this kind of philosophy, but why is he embarrassed? He has some kind of theory.
Here we are talking about shame and embarrassment, about hang-ups. Whether they have
cultural hang-ups or ego hang-ups, as long as a person has hang-ups, then from an academic
point of view, they have some kind of doctrine or theory. Based on that, we can develop a
dialogue.
For someone like this who has no religious or philosophical background, we should begin with
mind training. We should teach them things like the faults of samsara, the effects of karma, the
preciousness of a human body, shamatha meditation and different meditations on bodhicitta. We
should teach a gradual path, and then we can introduce the Madhyamika. Because according to
the Mahayana sutras, if a person does not have a good foundation of mind training and practice,
it is considered a violation of the bodhisattva vow to teach them the Madhyamika. It could
destroy them. In the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas, it is said that teaching emptiness directly to
someone who is not qualified is like someone without any experience holding a poisonous snake.
[H9] (iii) Those who have already awakened into the family of the Mahayana
The third kind of listener, who is described here in the fourth sloka, is someone that you can
teach directly. He does not need to be convinced with logic, and he does not need any kind of
foundational teachings.
[H8] (b) The benefits derived from being so taught, 6:5.1-7.1
[H8] (c) The importance of therefore listening to what is taught, 6:7.2-4
6:7.2-4 Skilled in the ways of the profound and the vast,
He will gradually attain the bhumi of Extremely Joyful.
Therefore, those aspiring thus should hear of this path.
In the last three lines of the 7th sloka, Chandrakirti is requesting us to listen. “Skilled in the ways
of the profound” refers to emptiness, and “vast” refers to the ten bhumis. Since the first bhumi
will be attained gradually, those who want to attain it should listen to this. It is like a request.
One may not understand the meaning of the great emptiness completely or even a little, but just
hearing the words and phrases that talk about the great shunyata can be of great benefit in this
life and the next. The story of Sthiramati is an example.
To teach a beginner, they
must have some hangups:
some shame and
embarrassment
For a beginner, we first
teach a gradual path of
mind training, and later
teach Madhyamika
The benefits of hearing
teachings on emptiness
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 69
Vasubandhu had four disciples, all of whom were greater scholars than him. When he taught
buddhist logic to Dignaga, Dignaga became a greater scholar on the subject of buddhist logic
than he was. Another of his disciples was Sthiramati (Lodrötenpa), and on the subject of
Prajñaparamita, he was considered greater than Vasubandhu himself.
In his past life, Sthiramati had been a pigeon. For almost all his life as a pigeon, his home was
near a cave where Vasubandhu lived, and he heard Vasubandhu reading the Prajñaparamita of
8000 Verses every morning as his daily practice. When the pigeon died, it seems that his
previous karmic deeds were not good, because even after a life as a pigeon, he was reborn as an
outcast, a sudra (dmangs rigs), the lowest Indian case. He was born as a son in a very poor
family of beggars. In India, it was usual for children, especially the sons, to beg for their parents
and the rest of the family. But this boy always got into trouble with his family, because he
brought home so little from his begging.
Close to his home, there was a statue of Tara, and every time that the boy begged some food, he
would first bring it to this statue and offer it to Tara. He would put food on her hand, and it
would always fall down, but because he considered that the fallen food now belonged to Tara, he
did not bring it home. So, what was left was very small, and his family would beat him. One
day, after begging for a whole day, he had seven beans. He put them on Tara’s hand, and they all
fell. Now he was very afraid to go back to his family, as he knew what would happen, so he
talked to the statue. He asked her how she could do this, as she did not accept anything he
offered, and he had nothing left to take home. He started to cry in front of the statue, and his
devotion was so strong that the statue came alive and held him. His family decided that this boy
was a little abnormal, so they brought him to Vasubandhu. He became Vasubandhu’s attendant,
and later became a very great scholar.
Most of the Indian scholars, such as Sthiramati, Chandrakirti, Asanga and Vasubandhu, practised
Manjushri, Arya Tara, and Achala (Miyowa) as their deities. These three are called the scholar’s
deities. Achala is wrathful form of Vajrapani, also sometimes considered a wrathful form of
Manjushri, with his left knee bent down.
Accumulating merit
At this point, after the 7th sloka, it is traditional to have a ceremony. With the 8th sloka, we are
going to start the meat of the Madhyamakavatara. The Madhyamika is so difficult that our
human wisdom and intelligence is not enough to understand it, so we need merit and blessings.
This is why we have a ceremony. The drubchen will finish tomorrow, and it is a very good
coincidence that we will start the selflessness of phenomena.
The way that Chandrakirti establishes the view is called a great ‘lion’s roar’. He will roar from
tomorrow onwards, and hopefully remain roaring in your mind and in your heart for the rest of
your life. Because if the lion roars all the time in your heart, then wrong views, incomplete
views, and touchy-feely views, which are like foxes and hyenas, will never even dare to come
near you. So, for those of you who are seriously listening to this, it would be good if tomorrow
you could offer some candles, incense and flowers to the shrine. I will also do this, because I
also need blessings, perhaps more than you do, so that my mouth will work and my mind will be
clear! It is also a big responsibility for me to teach you the right view of the Madhyamika.
Traditional ceremony to
create merit after
finishing the 7th sloka
The story of Sthiramati
and his past lives as a
pigeon and a beggar
The scholar’s deities
Chandrakirti’s view is a
lion’s roar that will
protect you from wrong
and incomplete views
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 70
The Madhyamika can be very difficult at times, but you should not be discouraged. The study of
buddhist philosophy is not the same as studying some other things. For example, if you want to
understand relativity, you cannot really visualise Einstein in the sky in front of you and receive
blessings from him. But you can here. And in a way, you already have the complete knowledge
of what you are studying here. Other studies are of things you do not have, so you have to start
somewhere. But here you are studying yourself; once your mind ‘clicks’, everything will
become easy. This is all a study of how your mind works – things like how you cling to things,
how the clinging creates problems, what happens if you get rid of that clinging, and so on. This
is why even the highest teachings in the Nyingma tradition, such as Dzogchen, will always praise
Madhyamika, Mahamudra and Mahasandhi as inseparable.
If you are unable to engage in any other methods to accumulate merit, you should rejoice that we
have the opportunity to be together here to talk about a great subject like this, as it shows that we
have accumulated merit in the past. And while we are hearing the Madhyamika we are also
accumulating a lot of merit, and by rejoicing, we will create even more merit.
When we talk about merit, it is not something touchy-feely. We are talking about causes and
conditions. Let us imagine that we are all watching a movie, but that you do not know that what
is happening right in front of us is a movie. You think that the events in the movie are really
happening, and so you become very involved with the story. If something sad happens, you cry.
You get excited, or if we are watching a horror movie, you will are scared. The person who is
sitting next to you knows that you are suffering, and he wants to tell you to relax, as this is just a
movie.
Although he might want to say this to you, if you have no merit then he may have a sore throat at
that time. Or perhaps he does not have a sore throat and he is telling you clearly, but at that
moment, somebody behind you coughs loudly so you miss what he is saying. Even if those
things do not happen, you still may not hear it properly. And even if you hear him clearly when
he says that the movie is not the real thing, you might interpret him to mean that reality is even
worse than the movie. So having merit is so important.
Having merit makes you a good listener. Having merit also makes a person a good speaker,
although in these teachings you do not seem to have the merit to be listening to someone who
speaks well! So, create merit. It can be as simple as offering a biscuit to a child. And if you do
not have a biscuit right next to you, you can just rejoice.
Avoiding a narrow view of the Madhyamika
It is such a shame that a great idea like Madhyamika philosophy has to be taught by people who
have a religious appearance. It automatically limits the whole idea of Madhyamika philosophy.
The listener or the reader of the Madhyamika philosophy will automatically make it into
something very narrow, such as a buddhist thing to do, or a religious thing to do, which is such a
shame. To be honest, it is a great shame even to have to use words or language, because it limits
the understanding and study of Madhyamika so much. Every time I speak, every time I give you
a new name, you are creating a phenomenon inside your head, and I am quite sure that it is a
limited phenomenon. But unfortunately, this is the only way that we can communicate.
Like any other ideas, like science, economics and politics, Madhyamika philosophy is trying to
build a better society, very simply speaking. In fact, if possible, the Madhyamika aims to create
We should rejoice that we
are hearing teachings on
Madhyamika
The importance of merit
We often develop a very
narrow understanding of
the Madhyamika
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 71
an enlightened society. In the Madhyamika, we are studying the cause that makes a society
dysfunctional. Why is our society not good? What is it that makes everybody go through
endless pain? Economists talk of business recessions and failures in economic policy as the
cause. Here in the Madhyamika we are also trying to understand what makes this society not
function properly, both temporally and permanently.
The Madhyamika finds that the problem is ignorance, the ego, clinging to the self as truly
existent. Simply speaking, this selfishness is the problem. Then it embarks on a thorough study
of where this selfishness comes from. Can we actually overcome it? Can we overcome it
permanently, or just for a few years? Is it really something that we can purify? For questions
like this, there are studies, meditations and contemplations. And based on these, all sorts of
religious-sounding terms and techniques came, such as the notions of guru, discipline, ethics,
generosity, and so on.
Sadly, because our mind is so small, we somehow get lost with these terms, and we think that
Madhyamika is a religion, because of all these small techniques. Sometimes I think that instead
of saying meditation on Madhyamika, we should say research on Madhyamika. And, for
example, the drubchen that is going on now, instead of calling it a drubchen, we should call it a
conference. It is the same. It is just a big gathering where we are trying to solve the problem.
When we go through seemingly complex philosophical debates, we should remember what these
people are trying to tell us. It actually very simple – they are trying to tell us that we should
understand what is reality. That is all. But then again, sometimes it is too simple, so is may
seem difficult. We are more used to fiction and to fakes than we are to reality. This alone tells
us that the Buddha has such great compassion. He almost has to surrender himself to our minds
that love fiction and fakes. He almost has to adopt that, and then devise an entire path that is also
a fiction. That is the only way that he can teach us. It is like the story of the person who dreamt
that a big monster was attacking him, and he was so frightened that he did not know what to do.
So, he asked the monster, “What can I do”? The monster replied, “I don’t know, this is your
dream”.
Let us suppose that you want to wake a person who is dreaming. You do not have a bucket of
water with you, or perhaps there is a bucket of water right in front of you, but your hands and
feet are tied, so you cannot use it. The only thing you can do is to tell them, “Hey look, you are
dreaming”. But if you say that, the other person may simply not listen. Worse than that, when
you meet this kind of person, you might try to tell them once or twice that they are dreaming, and
then you give up. This means that you have no compassion! If you are really a compassionate
person, then you really have to be skilful here. You almost have to go along with him, and say
“yes, that’s true”, this shows you have some kind of compassion. The Buddha’s teachings are
like this.
Before we start the 8th sloka, I have several more things to tell you. I looked at four
commentaries, and between them, I counted 428 pages of preparatory discussion preceding the
8th sloka. There is a lot of material, so I think we will find it helpful to follow where we are by
using the structural outline. I will be using the outline by Gorampa, but you could also use
Mipham’s if you like. At times, when the subject gets really difficult, you should exercise your
mind a little bit by doing everything the opposite way round. This is my personal advice to you.
For example, when you wake in the morning, think that you are now going to sleep. Say good
night to everyone, and think that when you are walking around, you are dreaming. And then,
when you go to bed, say hello and good morning to everyone. It might also help if you put on
Our selfishness, our ego
clinging is the problem
The aim of the teachings
is to help us distinguish
what is a fake and what is
reality
Madhyamika is trying to
build a better society by
studying what makes it
dysfunctional
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 72
your suit, shirt and tie when you sleep! Or you could wear your jacket like a pair of trousers
sometimes, and put your legs in the sleeves. You can do things like this, just to break your
normal habits a little bit. But I am just joking here, so do not take it seriously.
[H7] (3) Establishing emptiness, the subject to be explained (580)
From the structural outline, you will see that emptiness is to be taught in two ways:
1. Explaining emptiness as it is to be realised by all vehicles. This refers to the three
vehicles of the shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas.
2. Explaining emptiness as it is to be realised by the Mahayana.
We will come to the second one later, perhaps in the third year. The first one is very important,
because we are going to talk in detail about the two truths and the two kinds of selflessness. This
alone tells us that the shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas are all looking at one object,
the same emptiness. The only difference is the size of what they see.
[H8] (a) Establishing emptiness as it is to be realised by all vehicles
When we talk about path and fruit, lam dang drébu (lam dang ’bras bu), we also talk in terms of
the three vehicles: shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas. And theories or philosophical
tenets, drumta (grub ’tha), are divided into Mahayana and Hinayana. When we talk about a
philosophy, we are talking about a philosophy that includes path and fruit. Buddhism has four
main philosophical schools: Madhyamika, Cittamatra, Sautrantika and Vaibhashika. The first
two are Mahayana schools, and the other two are Hinayana:
Madhyamika Mahayana (bodhisattvas)
Cittamatra
Sautrantika Hinayana (shravakas and pratyekabuddhas)
Vaibhashika
This is very important, so please pay attention, as I know you will ask questions about this
repeatedly for the next few years. All four schools talk about the result of the path: shravakas,
pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas. They all have their own view of these three results. All four
schools also talk about the path. In fact, the three other schools also call themselves
Madhyamika. Everybody wants to be a follower of the middle way! In India, even for Hindus,
following the middle way is supposedly a very prestigious philosophy, so each school tries to
prove that their way is the middle way. When we talk about the Madhyamika, we adopt this
name for ourselves. But the other schools refer to the Madhyamika as ‘Nisvabhava’, which
means emptiness-talker or nothingness-sayer.
When the structural outline talks about “establishing emptiness as it is to be realised by all
vehicles”, it is not referring to the philosophical Hinayana and Mahayana, but to the path and
fruit of shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas. It is very important that you understand
this. I sometimes hear Mahayana people looking down at the Hinayana, and when you listen
carefully, they are putting down the path and fruit of the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. This is
an incredibly bad mistake, and will bring incredibly bad karma. We can look down on the
Sautrantika and Vaibhashika schools during the philosophical argument, but we should never
look down on shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. How can we? They are great people. Nyoshul
Khen Rinpoche has a beautiful term for the Hinayana. He says that instead of calling it the
Hinayana, we should call it the ‘Root Yana’. This tells us that the Mahayana and Vajrayana
cannot exist without the Hinayana. The path and the philosophy are two different things. But
The two ways in which
emptiness will be taught
The four philosophical
schools in buddhism
We can look down on the
philosophy of the
Hinayana, but never its
path or fruit
All four schools talk
about the path and the
result (shravakas,
pratyekabuddhas, and
bodhisattvas)
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 73
without a philosophy, there is no dialogue to establish the path. There is no means or medium.
So, somebody has to talk about it; somebody has to prove it.
[Q]: When we say ‘lesser vehicle’, we seem to be criticising the Hinayana motivation, as we are
referring to the motivation to liberate just yourself rather than all beings.
[A]: It is not really a criticism, although you might read it as a criticism. It is like saying that a
Land Rover is better than a Peugeot. That is not really a criticism is it? If you want to go to
Scotland or Africa, you take a Land Rover. But if you want to go to big cities like
Montignac, then you drive your Peugeot.
At this point, we are starting to explain the emptiness that needs to be realised by all the vehicles.
Chandrakirti is very clever here, because he alternates the word ‘emptiness’ and the word
‘dependent arising’. Sometimes he will use the term dependent arising, and at other times, he
will use the word emptiness. By changing the words, he is letting us know that they mean the
same thing. Later on, you will realise that this is a great tactic of his. We will be using this term
‘dependent arising’ repeatedly.
[H9] (i) Establishing interdependent arising by means of the absence of
any self in phenomena
In order to establish the first kind of emptiness, which is the emptiness to be realised by all
vehicles, we will proceed in two ways. First, Chandrakirti explains dependent arising by means
of the selflessness of phenomena, and secondly, he explains it by means of the selflessness of the
person. In brief, it is a teaching on the selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of the
person. The first of these has three subcategories:
(a) As ascertained from the sutras on suchness.
(b) As established in the shastras.
(c) As determined in this text by means of logical reasoning.
[H10] (A) As ascertained from the sutras on suchness (581)
According to the Dashabhumika Sutra, which is our supporting sutra, the Buddha said, “Oh,
bodhisattvas, a bodhisattva who has just crossed beyond the path of ‘Difficult to Overcome’
(meaning the fifth bhumi) will enter the sixth bhumi in ten different ways”. The name of the
sixth bhumi is ‘Advancing’, so you can say that a bodhisattva will advance to the sixth bhumi in
ten different ways at the same time. These ten methods are called the ten equalities, nyampanyi
chu (mnyam pa nyid bcu). They are:
• The equality of having no truly existing characteristics. In other words, all phenomena
are equal in the sense that they do not have any truly existing characteristics, tsenma
mépa (mtshan ma med pa). Similarly, we have:
• The equality of having no defining characteristic or definition, tsennyi mepa (mtshan
nyid med pa).
• The equality of the primordial absence of birth from any of the four extremes, togmar
kyéwa mepa (thog mar skye ba med pa).
• The equality of being unborn, makyépa (ma skye pa).
• The equality of absence, wenpa (dben pa).
• The equality of total purity, takpa (dak pa).
• The equality of having no elaborations or extremes, tröpa mepa (spros pa med pa).
• The equality of being beyond acceptance or rejection from the point of view of the
ultimate truth, langdor mepa (blang ’dor med pa).
For Chandrakirti,
dependent arising means
the same as emptiness
The Ten Equalities
Path and philosophy are
different, but we need a
philosophy to establish a
path
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 74
• The equality of being illusory like a dream, a mirage, a scarecrow, an echo, reflection of
moon in water, reflection of oneself in the mirror, and a magic manifestation, gyuma
(sgyu ma).
• The equality of being neither real nor unreal, ngöpo dang ngö mepa (dngos po dang
dngos med pa), equal in the non-differentiation of entity and non-entity;
The first eight of these are spoken from the point of ultimate truth. It is not important for us to
spend too much time on these ten equalities, because the Madhyamakavatara is only concerned
with one of these ten, and by teaching one, it covers all of the others. You might ask, why then
does he tell us this? It is good for you to hear the names, and it is good for you to realise how
little you have heard before. You may have received many teachings, and you may have heard a
lot about things like freedom from elaboration or extremes, which is the seventh equality. But
we have not really touched the others. This is just to tell you that study is vast.
[H10] (B) As established in the shastras (582)
The shastra we are referring to here is the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas. As I just mentioned, we
are only going to talk about one of the ten equalities: skye ba mepa, namely, that there is no such
thing as the arising or production of phenomena. Most shastras use the fourth equality to explain
emptiness. We are going to talk about this for a few years, so do not get too excited! We have
enough time to talk about this.
Buddhists says that all phenomena can be classified into two groups: compounded and
uncompounded, or we can say composite and non-composite. It is important for us to agree on
this classification before we embark on the rest of our studies. Can you find a phenomenon that
is neither of these? There is only one possible exception, which is the state of enlightenment.
But we have already discussed this (on p.27). Some scholars say that enlightenment is not a
compounded phenomenon, some say that it is. The Nyingmapas may say it is not even a
phenomenon, so you cannot even begin to classify it into one of these two. So, do you agree
with this classification of composite and non-composite phenomena?
[Q]: Can these two categories be explained in more detail?
[A]: When we talk about things being composite, we need to agree upon the definition of
composite. Strictly, from the buddhist point of view, we define a phenomenon as being
composite if it has the three aspects or characteristics of birth, remaining and cessation.
[Q]: Can’t we say that a composite phenomenon is a gathering of causes and conditions?
[A]: If we say that its characteristic, or definition, is that it is a gathering of causes and
conditions, it will not be pervasive enough. Remember when we talked about the definition
of ‘definition’ (on p.2 in the introduction), that a definition has to be free from three kinds
of fault? The gathering of causes and condition may be a definition of something specific,
but may not cover the general case. For example, if might help with the definition of a
‘sandalwood tree’, but it might not be general enough for the definition of a ‘tree’. We can
always have a debate about this. I can see there is some point to your question, as someone
could argue that the gathering of causes and condition must be the definition of composite
phenomena. But someone could also negate this by saying that the very fact of no gathering
of causes and conditions is also a composite phenomenon. Sometimes the causes and
conditions do not gather, but that very act of not gathering is also a composite phenomenon.
But then, he can extend his argument, saying that in order not to gather, there must be a
cause and condition for the not gathering. It can go round and round, and so I would say
that it is dangerous to definite composite in terms of causes and conditions. I cannot delete
it, but if you were debating in front of monks from Sera University, you would have to be
careful!
[Q]: Can’t the word composite mean that something can be analysed or cut into parts?
We will only talk about
one of the ten equalities:
the absence of birth
The definition of a
composite (or
compounded)
phenomenon: it has birth,
remaining, and cessation
The classification of all
phenomena as composite
(or compounded) or noncomposite
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 75
[A]: Yes that is also fine. In fact, that is the definition made by the Vaibhashika school. This
will come! I am always excited when I talk about the Vaibhashika school, because the way
they define ultimate truth and relative truth is incredibly smart. I think it is especially
relevant nowadays when you face the scientific world and their definition of ultimate truth.
But this is not the time – we will talk about this later.
[Q]: How can non-existent phenomena be composite?
[A]: That’s a very tricky question. Yesterday is not existent today, but it is nevertheless a
composite phenomenon. You might talk about a non-existent phenomenon like the horn of
a rabbit, but if I am a clever debater, I will ask you a question. When you talk about the
horn of a rabbit, I am imagining a horn of a rabbit, although I may attempt to say that there
is no such thing. I have to be careful! Philosophical debate is like a courtroom, and you
have to be very careful about what you say.
[Q]: When we talk about these three aspects of birth, remaining and cessation, it seems as though
we are talking about the categories of space and time.
[A]: Yes. That is very good. We are talking about space and time here, but more about time.
Buddhists do not talk much about space, but if you want to know about how they negate the
notion of space, read Aryadeva’s 400 Stanzas of Madhyamika, which has a thorough
investigation of so-called space.
This is good, because when we talk about time, this brings us back to the definition of a
composite phenomenon. The idea is this. If there is no cessation, then there must be either a
continuum of birth or a continuum of remaining. This leads to a complication. For example, if
there is no cessation of today, then tomorrow will never come. If the cessation of today is nonexistent,
then the remaining of today is always there.
We also talked about whether birth, remaining or death is the most important issue for our
ordinary minds, and we concluded that is birth. Of course, people sometimes think about death
or about living, but these are occasional thoughts. In our day-to-day life, and in many different
philosophies, we are always asking about origins. What is the origin of this? What is the cause
of this? How? Why? That is our habit, which is why it is important. So, here we will deal with
all these questions about birth. In the shastra, the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas, right after
Nagarjuna pays homage, he writes:
All these phenomena have never been born from, grown or produced by self.
They have never been born from or produced by other.
They have never been born from or produced by both,
And they have never been born from or produced by neither (i.e. with no cause).
This sloka is not really a thesis, as we have to remind ourselves that the Madhyamika do not have
theses, but for the time being, we will call it a statement. Nagarjuna made these four major
statements in his Mulamadhyamaka-karikas, and as we study each of these, we will meet all sorts
of sophisticated opponents. For example, in the first of these four, production from self, our
opponent is the Samkhya school. We will have to argue with many very well established and
very intelligent schools, and this will give rise to many difficulties as we study. Debating
production from other is much more difficult than production from self, because our opponents
are not only Hindus, but also include the highest school in Mahayana buddhism apart from
Madhyamika, the Cittamatra. They are also opponents of Madhyamika philosophy here. The
greater that our opponent is, the greater the difficulty that we will have when we study.
It is even more important for you to know that each of these schools represents your emotions,
the way that you think. For example, if I ask Gérard where he was yesterday, he might say that
he was in Montignac having a nice time with Ani Jimpa. And then if I ask him where he was this
morning, perhaps he will say he was with Adrienne. Now, he thinks that the macho man who
was with Ani Jimpa last night is the same as the man who was with Adrian this morning. This is
belief in being born from the self. He will say that he is the same guy. And when he goes back
to Ani Jimpa tonight, he will say that he is still the same guy. But because of his guilty
Can a non-existent
phenomenon be
composite?
How buddhists negate the
notion of space
In ordinary life, we
always ask about origins
and causes
Nagarjuna’s four
statements
These schools represent
our emotions, the way we
think
We will encounter
different opponents as we
go through these
statements
The Vaibhashika
definition of a composite
phenomenon
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 76
conscience, he will act a little differently, which Ani Jimpa will notice. She will say that he is
behaving slightly strangely today, but he will say, “No, I am the same person”. That is belief in
being born from the self.
When the Buddha taught, in order for him to teach, he had to have Brahma and Indra. We should
really thank some of the characters here – like Gérard Godet, Ani Jimpa, Jakob and Adrian –
because without using them as our examples, we cannot teach this. It is a bit like the rabbit’s
horn that was a favourite example of the ancient scholars.
[H11] (i) Identifying the differences between the Prasangika and the
Svatantrika (582)
[H12] (a) In general
We come to a difficulty here. There are two different ways of explaining the four statements
made in this single sloka written by Nagarjuna, which led to two schools of Madhyamika
philosophy in India. These two schools are called the Prasangika-Madhyamika and the
Svatantrika-Madhyamika. Bhavaviveka founded the Svatantrika, and Buddhapalita founded the
Prasangika (See also Introduction, p.8).
The two schools of Madhyamika have many similarities. They both believe that the cause of
samsara is attachment to the self, or ego, as truly existent. And both agree that production from
the four extremes has to be refuted in order to destroy the mind that clings to the truly existent
self of phenomena and the person. If we refer back to the root classification of existence, nonexistence,
both and neither, then production from the four extremes of self, other, both and
neither are all a subdivision of the first extreme, existence. Of course, only something that exists
can have a so-called birth. So, both schools also agree that all these four extremes have to be
refuted. So, the question is how are the two schools different. They are very different in the way
they establish the ultimate view, and in the way that they accept conventional truth.
[H12] (b) Differences in the reasoning by which they determine absolute
truth (589)
There are six major differences in the way that they establish the ultimate view, which
correspond to the six elements of a buddhist syllogism. The six elements of a syllogism are
illustrated by the example below:
The predicate is the thing that you are trying to prove. For example, if you say, “she is
beautiful”, then ‘she’ is the subject and ‘beautiful’ is the predicate. Taking the subject and the
predicate together forms the thesis or proposition; i.e. “she is beautiful”.
The origins of the two
Madhyamika schools:
Prasangika and
Svatantrika
The similarities between
the two schools
The six elements of a
buddhist syllogism
Mental formations are not born from self because they exist like a vase
(1) Subject (2) Predicate (4) Reasoning (5) Example
(3) Proposition = (1)+ (2)
(6) Syllogism = whole phrase, (1) to (5)
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 77
Next, in order to establish that she is beautiful, you give some reasoning, such as “she is
beautiful because she has two noses and four eyes”. Then you give an example, such as “like
Ani Jimpa”. The whole phrase taken together is what we call a syllogism. For example, “she is
beautiful because she has two noses and four eyes like Ani Jimpa”.
You might think that these six things are very plain words, but they are not. If you want to know
the difference between Svatantrika and Prasangika Madhyamika, they all matter. The way we
say things matters a lot. For example, there is a big difference between saying that “the cup is
empty” and that “there is no water in the cup”. Many problems in the world start from when we
take the meaning for granted. For example, if I say, “the cup is empty”, I might expect that you
hear “there is no water in the cup”.
[H13] (i) Subject (chos)
Svatantrika: For the Svatantrikas, the subject is usually very specific, such as ‘mental
formations’. This is due to historical reasons, because many of these Madhyamika scholars
previously belonged to another buddhist school, such as Cittamatra, Sautrantika or Vaibhashika;
they might even have been Hindus. And they would always bring some of their influences from
the past, such as, in this case, having a very specific subject. Returning to our example of a
syllogism:
“Mental formations are not born from self because they exist, like a vase”
This is what the Svatantrikas are trying to say here. Keep in mind that we are going to base our
explanation on the four affirmations of Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna said that things are not born from
the self, and now the Svatantrikas are giving a good reason why.
Mental formations 1 Subject chöchen (chos can)
are not born from self 2 Predicate drubjé chö (bsgrub bya’i chos)
{1 + 2} 3 Proposition/Thesis drubja (bsgrub bya)
because they exist 4 Reasoning tak (rtags)
like a vase 5 Example pé (dpe)
{whole phrase} 6 Syllogism jorwa (sbyor ba)
They are saying that mental formations are not born from self, because they are existent. For
example, like a vase. It is an incredible logic. In order for something to be born from the self, it
must be there before. If it is already there, why are we saying is it born? The logic is so simple,
so incredible, that it might even cause a heart attack! The logic is very simple: because it is
existent. But it has so much meaning! In this way, they conclude that mental formations are not
self-produced.
Prasangika: Although the Svatantrikas will always bring a specific subject such as mental
formations, the Prasangikas do not. Instead, they will add the word “etc.”, and say, “mental
formations etc. are not born from self”. They always prefer to include all phenomena, but the
Svatantrikas do not do this. This is a very big difference. As we will see later, the Svatantrikas
actually have a thesis during the relative truth, so they do not like to say “all phenomena”. They
prefer to make it specific.
[H13] (ii) Predicate (bsgrub bya’i chos)
Svatantrika: The Svatantrikas say “mental formations are not born from themselves in the
ultimate truth”. They would add the words “in the ultimate truth”. They say things like, “in the
ultimate truth, things are not born from themselves or from others”.
It is important not to take
the meaning of words for
granted
Svatantrikas will have a
specific subject, but the
Prasangikas prefer to
include all phenomena
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 78
Prasangika: Now, the Prasangikas do not accept this. They will just say that mental formations
are not born from themselves. Because according to the Prasangikas, even in the relative truth,
things are not born from themselves, from other, from both or from neither. This is another
lion’s roar.
In particular, Chandrakirti belongs to the school that is called ‘Prasangika-Madhyamikas that
accept ordinary experience’. He would definitely not add “in the ultimate truth”. He says that if
in the relative truth you ask a cowherd, where does cow dung come from, they will not talk in
terms of it coming from self, other, both and neither – they will just say it comes from a cow!
Chandrakirti says that this is relative truth, and you do not talk about it any more than that. We
will come to this later. The Svatantrikas accept the distinction between:
• Truly existent den drup (bden grub)
• Existence logically established tsedrup (tshad grub)
The Svatantrikas do not say that things truly exist, because if they said that, then the whole
Madhyamika philosophy would collapse. However, they do accept that in the relative truth,
some things are logically existent. This is why they accept that some things are born from other
in the relative truth, which is why they need to add the words “in the ultimate truth”. In this way,
the Svatantrikas indicate that they accept this in the relative truth. But the Prasangikas do not.
[H13] (iii) Thesis / Predicate (bsgrub bya)
Svatantrika: For the Svatantrikas, both the proponent and opponent must agree that the subject,
in this case “mental formations”, is logically existent. And then, after the subject has been
mutually agreed as logically established, they establish the thesis (in this example, “are not born
from themselves in the ultimate truth”). In other words, they actually have a thesis, which in this
case is that things are not born from the self in the ultimate truth.
Prasangika: For the Prasangikas, firstly the subject does not have to be logically established.
And secondly, the subject does not have to be mutually agreed upon. As long as your opponent
accepts it, it is fine. You, the proponent, do not need to accept it. For example, if you and I are
debating about this conch, if I am a Svatantrika then we must have a mutual agreement that this
is a conch. But if I am a Prasangika, I do not care, because I am a consequentialist. As long as
you think it is a conch, it does not matter whether or not I think it is a conch.
If we ask the Prasangikas, do you have a thesis, they will say, “No, not for myself”. So, we ask
them, why do they say that things are not born from themselves. And they will answer, “We say
this only to clarify your own ignorance. We are not saying it for ourselves, we are saying it for
you”. If a Prasangika says that you are dreaming, they do not have any thesis in there, for
example about themselves not dreaming, or about the non-dreaming of phenomena. They can be
very irritating, because we know they are right, but they have no thesis themselves. You will see
this often later on. An important difference between the Svatantrika and Prasangika methods is
that the Svatantrikas will destroy their opponent’s position by proposing a contrary view, while
the Prasangikas will destroy it by demonstrating that it is incoherent, that it collapses by itself.
[H13] (iv) Reasoning (rtags)
Svatantrika: Here the reasoning is “because they exist”. As with the subject, there must be
mutual acceptance of the reasoning by the opponent and the proponent. In this case, both must
accept that “they exist”, and then using that as a logic, the Svatantrikas will defeat their
opponent. Let us suppose that there is smoke on the hill. A Svatantrika would say, on that hill,
where there is smoke, there is fire because there is smoke. We are talking to someone who sees
The Prasangikas say
things are not born in the
relative truth as well as in
the ultimate truth
Den drup and tse drup:
Two kinds of existence
Chandrakirti relies on the
cowherd to tell us about
relative truth
The Svatantrikas accept
birth in the relative truth
For the Svatantrikas, the
subject must be logically
established and mutually
agreed
The Prasangikas do not
require this
For the Svatantrikas, the
reasoning must also be
mutually accepted
Prasangikas have no
theses. Their method is to
demonstrate that their
opponent’s thesis is
incoherent
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 79
the smoke, who does not really know whether there is a fire or not, and we are trying to convince
him that there is a fire because there is smoke. That’s it; it is simple.
There needs to be mutual agreement on the subject and the reasoning, but not the thesis. The
thesis is what you put in their mind. Both people need to have eyes, and they both need to be
able to see smoke in the distance. They must also know what smoke is, and that smoke comes
from fire, because if you are talking to someone who has never seen smoke or fire, then the logic
will not work.
[Q]: But this does not make sense, as you said that both must logically agree the subject. So if I
see smoke, I must immediately know that there is fire, since I accept that smoke comes from
fire.
[A]: It could be something like this. Perhaps until now you did not see the fire, and while you
are turning away, I suddenly see the smoke, and I say, “Hey, Dominique, there must be a
fire on that hill, because there is smoke”.
Prasangika: Again, for the Prasangikas, this is not necessary. As long as the opponent accepts
the reason, that is fine. If the other person sees smoke, and yet he does not believe there is a fire,
the Prasangikas would say, “Well, in that case, they there should not be any smoke if there is no
fire”. Of course, the Prasangikas must also know that the other person accepts that smoke comes
from fire.
The Svatantrikas say, “There must be fire because there is smoke”. The Prasangikas say, “There
cannot be any smoke because there is no fire”. It is as simple as that. The Prasangikas are more
on the attack, nastier, so to speak. They would say that you will end up with the consequence
that there should not be any smoke, as you say there is no fire but you can see the smoke! You
cannot deny that, so there must be fire.
[H13] (v) Example (dpe)
It is the same here. The Svatantrikas require the example to be mutually agreed by opponent and
proponent, and the Prasangikas accept an example that only the opponent accepts.
[H13] (vi) Syllogism (sbyor ba)
Overall, the Prasangikas do not accept the syllogism for themselves. They do not have their own
so-called inferential logic. Instead, they use only their opponent’s inferential logic to defeat
them. They do not believe in things like “there must be fire because there is smoke”. But
because they know that you believe in this logic, although they do not believe it themselves, they
will use your logic and defeat you. So, these six differences in reasoning make up one of the
essential differences between the two schools. This is another lion’s roar of Nagarjuna:
“I have no thesis, therefore I am innocent. I am free from all faults”.
[Q]: Do the Prasangikas accept logic as a criterion of truth?
[A]: They accept it just to clarify the other person’s doubt. This is a good question, because
many of the Svatantrikas are ex-Sautrantika or ex-Cittamatra. Those two schools are very
logic oriented, and they believe in the so-called undeceiving nature of logic, which the
Prasangikas do not accept. They only accept it for the sake of communication.
[Q]: Do the Prasangikas have a view, given that they have no theses?
[A]: They do not have a view in the ultimate truth, and they do not even have a view in the
relative truth. This is their beauty!
For the Prasangikas, it is
sufficient if the opponent
accepts the reasoning
The Prasangikas do not
accept the syllogism
themselves
Another lion’s roar of
Nagarjuna: “I have no
thesis, therefore I am
innocent”
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 80
I am sure that many people take the approach that in the ultimate truth, such things do not exist;
but in the relative truth, buddhists always go a little bit weak. They say that such things may
work in the relative truth. That is good during the path, but in the theory, when we are
establishing the view, you cannot do that.
At the end of the sixth chapter, our opponent asks, if you do not have a view, why are you doing
this? The Prasangika answer is that it is out of our great compassion, because we know you have
so many problems, and we cannot resist telling you that you have these problems! Therefore, we
have come here to destroy all your views. Whenever His Holiness the Dalai Lama teaches, even
when he was about to receive the Nobel peace price, he chants the following sloka, which
essentially means, “To the lord Buddha, who has no view, I prostrate”:
To the lord Buddha,
Who taught us the view-less teaching,
In order to destroy all views,
I prostrate.
This is actually the aim of the Prasangika Madhyamika, to destroy all views.
[Q]: What about the Four Noble Truths? Surely, they are also a view?
[A]: Yes. The Prasangikas accept all that, but only for the sake of others. But you might ask
them, how could you say that you are debating with your opponents out of your compassion
for them? If you do not have a view, then why do you say that you have compassion?
Their answer is that they are not saying that they have established their compassion as
logically or truly existing. They know very well that compassion is illusion. Yet, the
Prasangikas talk about compassion the most; all is for the sake of other beings. And the fact
that we cannot accept that they do not have a view tells us how strong our emotions are
towards having a view.
[Q]: But it is normal for us to talk of view, meditation and action, so the view is there.
[A]: I have some good advice for you: do not mix these. When we talk of view, meditation and
action, we are talking about the path. Even if you are a Prasangika, you have to teach a
path. And during the path, we talk about view, meditation and action. But right now, we
are establishing the view. The Prasangikas are establishing the view that there is no view,
so for them, establishing the view them means destroying others’ views.
[Q]: What about ground, path and fruition? Doesn’t a view have to include these three?
[A]: Even ground, path and fruition are also path language. If you attain enlightenment now, you
have not studied Madhyamika before, because there is no such thing as ‘before’. There is
no view. Therefore, the fruit is not a result of a certain practice.
[Q]: In the Bodhicharyavatara by Shantideva, who is Madhyamika Prasangika, he says that you
can only have perfect compassion when you have no view. Why is it only then that one can
have perfect compassion? Is what holds back the other views that their compassion is not
perfect?
[A]: I would not put it like that. I am so Sautrantika oriented, and if you put down the
Cittamatrins, I get even angrier!
[Q]: Why is their compassion not perfect?
[A]: I think it is because of this view. When you have grasping, you have no view. But most
people interpret this to mean that you should only have no grasping in the ultimate truth.
But for the Prasangikas, it also applies to the relative truth. This is incredible! This is what
they call the lion’s roar. We will come to this again.
[Q]: When one attains enlightenment, there is no path, so what is more important? It is the path
or enlightenment?
[A]: The path. Without the path, enlightenment is boring! The path is what makes it exciting.
There are three stages of attachment on the path: the first stage is you think you are not
perfect. The second stage of attachment is that you want to be perfect. And the third stage
of attachment is following a path to perfection. One mahasiddha said that our first mistake
is to think that we need a path.
If the Prasangikas have
no view, why do they
teach?
The Prasangikas aim to
destroy all views
The Prasangikas have
compassion without a
view
It is important not to mix
path language and view
language
If you have grasping, you
have no view
The three stages of
attachment on the path
To establish the view that
there is no view, the
Prasangikas must destroy
all views
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 81
With this, we have very briefly finished looking at the differences between Prasangikas and
Svatantrikas based on their approach to the ultimate truth.
[H12] (c) Differences in the way they set out the conventions of relative
truth (592)
In the structural outline, the differences between Prasangikas and Svatantrikas are discussed in
two parts: (a) in the way they establish the view; (b) in the way they accept conventional truth.
We have now come to the second part, which has three points: ground, path and fruit (or result).
[H13] (i) Ground
The Svatantrikas accept that in the relative truth, in the conventional truth, seed and shoot are
different. Therefore, from a seed that is different from the shoot comes a shoot that is different
from the seed. But the Prasangikas do not accept that. There will be a detailed explanation later.
Also, for the Svatantrikas, there is a common ground between composite phenomena and
undeceiving phenomena. In other words, a phenomenon can be both composite and undeceiving.
For the Prasangikas, all composite phenomena are fake or deceiving. No phenomenon is both
composite and undeceiving. This is important if you are studying buddhist logic, but it is not
important here.
The Svatantrikas also say that a valid cognition, such as when you see a fire, is undeceiving. But
for the Prasangikas, a valid cognition can also be deceiving. When the Svatantrikas talk about
valid cognition, they talk about two kinds of cognition – direct and indirect. Therefore, there are
two types of logic system:
• Direct cognition (mngon sum tshad ma). For example, this is a microphone, because
you see it.
• Inferential logic (rjes dpag tshad ma). You do not see the fire, but you see the smoke –
indirect cognition. The existence of fire has been proved with indirect cognition logic.
You will study this further if you study buddhist pramana, logic. The Svatantrikas say that there
are only these two classifications, but the Prasangikas add two more.
• A special example.
• The Buddha’s word, which they say cannot really be classified within direct or indirect
cognition logic.
The next one is important. We normally talk about two kinds of relative truth – valid and invalid
relative truth. According to the Svatantrikas, the classification of valid and invalid relative truth
is only made based on the object. But for the Prasangikas, the classification of valid and invalid
relative truth is made on both subject and object. This is important, and the explanation will
come. So, we have finished the ground, briefly.
[H13] (ii) Path
There are also differences during the path. The Svatantrikas do not accept that shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas understand the selflessness of phenomena, but the Prasangikas say that they do
understand this. If they did not, they could not understand the selflessness of a person. We have
already talked about this (see chapter 1, p.38). According to the Svatantrikas, there is perception
Can a phenomenon be
both composite and
undeceiving?
Can a valid cognition be
undeceiving?
Is the distinction between
valid and invalid relative
truth made only on the
object or the subject as
well?
The Prasangikas have
four types of logic
Are seed and shoot
different in the
conventional truth?
Do shravakas understand
the selflessness of
phenomena?
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 82
of appearance during the meditation time of an arya, a non-samsaric being. But according to the
Prasangikas, there is no perception of appearance.
[H13] (iii) Fruit
The Svatantrikas say that there is a difference between the post-meditation time and meditation
time of a buddha, but the Prasangikas say that there is no difference.
[H11] (ii) Refuting the Svatantrika way (593)
[H11] (iii) Detailed explanation of how the Prasangikas determine the truth
(594)
Now, I want to make a special introduction to the Prasangika Madhyamika before we return to
the text. There is a good key for this, which is the distinction between truly established dendrup
(bden grub), and logically established tsédrup (mtshad grub).
I have already said that both the Prasangikas and the Svatantrikas try to purify the defilement of
considering things to be truly established. This automatically tells us that the Prasangikas have a
path, because the defilement that needs to be purified by the path is this clinging to things as
truly established. The Prasangikas accept that sentient beings are ignorant, which is why they
teach them. But they are not saying that they are logically ignorant. They do not accept things
that are logically established. However, all the views and ideas that have been founded by other
schools are the conclusions of a certain system of logic; this is why the Prasangikas do not accept
these kinds of view.
As a student of Madhyamika philosophy, you should be developing certain habits about how you
say things. While establishing the view, the Prasangikas do not have any assertions. While
establishing the path, such as practising meditation, of course there is ground, a path, a result and
all of that. But if somebody asks if any of these are existent, then this question is coming from
the other department – the department of establishing the view. Questions like “do they truly
exist” or “do they not exist” are part of establishing the view. However, questions like “how can
I have devotion to guru” and “how should I abandon defilements”, are questions related to the
path. These are two different kinds of questions.
It is very simple. Suppose that you ask Chandrakirti whether he has some drinking water in his
house. If you are thirsty, and you really want to drink some water, he will say yes. But if you
are a logician, and you are there to debate with him, then he will be careful and ask you what you
are talking about. There is always a difference between the path, and establishing the view.
[H12] (a) Setting out the Prasangika view
We study this under three categories: (a) establishing the view on one’s own part, (b) refuting
wrong views on the part of others, and (c) refuting objections to the Prasangika view.
[H13] (i) Establishing the view on one’s own part
[H14] (a) What is to be established (594)
• That relative truth is like an illusion
The Prasangikas do not
accept things that are
logically established
Both schools seek to
purify the defilement of
‘truly established’
The difference between
questions related to the
path and the view
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 83
• That absolute truth is free from any elaborations
• That in terms of both there is no truth in appearances
When establishing the view, the Prasangikas are trying to establish two principal things. In
relative truth, that everything is like an illusion, and in the ultimate truth, that everything is free
from extremes.
As you can see, the Prasangikas are not going to say it is only in the ultimate that nothing exists,
but that relatively everything exists. You might almost think that saying everything is an illusion
is actually an ultimate view. And for both, whether you are trying to establish that relatively
everything is like an illusion, or the view that everything is free from extremes, first you have to
negate this clinging to appearance as truly existent. This is very important! You are trying to
establish a relative view, which is illusion, and you are trying to establish an ultimate view,
which is free from extremes. For both, you need to negate clinging to all appearances as
something truly existent. This is why from now on, you will repeatedly hear the word denmé
(bden med), which means “not truly existent”, as it is of primary importance.
[H14] (b) How it is established (595)
In order to establish this, there are two proofs. For those who can accept them, the Prasangikas
will bring quotations from the ngé dön (nges don) sutras, the absolute sutras (or sutras of certain
meaning), not the drang dön (drang don) relative sutras (or sutras of provisional meaning). The
second proof is through the special consequentialist logic of the Prasangikas, which says things
like “you will end up with these consequences if you accept this”.
[H13] (ii) Refuting wrong views on the part of others
[H14] (a) Identifying what is to be refuted
[H15] (i) By means of the path
[H16] (a) All delusory appearances
What needs to be refuted by the path is all the delusions, such as anger, which are to be refuted
by love, compassion, non-duality, bodhicitta, generosity, discipline, and so on.
[H15] (ii) But here, by means of the Buddha's words and logic
Something more needs to be refuted, this time, by the Buddha’s words and logic. So, we need to
talk about the objects of this second kind of refutation. Two things need to be eliminated or
refuted: one based on the object, one based on the subject.
[H16] (a) The object
There are two things to be eliminated or refuted. We cannot say ‘defilements’ here, as that is
path language. Defilements are things like anger, jealousy, and pride, which need to be purified
by the Vajrasattva mantra. But all that is path language, so here we talk about the two things that
need to be refuted.
• The first is labelling created by imputation-ignorance, küntak marigpa (kun brtag ma
rig pa). Please do not get stuck here, because I will explain this later! As Longchen
The Prasangika view:
Relatively, all is illusory.
Ultimately, all is free
from the four extremes
The two types of labelling
that are to be refuted
Negating clinging to
appearances as truly
existing
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 84
Rabjam said, if you want to see the whole view, it is good not to become stuck on the
path. You should go right to the top and then look down.
• The second is labelling created by innate ignorance, lhenkyé marigpa (lhan skye ma rig
pa). Perhaps some of you who have been to a few Dzogchen teachings are familiar with
the words. There are two kinds of ignorance, labelling and innate. Here it is almost the
same, but there is a slight difference. The difference here is that both are labelling.
Imputation is labelling, and innate ignorance is labelling.
[H17] (i) Labelling created by the ignorance of imputation
This first object of refutation includes all the conclusions of all the theoretical schools except the
Prasangika Madhyamika. From now on, we will refer to all other schools of buddhism or
Hinduism apart from the Prasangikas as substantialists, because they believe in substance. Now,
labelling created by the imputation-ignorance (i.e. the kind of ignorance that is imputation) has
two subcategories: exaggeration and underestimation.
[H18] Exaggeration: the extreme of existence
This is also divided into two:
[H19] Self of a person
The self of a person refers to all ideas of self that are established by buddhists and Hindus. Here
we are talking about the label of ‘I’ and ‘me’ that are given by theoreticians. We are not talking
about the idea of self that you create yourself, as in the 3rd sloka of chapter 1: “Initially fixating
on this so-called ‘I’ as an existing self, ‘Mine’ gives rise to grasping”. We are not talking about
that here.
[H19] Self of phenomena
The self of phenomena again refers to all the assertions or labelling by all the Buddhist and
Hindu philosophers, this time about phenomena.
[H18] Underestimation: the extreme of non-existence
The second subcategory is underestimation, which is another type of labelling made by
imputation. Here we are referring to schools like the Charvakas (not to be confused with
shravakas!), and probably the existentialists as well. They do not believe in past lives, cause and
effect, and so on, but only in coincidence. Do not worry that you have to know all this right
away. We have to start somewhere: do not get discouraged. The important thing now is for me
to continue, and create a few landmarks such as Gérard Godet, so that you will remember. When
you write a story, people only remember when something dramatic happens.
[H17] (ii) Labelling created by innate ignorance
Labelling by innate ignorance refers to those who have a theory, or no theories. Whether or not
people belong to a religious or philosophical school like buddhism, they all have a notion of ‘I’.
We have now finished with the object, so we turn to the subject.
[H16] (b) The subject
The beliefs of the
Charvakas
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 85
The subject includes clinging to things as truly existent (bden ’dzin), or apprehending their mere
appearance (mthsan ’dzin).
[H14] (b) Explaining the reasoning by which it is refuted
The Prasangikas use four methods to refute the views of others. These will all come in detail
later on, but in summary, they are:
• Pointing out contradictions in an opponent’s view (’gal ba brjod pa’i thal gyur)
• Using the opponent’s inferential logic (gzhan la grags kyi rjes dpags)
• Reductio ad absurdum: where we use the opponent’s logic to derive conclusions that
the opponent does not accept (rgyu mtshan mtshung pa’i mgo snyoms). For example, if
he says, “I am a human because I have a head”, we might say, “That dog is also a
human because it also has a head”. Here he is trying to prove his view using a
particular logic, but we use his own logic to derive a consequence that he does not want
to prove. You will find that the Prasangikas do this a lot.
• Pointing out circular arguments that prove nothing: (grub byed grub bya dang
mtshung pas ma grub pa). A circular argument arises when the proof that the opponent
is trying to use is the same as what he needs to prove. In other words, the proof is not
yet proven, so it cannot be used as the basis of deriving another proof. For example, it
would be like saying, “this is a head because it is a head”. This is a big mistake, but it is
common for many philosophers to make it.
[H13] (iii) Being rid of any faults for one’s own part (596)
[Note: Rinpoche did not teach specifically under this heading]
[H12] (b) Refuting objections to the Prasangika view (598)
There are two subcategories to “Refuting objections to the Prasangika”: based on establishing
the relative, and based on establishing the ultimate.
Relative: At times in this text, it will seem like the Prasangikas are accepting things. For
example, they might accept that there is smoke, but they do not accept things for themselves.
They are only saying that they agree in order for the other person to understand that there is fire.
Ultimate: When the Prasangikas say they have no assertions, it is important to know that by
saying this, they are not making another assertion. In this way, no logic can ever enter into this
kind of statement, even though it is not a thesis.
This is all an outline and we will begin to go through it in detail after some questions.
[Q]: For people who say they do not affirm any views, it seems as though the Prasangikas have
many views about the ground and the path.
[A]: As I said before, they accept these things during the path, but not during the view.
[Q]: Do the Prasangikas and Svatantrikas agree that self-production does not exist?
[A]: As far as a phenomenon not being self-produced is concerned, they both agree. But there is
a big disagreement in they way they establish this. As I said, the Svatantrikas want to add a
few words; the Prasangikas do not. At a glance, you may not think it is such a big
difference, but later on, you will see why the Prasangika view is exceptional. But then of
course, you are studying Prasangika text, so you will not hear so much about the
The four methods of
refutation used by the
Prasangikas
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 86
Svatantrikas, which is a shame! Ideally, after studying this text, you should study the
Madhyamika Alankara (dbu ma rgyan) by Shantarakshita – let us see what he has to say!
[Q]: Can you say some more about the structural outline you are using?
[A]: I am using Gorampa’s structural outline, but I am deleting all the arguments among the
Tibetan schools. We have not even touched on these so far. You see, there are not only the
arguments between the Prasangikas and Svatantrikas on how to define things, there is also a
debate between Tsong Khapa and Gorampa and all the great Tibetan scholars on how to
define the definitions! I have not even touched on these debates. The commentaries of
Gorampa and Mipham are very similar, although Tsong Khapa has his own unique
presentation. During the arguments about production from other, I might go through some
of the Tibetan arguments, as they are very interesting, and not just a pile of words. But the
approach also depends on the particular school. Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo and Jamyang
Khyentse Chökyi Lodrö set up the Dzongsar school, and they mainly used the commentary
by the Dzogchen Khenpo Zhenga, because it does not have any Tibetan fabrication.
The Madhyamika is a vast study. Over 200 different authors have written commentaries on the
Madhyamika in Tibet alone. But do not think it is hopeless. It is possible for you to learn all
this. It is a matter of interest. You can do it, if a person like me has the energy and interest to
read a complicated novel like Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, with all those names in
Russian, all those happenings and goings back and forth. This is much easier!
Combining study and practice
Somebody asked me a question about how to combine study with practice. Study is like building
a suit of armour. It will help you to develop a diamond-like devotion. You might later realise
that your guru is a sadomasochist transvestite, but if you have diamond-like trust, you may not
fall apart! Study is also important because it is like endless wealth. If you have great wealth,
you can also give it to others. If you have studied well, it also benefits many people.
When it comes to practice, then you are bringing your emotions. Emotions know no logic,
although sometimes they pretend that they know logic. Just look at our emotions – at a certain
point in time, we like things using a particular logic, and then after a few years, we do not like
them, but this time using a different logic! There is no established solid logic. When we are
talking about practice, as long as something goes against your ego’s wish, it becomes a practice.
And for that, meditation is strongly stressed, because meditation, especially shamatha, isolates
the ego from all its distractions. Isolation is the last thing that ego wants, because ego is
fundamentally unhappy with its condition. Ego’s very nature is insecurity: insecurity about its
own identity and its own existence.
Therefore, ego always wants to have all sorts of excuses and distractions in which it can
somehow take refuge, and for a time forget its own insecurity. You should try sitting still
somewhere for a minute! Your hand will move towards a newspaper or to a remote control to
switch on the television. Ego needs to be occupied, but the more you let it occupy itself with
something, the more it settles down and becomes strong. So, we need meditation, which isolates
ego from all these distractions. However, studies like this can also become a distraction. So, you
have a guru. And if he tells you that your meditation is to drink 38 coca-colas a day, then you
should do that! And the less you fabricate the better. Beyond that, I do not know, as I am not
your spiritual master. You need to ask your spiritual master, individually.
We have been omitting
the arguments among the
Tibetan schools
Study is like a suit of
armour and like endless
wealth
As long as something
goes against your ego’s
wish, it becomes a
practice
We need meditation to
isolate ego from
distractions
Studying the view of the
Svatantrikas
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 87
The importance of mind training
When Madhyamika philosophy is taught, the teacher is supposed to remind the students about all
the other types of mind training and lojong from time to time. A strict teacher like Khenpo
Kunga Wangchuk would do this almost every day. He would teach lojong for 45 minutes, and
then spend 45 minutes on the Madhyamakavatara. Unfortunately, we cannot do it that way here,
as the situation is different. But I should remind you of this repeatedly.
Like guru yoga in the Vajrayana teaching, lojong is the essential teaching of all the Mahayana
and all the Hinayana. Without this, there is no ground, because without lojong, one does not see
the futile aspect of samsara. Until we see the futile aspect of samsara, we will remain victims of
the eight worldly dharmas. And if you are victim of the eight worldly dharmas, then you are a
weak person. The eight worldly dharmas are:
Wanting to be praised Not wanting to be criticised
Wanting to gain Not wanting to lose
Wanting to be happy Not wanting to be unhappy
Wanting to be famous Not wanting to be ignored
These eight worldly dharmas are like armour for the ego. Ego wishes to have four of them, and
wishes to not have four of them. From time to time, it is important that we check whether we
are, at this very moment, victims of one or all of these eight worldly dharmas. When I check
myself, I am very much a victim of all of them. For example, if you want to receive some exotic,
high-class Vajrayana teachings, all you have to do is praise me. Of all the eight, I think this is
the biggest problem for me. So, we must check repeatedly whether we have fallen into this trap.
I will give you another example. I realised that when a person is victim of these eight worldly
dharmas, they lose genuineness. For example, I realise that because of my position, I am always
living a very pretentious life. I do not have the shame and embarrassment that I should have.
But I do have the lack of inhibition! So, every move that I make, even blowing my nose, is an
act to draw attention to myself.
When I was last in London, I wanted to check myself. So, I went to Soho, a red light district, and
I came across a young man who was distributing leaflets in the street. These leaflets were for
prostitutes, telephone sex and all that. Then I thought, well, I should try this. I went to him and
asked if I could distribute them for him. He was surprised at first, and he looked at me for a
while. But then he said that if I really wanted to, of course I could. He became very happy and
left. So then, I distributed them. But every time I saw someone Japanese or Chinese who
resembled a Tibetan, I hoped that they were not Tibetan. I worried that they might ask me,
“Rinpoche, in what act for the benefit of sentient beings are you engaged?” Also, some people
started asking me questions once they read the leaflets, such as what should they do next? I did
not know anything, and said that everything is written down there. There was a garbage bin
nearby, and many times, I was tempted to throw all the leaflets in there. But I did not do it, and I
managed to distribute them all!
As I was saying, until we have a good lojong, our emotions will be very rigid. And until your
emotions are flexible, or at least soft, this kind of Madhyamika philosophy might enter your
intellectual head a little bit, but it will not sink into your heart. Your emotions will not accept
The eight worldly
dharmas
Madhyamika should be
taught together with
lojong
Lojong is the essential
Mahayana teaching. It
shows us the futile aspect
of samsara
They are like armour for
the ego, and we need to
check if we are their
victims
The story of Rinpoche
handing out leaflets in
Soho
Until your emotions are
flexible, the Madhyamika
will enter your head, but
not sink into your heart
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 88
that things are not truly existent, that things are not logically existent. With this, let us return to
the text.
[H10] (C) As determined in this text by means of logical reasoning (598)
We are now starting the third subcategory of explaining interdependent arising by means of the
absence of any self in phenomena. The first two were how the Buddha explained it and how it is
explained in the shastra. The third is how it is explained here in this text.
You need to understand a few things here. The Prasangikas are definitely not seeking to negate
the process of birth in general. If you ask Chandrakirti whether his mother gave birth to him, he
would say yes. The problem here is that theologians and theoreticians, from both buddhist and
Hindu schools, have established so many views.
When we talk about truth, it is like a basic instinct that we have. Truth is something that we
adopt, and what is not true, or fake, is something that we do not adopt. For example, we
distinguish between genuine Italian leather – truth – and fake leather made in Thailand. We do
this. You should also notice that without the imitation, there is no such thing as something
genuine. If it were not for imitations, advertisers could not brag about how genuine their
products are. But in the ordinary world distinctions such as fake and truth, genuine and
imitation, are completely taken for granted. There is not much reasoning behind them. The
decisions are mostly made by common or majority agreement, or by direct cognition, such as
when you touch the fire and it has heat, so you decide that from now on it is hot. That is as far as
it goes, and it does not go very far.
I am telling you this because the ideas of true and not true are the basis upon which we develop
our philosophies, ethics, religions and everything else. For example, the Vedic religions have the
idea that God is truth. Again, you can see here that the definition of truth is something that is not
a fake. It is something that is unfabricated, something that has always been there whether you
fabricate it or not, something independent from all causes and conditions. It is like the difference
between magic and non-magic. For example, this tent is true; it is real, because it is not
dependent on a magician. If a magician were somehow to display a magical tent, then it would
be a fake. The magician would have created it, and it would be dependent on him. We would
say that it was his idea, his trick.
So, many of these Vedic religions believe that God is truly existent. It is independent from
causes and conditions; human beings do not fabricate it. It is not a fake; it is there all the time.
And the rest is all maya, or illusion. This is what they believe.
I think that Christianity, Islam and Judaism must also talk about truth and non-truth, although
they may not use this language. We can debate this, but I think that there must be a right and
wrong way of doing things – ethics. Why is going to church every Sunday the right way? There
must be a view, and as we go on, they will say things like it is because God is the only merciful
one, and so on. If we ask why killing is bad, they will have another answer: because it is against
this and against that. The distinction between truth and non-truth is always there. In other
words, they are establishing a truly existent phenomenon.
The Vaibhashika school in buddhism has extensively defeated the idea or notion of God, and
shown that it is a fabrication of whatever the religion. For the Vaibhashikas, only two smallest
The ideas of true and not
true are the basis for all
our philosophies and
religions
Vedic religions believe
that God truly exists, and
the rest is illusion
All other religions also
distinguish true from not
true, i.e. establish a truly
existent phenomenon
We distinguish between
truth, like genuine Italian
leather, and fake, like
Thai imitations
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 89
things exist: a very small thing like an atom, and a very small particle of mind. This is why we
call them Vaibhashika, which means ‘proponent of discrete entities’ (bye brag smra ba). The
Sautrantika view is very similar, although there are some differences. The Cittamatra school has
extensively defeated these ideas of the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas, and they conclude that
only mind is truly existent. Everything else is just an illusion, made in Thailand. Mind is the
only one that is genuine leather.
But Chandrakirti does not believe in genuine leather. Well, he believes in genuine leather, but
not in truly existent genuine leather. He thinks that if it exists, then it has to have a birth. And if
it is truly existent, then it has to come from self, other, both or neither. Since he will refute all of
these possibilities when he examines them, he concludes that it cannot exist. So, if you ask him,
well in that case what would you accept, he would say, “dependent arising”. Without genuine
leather, there is no imitation leather. Without imitation leather, there is no genuine leather.
Genuine is dependent on imitation, and imitation is dependent on genuine. This is his
philosophy, so for him there is no such thing as a real cause.
Chandrakirti will proceed in three stages. He will explain dependent arising, in order to refute
the four extremes of birth. Next, he will explain why everything is dependently arising. And
then he will explain the benefit of understanding dependent arising.
[H11] (i) The use of reasoning to refute the four extreme theories of genesis
(598)
6:8.1-2 Not created by itself, how can it be created by another?
Not created by both, what exists without a cause?
[H12] (a) Explaining the truth of interdependent arising by refuting (the four
extreme theories of) genesis (598)
[H13] (i) The proposition of Nagarjuna in brief, 6:8.1-2
The first two lines of the 8th sloka are a brief presentation of the four affirmations of Nagarjuna.
The first of these, “Not created by itself”, will not be explained thoroughly in this text, but there
is a good explanation in the ninth chapter of Shantideva’s Bodhicharyavatara. Here, our
emphasis is on the second one, “how can it be created by another”, and our opponents will
mostly be buddhist. The third and fourth affirmations are in the second line: “Not created by
both, what exists without a cause”.
[H13] (ii) Detailed explanation of the reasoning (599)
[H14] (a) Autogenesis (Self-Arising)
Here our symbolic opponents are the Samkhya school, which was founded by Kapila, who is
thought to have lived in the 7th century BC. It advocates a quite complicated dualistic vision of
the universe, starting with the old question, what is the universe made of. It leads on to questions
about the true self or, more accurately, telling the true self from that which appears to be self.
According to the Samkhyas, there are two basic categories in the universe: purusha and prakriti.
They say that the history of the world is the history of these two fundamental constituents, which
is quite different from Upanishad thought. From this simple dualism develops a very complex
set of interrelations between purusha, which is like the spirit of atman, and prakriti, which is like
the matter of original nature. The nature of purusha is spirit; it is many spirits. It is being,
consciousness. It is limitless, untainted awareness.
Chandrakirti does not
believe anything is truly
existent. He only accepts
dependent arising
The Samkhya view: the
two basic constituents are
purusha and prakriti
The Vaibhashikas refuted
God, but they were
refuted by the
Cittamatrins, who said
that only mind is truly
existent
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 90
The Samkhyas argue that the world is formed as purusha infuses prakriti, and thereby stimulates
the three states of prakriti, which are called the three gunas. These are activity (rajas in
Sanskrit), inactivity (tamas) and transparency (sattva). This is a very interesting theory – it is the
highest Hindu philosophy. If you are not careful when explaining the Buddha nature, you might
end up talking about something more like purusha.
The gunas interact and play different parts in the development of prakriti. As prakriti is
activated, it becomes buddhi, or intellect, out of which individual egos evolve. Individuals often
confuse their ego with their true self, and liberation can only happen when the true distinction is
understood. The true liberation is obtained at death, when the bonds between purusha and
prakriti are dissolved.
The Samkhya school also believes strongly in causation. This part is important. They argue for
cause, effect and the indestructibility of matter. Scientists say something quite like this. It is
known as the theory of existent effect, which means that the effect already exists in the cause of
all things. So, in some mysterious way, the cause of something pre-exists its effect, although
they are distinct. Consider a jar of clay, for example. The jar is the clay, but it is not the lump of
clay.
The basic idea is that what already exists cannot change, and what is not existent cannot be born.
This is a very good idea! What is there cannot be changed into something else, what is not there
cannot be born. In a way, it is a dualistic view, and they accept that. They are saying that in that
clay, the vase is already there. It is not as though it was clay before and then becomes, or
changes into, a vase. They are saying that the pot is in the clay: the effect exists at the same time
as the cause. I am sure that if I prepare for a few days and then take the side of the Samkhyas,
most of you will end up fumbling with words as you try to attack me. The Samkhyas are a great
school, not just a stupid bunch of people!
[Q]: What happens if the pot breaks?
[A]: Which pot? If you are making another pot with the broken clay, then the other pot already
exists there. Cause and effect exist at the same time. It is known as the theory of the
existent effect. Water has the effect of quenching our thirst. This effect is there, which is
why we drink water. If it did not have the effect of quenching thirst, then no matter how
much water we might drink, it would never quench our thirst. This logic is incredible!
[Q]: Is there a substance that is underneath all this?
[A]: Yes – prakriti, in its three states of rajas, tamas and sattva.
[Q]: But this makes no sense.
[A]: That is good! Because that is exactly what Chandrakirti is saying. You do not need to know
everything about the Samkhya school here; all you need to know is that one of their
essential theories is that the cause already contains the result. Their logic is that what is
existent cannot be changed, and what is not existent cannot be born. So, within the clay,
there must be a pot. If the pot does not already exist there, then it cannot be born. So, no
matter how a potter might try to make a pot, he could never create one.
[Q]: If the effect already exists in the cause, we cannot speak of the theory of causality.
[A]: I am not defending them! We will come to all this shortly.
[H15] (i) Reasoning from the commentary (Madhyamakavatara)
[H16] (a) Autogenesis refuted by suchness
[H17] (i) Untenable consequences explicit in the opponent’s statement
I do not know how you are finding things like these syllogisms. You might think that we are
learning new things here, but we are not. We are learning something that we have always done,
The three gunas: rajas,
tamas, and sattva
Liberation is obtained at
death, when the bonds
between purusha and
prakriti dissolve
The Samkhya view is
known as the theory of
existent effect – the cause
contains the result
What exists cannot
change, and what does
not exist cannot be born –
the pot is in the clay
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 91
but in order to study a philosophy, we have to learn about our normal habits using words and
categories. This is why you might find it difficult.
Even when a cook boils an egg, there is a complete syllogism and a complete inferential logic. If
you have this much water, this much heat and this much fire in the stove, the egg will be cooked
around this time. So now you might ask, why do we need to study this? We need to study this
because we are trying to prove something that cannot be directly cognised, like the fire on the
hill. That is not an object of direct cognition. But if you can see the smoke, then you can say
that there must be fire. This is the syllogism, the inferential logic, and we have drawn
conclusions this way for many centuries. It is similar in this case, when we talk about the
refutation of ‘born from the self’, or autogenesis. However, the root text is very condensed, and
you may find it hard to follow, so I will explain it briefly and then we should have a discussion.
[H18] (a) Such genesis would be meaningless (Buddhapalita’s refutation),
6:8.3-4
6:8.3-4 There is no purpose in something already arisen arising again.
What is already arisen cannot arise again.
Chandrakirti starts to negate self-birth in the third line of the 8th sloka. The third and fourth lines
of the 8th sloka are Buddhapalita’s refutation. He argues that if things are born from the self, then
there is no purpose or benefit to the act of birth. The act of birth is not even necessary if things
are born from the self, because they are already there. As we have seen, the Svatantrikas say that
mental formations are not born from the self because they are existent. You can only have the
idea of birth for something that does not already exist. There was no flower in your garden
before, but now it is being born.
Do not think that this is complicated. It is very simple. If something is already there, then it
cannot be produced, because it is already there. If something is born from the self, then there
must already be a self there that is giving birth. And if the self is already there, then what is the
point of being born? The whole purpose of so-called taking birth is that you do not have a child,
so you produce a child. But here, the child is already there. If somebody walks into the tent and
says she has come from the kitchen – that is our ordinary conception. But in this kind of
analysis, she was already here. That coming from the kitchen does not exist. These are hidden
simple aspects of life. They are very simple, but they usually remain hidden in our lives. The
important thing to remember is that the Samkhyas say the result is already there.
The Samkhyas are saying that cause and effect have one essence, and that the cause contains the
result. In the ninth chapter of the Bodhicharyavatara, Shantideva negates this argument, saying
that in this case, when you eat rice, you must be eating shit (9:135.3-4). You might argue that
there is a potential of shit there, and that this is what you are eating. But because the Samkhyas
believe in things being truly existent, they cannot use the word ‘potential’. They believe that
purusha is truly existent, that prakriti is the wealth of the purusha, and that purusha enjoys the
prakriti. Purusha, the atman, is truly and permanent existent, so they cannot even dream of
talking about potential. Words like ‘potential’ belong to the dependent arising school, people
like us.
[H18] (b) No genesis would ever actually occur (Chandrakirti’s refutation),
6:9.1-2
6:9.1-2 If you truly believe something already created could recreate,
Production such as germination could not occur in ordinary experience.
Even in boiling an egg,
there is a complete
syllogism
We use syllogisms to
prove something that
cannot be directly
cognised
If things are self-born,
birth has no purpose, as
they are already there
Shantideva refutes selfbirth
in the ninth chapter
of the Bodhicharyavatara
The Samkhyas cannot talk
of ‘potential’, because
they believe in things
being truly existent
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 92
The first two lines of the 9th sloka are a new negation by Chandrakirti. The Samkhyas say that
cause and effect have one essence, so they are saying that the seed comes from the seed, because
they are one essence. This is another Prasangika method of attack. Since the Samkhyas believe
things have the same essence, they are saying that seed is producing seed. In this case, there will
never be a time with a shoot. The occurrence of shoot can never exist at all, because the time is
totally occupied by the seed.
[H17] (ii) Conflicting consequences implicit in the opponent’s statement
[H18] (a) Such genesis would be endless, 6:9.3-4
6:9.3-4 Or a seed would continue to recreate until the end of existence –
What [sprout] would ever cause it to cease?
The third line is very similar to the first two lines, but concentrating more on the seed. Here the
Samkhyas will have the consequence that the seed will continue forever, so the shoot will not
have a chance to arise. The fourth line is almost like an answer to a question, which is hidden
here. The question, or objection, from the Samkhyas is that when a seed produces a shoot, the
condition of the seed gradually changes because of things like water, earth, moisture and warmth
and so the seed gradually becomes a shoot. Chandrakirti’s answers: how can it destroy itself,
because according to the Samkhyas, the causes and conditions are not separate from the shoot. If
they are separate, their theory is that phenomena are other-born, not self-born.
[H18] (b) The nature of cause and effect would be mixed up, 6:10.1-2
6:10.1-2 A sprout different from its instigating seed – with a distinct form,
Colour, flavour, potency and ripening – could then not exist.
The first and second lines of the 10th sloka say that for the Samkhyas who believe in the selfborn,
a consequence will be that the cause and the result will become mixed up. In other words,
he is saying you could never differentiate between the seed and the shoot, in terms of their
colour, flavour, potency or ripening, because they are the same.
[H18] (c) Cause and effect would be both different and the same, 6:10.3-11
6:10.3-4 If the self-substance of the previous vanishes,
As it assumes another nature, what remains of its suchness?
The two next lines are saying something like this. When you make yoghurt, you start with milk.
But when the milk becomes yoghurt, you cannot say that the yoghurt is a different entity from
the milk. You will not find a shoot that is a totally different entity from a seed. Another example
is enlightenment. When you attain enlightenment, we Vajrayana people say things like this
person gets enlightenment, this Buddha nature becomes awakened. The result is already there;
all you need to do is realise this. But because you do not realise this, you create a separation
between cause and effect. And that is delusion, which in turn creates all this illusion.
Chandrakirti’s negation here is in the form of a question. He asks them: if the previous selfsubstance,
such as the seed or milk, vanishes into another nature like yoghurt, then what remains
of its reality or suchness? He is asking them, what remains of the thing that they call self-born?
If something is self-born, then that same suchness must remain, but they have said that it is
already transformed.
External conditions like
warmth and moisture
cannot change a seed into
a shoot, as then it would
no longer be self-born
If things are self-born,
cause and result cannot
be distinguished
Objection: seed
transforms into shoot, but
they are not totally
different entities
If cause and effect have
one essence, then seed
must produce seed
If things are self-born,
their suchness must
remain. It cannot be
transformed
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 93
6:11 If in ordinary experience seed is not different from sprout,
You could have perception of neither seed nor sprout.
And, if they were the same, when seeing the sprout,
You should also see the seed. Thus, your thesis is unacceptable.
If the seed is not different from the shoot, then the consequence for the Samkhyas is that in the
same way that they cannot perceive the seed, they also will not see the shoot. Or because they
are the same, then when they see the shoot, they should also see the seed. Now he negates selfborn
even in the relative, conventional truth.
[H16] (b) Autogenesis refuted by ordinary conventional experience, 6:12.1-2
6:12.1-2 Because a result is seen upon disappearance of the cause,
To say they are the same is not accepted even in ordinary experience.
Even in the ordinary experiences, although the cause such as milk exhausts, we can still see the
result like yoghurt. That’s why even in ordinary experience, ordinary people would not say that
cause and effect are one, because ordinary people would say that it was milk before and it has
now become yoghurt. They would say that they are separate. This is why a thesis that believes
in things being born from the self, such an imputation, cannot be accepted not only in the
ultimate truth, but even in the conventional truth.
[H16] (c) Concluding summary of these two, 6:12.3-4
6:12.3-4 So-called creation from a self, when properly investigated
Is impossible, in suchness as well as ordinary experience.
[H15] (ii) Reasoning from the commentary (Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarikas),
6:13
6:13 If creation arises from a self, it follows that the created, the creator,
The act and the agent all are the same.
As these are not one, this ascertation is impossible,
As there will follow the shortcomings already extensively explained.
In conclusion, if one asserts that things are born from the self, then the one that is created, such
as smoke or shoot, will become the same as the creator, like the fire or the seed. In addition, an
act such as writing, and the agent, the writer, will also become the same. That is not possible,
because there are so many shortcomings that we have already explained.
Discussion on production from self (auto-genesis)
So, we have gone through this briefly, and we will go back and discuss it a little more. But first,
I would like to know where your difficulties are with this, or what you cannot accept. One of the
If seed and shoot are not
different, you should see
both of them together or
neither of them
Cause and effect are
separate in ordinary
experience. This refutes
the Samkhyas
In conclusion, the creator
and the created must be
the same, which is
impossible
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 94
biggest problems here is that not knowing much about the Samkhyas, our opponent. So, please
ask some questions.
[Q]: Can you summarise the problem with the Samkhyas?
[A]: What Chandrakirti is unhappy about is that they are trying to establish a truly existent
phenomenon here, purusha, and a prakriti which is like self-born. So, because you say they
are truly existent phenomena, he refutes them with several different arguments. For
example, they say that things are born from the self. Birth means that you produce
something that you do not already have. Otherwise, what is the point of producing? What
is produced? And if you do not have it already, how can it be born from something you do
not have? If you separate these two words – born and self – there is a contradiction. It is
not only a contradiction; it is meaningless. And it is not only meaningless; it is useless,
because it is already there. But there is a big danger here, because we are trying to make it
sound very simple to attack the Samkhyas, and I do not want to do this. They are very
tough people. Actually, all we need to do is delete the word truly existing, and what they
say makes a lot of sense. For example, they are saying that the conch has a sound. And this
is true. But where they went wrong is that they said it is truly existent. If you were to ask
Chandrakirti “Where does the nice sound of the conch come from?”, then conventionally
speaking, he would say it is dependent arising. Mouth depends on the conch, conch
depends on mouth and sound depends on conch and mouth: dependent arising. But the
Samkhyas want to create a god, purusha, which is a truly existent creator. That is where
they went wrong.
[Q]: If we use ordinary conventional experience to refute the Samkhya argument, then why don’t
we accept other-arising as true, since this is accepted by ordinary conventional experience?
[A]: You will see when come to discuss the other-born. Today, our hero said that self-born is not
accepted by ordinary people. But tomorrow, when we talk about other-born, he will say that
ordinary people would say “I planted this tree”, “I planted this son in my wife’s womb”:
they do not accept the other-born. He will slip to the other side again! Ordinary people are
like Madhyamika people: they are flexible, and they do not analyse. The only difference is
that ordinary people just accept a certain reality, but the Madhyamikas analyse and find out
that things are dependent arising. Ordinary people do not have a path, but the Madhyamikas
have a path.
[Q]: I think we are misrepresenting the Samkhya position. We are analysing things that they say
do not truly exist as if they truly exist. It seems to me that they are saying that Atman truly
exists. When they say that all these phenomena are born from self, it is just a linguistic
convention of theirs. What they mean is exactly what you mean. Things cannot actually be
born from the self; they are an illusion. It seems as if they are born from the self, and it
seems as if they have a separate nature, but in fact, they do not. They are all the Atman. So,
we have separated their argument, and we are agreeing with them while also trying to show
that they are absurd.
[A]: The only trouble here is the truly existing. They believe in truly existent Atman, whereas
we do not believe in truly existent emptiness or dependent arising.
[Q]: But they say that atman is limitless. It has no beginning, so it was not born.
[A]: But that is self-contradictory. They cannot both say that atman truly exists and that it is
limitless.
[Q]: Can you explain how they understand time?
[A]: They say that time is illusion; it is maya. They are only slightly different from buddhism, I
think. In the Vajrayana, the Samkhyas are so highly praised that their view actually
qualifies as a defilement that needs to be purified by the first initiation, the vase initiation.
They are very high.
[Q]: Do the bodhisattvas have the view that we are trying to establish here?
[A]: A bodhisattva on the sixth bhumi does not have the three fetters, and because of that, he
does not have the clinging to the view of the Samkhya school. But nor does he have
clinging to the view of the Madhyamika school, because he does not have clinging to any
view. But right now, we are establishing a view for ordinary people like us. We are
gradually beginning to establish a view by negating the four corners of birth from self,
The main problem with
the Samkhyas is that they
try to establish truly
existent phenomena
Ordinary people are
flexible and do not
analyse, but they have no
path
Bodhisattvas do not cling
to any views, but we need
to establish a view for
ordinary people like us
The Samkhyas believe in
truly existent Atman, but
we don’t believe in truly
existent emptiness
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 95
other, both, and neither. Today we are starting by negating the first corner, which is selfborn.
[Q]: But what about when we talk about the bodhisattva seeing the gift, the giver and the
recipient all as empty?
[A]: That is totally different. The key here is truly existent. Bodhisattvas do not believe in truly
existent emptiness. So, a bodhisattva understands the unity of these three by understanding
that the three do not truly exist. This is why they cannot become one. For the Samkhyas,
although they are also trying to say that they are all one, the difficulty is that they say they
are based on truly existent purusha and prakriti. This is the problem.
I think that the theory of self-born is actually quite difficult to communicate. Most of the time, if
we are students of a philosophy, science, technology or whatever, we are usually more oriented
towards the other-born. The self-born theory is almost something religious. I do not think that
scientists talk about self-born, do they? Scientists do not have this problem of truly existent, do
they? Of course, they still cling to truly existent emotions, but they do not try say that these are
theoretically established.
Let me give a simple example. I am. I have a clinging to a truly existent self. I am true. I am
not like a rainbow; I feel pain when something hits me, I have emotions. Then I start a school,
and after much analysis, I found that I am truly existent. That is a theory. It is the worst kind,
because you already have your own share of problems, but now you are creating a new problem
for yourself.
Chandrakirti has compassion towards the kind of ignorance like feeling ‘I am truly existent’. He
has very gentle compassion, and he gives us a path for this – compassion, bodhicitta and so on.
But if I have created an idea or ideology of ‘I’, he has a very wrathful compassion. He does not
teach me compassion or give me any meditation instructions. First, he will use my own logic
and defeat me. He will show that my establishment of this self is wrong. Ordinary people do not
share the ideas of the Samkhyas. Do you think that you are purusha? No, you think you are
John, or whatever. Scientists fall into this second category.
[Q]: But modern science is showing that the mind depends on the brain.
[A]: If you say that brain is mind, I will accept that. Buddha also said it. Brain is part of the
kamsum (khams gsum), the three realms. Buddha said everything is mind, so brain has to be
mind! But mind is not brain; there is a difference. There is a problem if you think that
mind is brain. Let us suppose that the brain presently sitting in your head, and all its brain
cells, are all in good condition. And then I show you six objects in front of your head.
There is no sickness and no dysfunction, and there are six objects, so the brain has to
perceive all six objects simultaneously. But the brain chooses not to see all of them, and
that choice comes from habitual patterns. This demonstrates that mind is not brain (see
discussion starting on p.240).
[Q]: The brain is a systemic organ. Science has shown that habitual patterns are created while
young people are growing up, so what you are saying is not necessarily true.
[A]: All right. We will come to this during other-production anyway. Debating with scientists is
so difficult, because they do not have an established view! They are always changing their
view, every century, every year, even every time they have a conference! When the Buddha
taught the reality of the phenomena, he said that even before the Buddha came to this earth,
it was like this. And even after all the buddhas have gone, it will still be like this. Even if
buddhas are teaching something completely wrong, reality will never change. We do not
need conferences; we do not need discussions. It is there, it has been like this, it is going to
be like this and it is like this right now.
[Q]: But who is there to say this?
[A]: Nobody has to be there to say this. That reality is simply dependent arising.
There is nothing exotic, colourful, or interestingly shaped – just dependent arising. That’s it. As
long as there are some crazy scientists who think that they have found what is ‘smallest’, then the
Bodhisattvas do not
believe in truly existent
emptiness
Clinging to self is simply
ignorance, but creating a
theory about self is the
worst kind of problem
Chandrakirti has gentle
compassion to clinging to
self, but is wrathful
towards theories of self
The Samkhya view
conflicts with ordinary
experience: do you think
you are purusha?
The view of science is
always changing, but the
reality of phenomena
never changes
Showing that brain is
mind, but mind is not
brain
Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche – Madhyamakavatara – 1996 Chapter 6 – 96
mind that thinks ‘this is the smallest’ is very much dependent on the object ‘smallest’. And the
object ‘smallest’ is dependent on the crazy mind that decided that it is the smallest. And this is
why at times you will find it said in buddhism that reality is inexpressible and unthinkable. That
is not an excuse; it is the best answer. As soon as you try to express it, reality is deformed; it
becomes paralysed, like a vegetable, as soon as we speak. But despite that, I would still tell you
that reality is simply dependent arising.
I think this is an incredible finding. But the Samkhyas do not believe in dependent arising. They
do not believe that purusha is dependent on anything. Ah! If only they would say that purusha
is also dependent, then they would be accepting th